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Robert A. Anderson, ISB #2 1 24. 
Mark D. Sebastian, ISB #6012 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
C. W. Moore Plaza 
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 7426 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Telephone: (208) 344-5800 
Facsimile: (208) 344-551 0 
E-Mail: randerson@ajhlaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
LESLIE WEINSTEIN, and LINDA 
WEINSTEIN, Husband and Wife, 
individually and as Guardians ad litem far 
SARAH R. WEINSTEIN, and SARAH R. 
WEINSTEIN individually 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND 
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY and 
PRUDENTIAL GENERAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY and LIBERTY MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY and LM 
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 
INSURANCE, 
Defendants. 1 
Case No. CV PI 0400280D 
SECOND AMENDED ANSWER TO 
PLAINTIFFS' FOURTH AMENDED 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR 
TRIAL BY JURY 
COME NOW, Defendants PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 
INSURANCE COMPANY and PRUDENTIAL GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY and 
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and LM PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 
SECOND AMENDED ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' FOURTH AMENDED c o M P L A I N T Q Q B 2 1 3  
DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY - 1 
, J 
INSURANCE, in  the above-entitled action by and through their counsel of record, 
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP, and hereby Answer Plaintiffs' Fourth Amended 
Complaint and Demand for Trial by Jury (hereinafter, "Complaint") as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
The Complaint fails t o  state a claim against these answering Defendants 
upon which relief can be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
1 .  
Defendants deny each  and every allegation contained in Plaintiffs' Complaint 
not  specifically admitted herein. 
2. 
Defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraph 2 o f  Plaintiffs' 
Complaint. 
3.  
With regard t o  the allegations contained in paragraph 3 of Plaintiffs' 
Complaint, Defendants admit only that  Liberty Mutual lnsurance Company and LM 
Property and Casualty lnsurance are insurance companies that  are authorized t o  sell 
insurance in the State of Idaho and that  Liberty Mutual lnsurance Company 
purchased Prudential Property and Casualty lnsurance Company on  November 1. 
2003.  
900211 SECOND AMENDED ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT A D 
DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY - 2 
4. 
Defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of the 
Complaint. 
5. 
With regard t o  the allegations contained in paragraph 7 of Plaintiffs' 
Complaint, Defendants admit only that Sarah Weinstein was an occupant of the 
vehicle driven by Linda Weinstein. 
6. 
Defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraph 8 of the Complaint. 
7 .  
With regard to  the allegations contained in paragraph 9 of the Complaint, 
Defendants admit only that the incident which occurred on September 30, 2002, 
was an occurrence under the policy issued t o  the Weinsteins, but deny the 
remaining allegations contained therein. 
8. 
Defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of 
the Complaint. 
9. 
With regard t o  the allegations contained in paragraph 13  of the Complaint, 
Defendants only admit that an automobile collision occurred on September 30, 
2002, that said collision qualifies as an occurrence under the Policy of insurance, 
but deny the remaining allegations contained therein. 
SECOND AMENDED ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT A a00212 
DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY - 3 
10. 
With regard t o  the allegations contained in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, 
Defendants only admit that Sarah Weinstein received medical treatment, and that 
the total amount of medical bills incurred by Sarah as described in the Complaint 
total approximately $14,500, but deny the remaining allegations contained therein. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
- 
A t  all times relevant t o  the allegations for failure t o  make multiple advance 
payments under the uninsured motorist provision of the Policy, the answering 
Defendants were relying upon the advice of counsel. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
The Defendants have fully performed in  good faith each term of the 
agreement between them and Plaintiffs. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
In the event Plaintiffs recover a verdict or judgment against Defendants, then 
said verdict or judgment must be reduced by the laws of the State of Idaho, by 
those amounts which have been, or will, w i th  reasonable certainty, replace or 
indemnify Plaintiffs, in whole or in part, for any past or future claims of economic 
loss, for any collateral source such as insurance, social security, workers' 
compensation or employee benefit programs. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
SECOND AMENDED ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT 400213 
DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY - 4 
Without admitting that there was an intentional or unreasonable delay or 
denial of Plaintiffs' claim, any alleged delay or denial was fairly debatable or was 
the result of an honest mistake. 
SEVENTH DEFENSE 
That a condition precedent of Defendants' obligations has not occurred 
andlor that Plaintiffs may have violated or failed t o  comply wi th  certain conditions 
of the insuring agreement thereby discharging these answering Defendants from 
obligations under the insuring agreement with respect t o  the claims set forth in 
Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
That the fault of Plaintiffs was equal t o  or greater than the fault of 
Defendants, if any, and that said Plaintiffs' fault was the sole, direct and proximate 
cause of any damages andlor injuries suffered by Plaintiffs. 
NINTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' actions have prevented the Defendants from performing their 
contractual obligations, if any. 
TENTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs failed to  take reasonable steps to  mitigate the claimed or alleged 
damages. 
000214 
SECOND AMENDED ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 
DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY - 5 
ELEVENTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state a claim for relief against the Defendants, 
either separately or collectively, entitling Plaintiffs t o  punitive damages in 
accordance wi th  ldaho Code § 6-1 604. 
REQUEST FOR ATORNEY'S FEES 
Defendants request that they be awarded their attorneys fees and costs 
incurred herein pursuant t o  the provisions of ldaho Code § § 12-1 20 and 12-1 21  
and I.R.C.P. 54. 
DEMEND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Defendants hereby demand a trial by jury in accordance wi th  the previsions 
of Rule 38(b) of the ldaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
WHEREFORE, having answered, Defendants pray that Plaintiffs take nothing 
by their Fourth Amended Complaint, that the same be dismissed, and that the 
Defendants be awarded their attorney fees and costs incurred herein. 
DATED this 3)'day of May, 2007. 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
Attorneys for Defendants 
0002.15 
SECOND AMENDED ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 
DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY - 6 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
9 I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 3day of May, 2007, 1 served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing SECOND AMENDED ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' FOURTH 
AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY by delivering the 
same to  each of the following attorneys of record, by the method indicated below, 
addressed as follows: 
James Risch [ I U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
RlSCH GOSS INSINGER GUSTAVEL [ 1 Hand-Delivered 
407 W. Jefferson Street [ I Overnight Mail [Bl Facsimile Boise, ID 83702 
h k  a.i* 
Mark D. Sebastian 
6)00216 SECOND AMENDED ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT ND 
DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY - 7 
LN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRIJZ' OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR TJiE COUNTY OF ADA 
LESLIE WINSTELN and LINDA 
WEINSTEm, Husband and Wife, 
individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for 
SARAH R. WEmSTEm, and SARAH R. 
WEINSEW, individually, 
Plaintiffs, 
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND 
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY 
and PRUDENTm GENEiRAL 
LNSURANCE COMPANY and LIBERTY 
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and 
LM PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 
INSURANCE, 
Defendants. 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Case No. CV PI 04002301) 
1 
1 SPECIAL VERDICT 
j 
) 
1 
j 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
-1 
We, the jury, answer the questions submitted to us in the special verdict as follows: 
COUNT I 
CLAIM OF BAD FAITH OF LINDA AND LESLIE WEINSTEIN 
OWSTION NO. I: Was there a breach of contract on the part of the defendants as to the 
medical payments provision of the insurance contract? 
If you answered the above question "Yes," then please answer Question No. 2. If you 
answered the above question ""No," then proceed to Question No. 3. 
Did the defendants' commit bad faith in handling the medical 
payments coverage which was the proximate cause of damage to Linda and Leslie Weinstein 
d 
YES NO i" 
- Was there a breach the part of the defen 
the uninsured motorist provision of the insurance contract? 
/ 
YES 
*/Lbc.- 
If you answered the above question "Yes," then please answer Question No. 4. If you 
answered both Questions No. 1 and Question No. 3 "No", please proceed to answer the question 
for Count III. 
.QUESTION NO. 4: Did the defendants' commit bad faith in handling the uninsured 
motonst provlslon 
and Leslie Weinstein? 
If you answered Question No. 2 and or Question No. 4 "Yes", then please answer 
Question No. 5. If you answered the above question "No," then proceed to answer the questions 
for Count Ln. 
OWSTION NO. 5: What is the total 
Weinstein as a result of defendant's bad faith? 
d 
ANSWER:$ 2\01 boo 
If you awarded damages in response to Que 
Count 11, Punltive Damages. 
COUNT 11 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
damages? 
QUESTION NO. 2: If you answered "YES" to t is the total amount 
of punitive damges you award? 
ANSWER $ 
Please now answer the question for Count HI, as to 
COUNT I11 
DAMGES AS TO SARAH 'WEINSTEIN 
OUESTION NO. 1 What is the total amount of damages sustained by Sarah Weinsreln 
as a result of the accident which occurred on September 30, 2002? You should include the total 
amount of dmages and do n 
court will make that calculation. 
only the foreperson need sign. If the vote is less than unanimous but nine or greater, each person 
voting in favor of the verdict should sign. 
DATED this day of 
Foreperson 
JAMES E. RISCW (ISB ii1224) 
R. JOHN INSINGER (ISB if1678) 
JASON S. RISCI-I (ISB #6655) 
RISCH GOSS mSINCER GUSTAVEL 
407 West Jefferson Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702-6049 
Telephone: (208) 345-9974 
Facsimile: (208) 345-9982 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAI10, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
L,ESLIE WEINSTEPN and LINDA ) 
WEINSTEN, Husband and Wife, ? 
individually and as Guardian Ad Litern for ) Case No. CV PI 0400280D 
SARAH R. WEINSTEIN, and SARAH R. ) 
WEINSTEIN, individually, ? JUDGMENT 
1 
Plaintiffs, 1 
? 
vs. ) 
1 
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND 1 
CASUAL,TY INSURANCE COMPANY ) 
and PRUDENTIAL GENERAL ? 
INSURANCE COMPANY and LIBERTY ) 
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and ) 
LM PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 1 
INSURANCE, ? 
1 
Defendants. 1 
The above-entitled matter having been tried to a jury, and the jury having rendered its verdict; 
Judgment is hereby entered in favor of LESLIE WEINSTEIN and LINDA WEINSTEIN, 
plaintiffs, against LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE: COMPANY, defendant, in the amount of s;4 \ t w o  ~~ .)p, h q c ~ h  Dollars ($ 6, a lo, o 00 00 ). 
IT IS SO ORDERED This [ &day of October, 2007 
HON. DARLA S. WILLIAMSON, District Judge 000221 
Robert A. Anderson, ISB #2124 
Mark 0. Sebastian, lSE3 #6012 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & MULL LLP 
C. W. Moore Plaza 
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 7426 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Telephone: (208) 344-5800 
Facsimile: (208) 344-55 10 
E-Mail: randerson 8 ajhlaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
LESLIE WEINSTEIN, and LINDA 
WEINSTEIN, Husband and Wife, 
individually and as Guardians ad litern for 
SARAH R. WEINSTEIN, and SARAH R, 
W EINSTEIN individually 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND 
CASUALTY INSUWNCE COMPANY and 
PRUDENTIAL GENERAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY and LIBERN MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY and LM 
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 
INSURANCE, 
Case No. CV PI 04002800 
MOTION TO CONTACT JURORS 
(Oral Argument IS Requested) 
Defendants. 
COME NOW, Defendants in the above-entitled action, by and through their 
counsel of record, Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP, and, pursuant to the Court's order 
entered on October 1, 2007, hereby move this Court for its order permitting Defense 
counsel to contact jurors. 
The Court should grant this motion for the foliowing reasons: 
MOTION TO CONTACT JURORS - I 000222 
u 10/05/2007  FRI 08 :22  ITX/RX NO 741 21 
a u r  v u i  u r  U U .  uo r A A  L U O J  ANDERSON, JUL14W, @ 0 0 4  
- .- 
( I )  The Court has given 1DJi 1 .I?, instnrcting the jury that they need not speak to 
either party, and to contact 'the Court if a party persists in attempting to 
communicate with them; 
(2) Idaho Rule of Evidence 606 restricts the admission of evidence from jurors that 
would tend to impeach a verdict; 
-7 
(3) Per Rufe 606, a party is pemiBed to inquire and obtain evidence as to whether 
extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention 
or whether any outside influence was impropedy brought to bear upon 
(4) Plainti~shotion improperly prevented Defendants from communicating 
jurors immediately following entry of the verdict, but evidence o 
influence or prejudicial information is best raised in a motion for new trial, which 
must be brought within 14 days of the entry of judgment, and therefore this 
Court's prohibition has potentially prejudiced Defendants right to bring a motion 
for new trial; 
(5) Oppos~ng counsel has had notrce via the hearing and discussion on Plaintiffs' 
October 1, 2007 motion to prohibit contact with the jurors, and through this 
motion, of Defendants' interest in contacting the jurors; and, 
(6) Legal counsel should be permitted to inquire of the jurors in order to learn and 
improve counsel's skills as an advocate. 
For these reasons, the Court should grant Defendants' motion and permit 
Defendants to contact the jurors. 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED, 
DATED this H 6 a y  of October, 2007. 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
BY 
a,/\ I
Mark D. Sebastian, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
MOTION TO CONTACT JURORS - 2 
10 /05 /2007  FRT 0 8 : 2 2  I T K / R X  KO 74121 
ANDERSON, JUL1.W 6Jj - g i I i "  
g 
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1 HEREBY CERTIFV that on this ay of October, 2007, 1 sewed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION NTACT JURORS by delivering the same 
to each of the following allomeys of record, by the method indicated below, addressed 
as follows: 
James Risch US. Mail, postage prepaid 
RISCH GOSS INSINGER [ ] Hand-Delivered 
GUSTAVEL Overnight Mail 
407 W. Jefferson Street. Facsimile 
Boise, ID 83702 
Mark 0. Sebastian 
MOTION TO CONTACT JURORS - 3 
Robert A. Anderson, ISB No. 21 24 
Phillip J. Collaer, 1SB No. 3447 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
C. W. Moore Plaza 
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 7426 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Telephone: (208) 344-5800 
Facsimile: (208) 344-55 1 0 
E-Mail: 
pcollaer@ajhlaw .corn 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DfSTRlCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
LESLIE WEINSTEIN, and LINDA 
WEINSTEIN, Husband and Wife, 
individually and as Guardians ad litern for 
SARAH R. WEINSTEIN, and SARAH R. 
WEINSTEIN individually, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND 
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY and 
PRUDENTIAL GENERAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY and LIBERTY MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY and LM 
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 
INSURANCE, 
Defendants. I 
J- DAVID NiaVAhl j , 
By J. EARLE 
L-)EFIJ'P; 
Case No. CV PI 04002800 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL RE: JUROR MISCONDUCT 
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL RE: JUROR MISCONDUCT - I 
000225 
ORIGINAL 
COME NOW the defendants, by and through their counsel of record, Anderson 
Julian & Hull, LLP, and pursuant to the provisions of Rule 59(a)(21 of the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure, hereby move this Court for an order granting a new trial in this 
action. 
This motion is made upon the grounds and for the reason that juror misconduct 
occurred during the course of voir dire examination during the jury triai in this case, 
Such "misconduct" consisted of the failure of the juror Mark Barbo to  affirmatively 
respond to questions posed during voir dire that would have revealed that he was a 
current policy holder of insurance policies issued by the defendants and that there was 
a claims history with respect to  these policies. Such information would have 
warranted his removal for cause as had occurred with all other jurors who responded 
affirmatively to  the question posed by the presiding judge. 
This motion is supported by the affidavits of Janet Nolan and Phillip J. Collaer 
and by the Memorandum of Law filed herewith. 
DATED this day of October. 2007. 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
Robert A. Anderson, Of the Firm 
Phillip J. Collaer, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL RE: JUROR MISCONDUCT - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVlCE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 6 day of October, 2007, 1 served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL RE: JUROR 
MISCONDUCT by delivering the same to each of the following attorneys of record, by 
the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
JAMES E. RISCH [XI U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
RISCH GOSS INSINGER GUSTAVEL [ ] Hand-Delivered 
407 West Jefferson I 1 Overnight Mail 
Boise, Idaho 83702 [ 1 Facsimile 
Telephone: (208) 345-9974 
Facsimile: (208) 345-9982 
A ttorne ys for Plaintiffs 
Phillip J. Collaer 
000227 
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL RE: JUROR MISCONDUCT - 3 
Robert A. Anderson, ISB #2124 
Mark D. Sebastian, ISB if6012 
ANDERSON, JULIAN 2% HULL LLI" 
C. W. Moore Plaza 
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 7426 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
'Telephor~e: (208) 344-5800 
Facsimile: (208) 344-55 10 
E-hlail: randerson@ajhlaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
LESLIE WEINSTEIN, and LINDA 
WEINSTEIN, Husband and Wife, individually 
and as Guardians ad litem for SARAH R. 
WEINSTEIN, and SARAH R. WEINSTEIN 
individually 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND 
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY and 
PRUDENTIAL GENERAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY and LIBERTY MUTlJAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY and LM 
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV PI 0400280D 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
REMITTITUR OR, IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, NEW TRIAL 
[Oral argument IS requested] 
COME NOW, Defendants in the above-entitled action by and through their counsel of 
record, Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP, and hereby move this Court, pursuant to Rule 59 of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, for its order of remittitur or, in the alternative, a new trial as to 
the bad faith claims related to the uninsured motorist claims handling, Sarah Weinstein's 
ul~insured motorist coverage and damages, and the punitive damage award. 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR REMITTITUK OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, N m  02 2 8 
TRIAL - 1 
The motion for reniittitur is brought on the grounds that (i) the statutory cap on punitive 
damages found at Idaho Code $ 6-1604 applies, limiting punitive damages to the greater of 
$250,000 or three times the compensatory damages, (iij there are insufficient facts to justify the 
award of compensatory damages to either Mr. and Mrs. Weinstein, or Sarah Weinstein, or the 
award of punitive damages, and (iii) the punitive damage award is unconstitutional. 
The motion for new trial is brought pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(l ), (3), and ( 5 )  - (7) on the 
grounds that (i) there were irregularities in the proceedings by which Defendants were prevented 
from having a fair trial; (ii) there was surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded 
against; (iii) the damages were excessive, and appear to have been given under the influence of 
passion and/or prejudice; (iv) the evidence presented was insufficient to justify the verdict; (v) 
there were nurnerous errors in law occurring at the trial. The specific facts supporting this motion 
are set fbrth in the affidavit of counsel accompanying this motion, and the memorandum of law 
in support, which are incorporated herein by reference. 
This motion is supported by a memorandum of law and affidavit of counsel submitted 
concurrently herewith. 
AND-ULIAN & HULL LLP 
Attorneys for Defendants 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR RERIITTITUR OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, NE 
TRIAL - 2 roo229 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thi ay of October, 2007, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT TION FOR REMlTTlTUK OK, IN THE 
ALTEKNATIVE, NEW TRIAL by delivering the same to each of the following attorneys of 
record, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
James Kisch [< U.S. Mail, poslage prepaid 
RlSCW GOSS INSINCER CUSTAVEL 1 Hand-Delivered 
407 W. Jefferson Street [ ] Overnight Mail [ ] Facsimile Boise, ID 83702 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR REh1ITTITUR OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, NE 
TRIAL - J X00230 I 
i 
OCT 1 5 2007 
Ada County Cterk 
JAMES E. RISCH (ISB #1224) 
R. JOHN INSINGER (ISB ii1578) 
JASON S. RISCH (ISB 116655) 
7 RISCH GOSS INSINGER GUSTAVEL 
amumme 407 West Jefferson Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702-6049 lCllr 
Telephone: (208 j 345-9974 
0 Facsimile: (208) 345-9982 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRIC?. 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
LESLIE WEINSTEN and LINDA ) 
WEINSTEN, Husband and Wife, 1 
individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for ) Case No. CV PI 0400280D 
SARAH R. WEINSTEIN, and SARAH R. ) 
WEINSTEIN, individually, 1 JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
) PLAINTIFF SARAH WEINSTEIN 
Plaintiffs, 1 
) 
vs. ) 
1 
PRUDENTIAL, PROPERTY AND 1 
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY ) 
and PRUDENTIAL GENERAL ) 
mSURANCE COMPANY and LIBERTY ) 
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and ) 
LM PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 
INSURANCE, 
) 
) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
The above-entitled matter having been tried to a jury verdict and the Court having made appropriate 
adjustments thereto; Judgment is hereby entered in favor of plaintiff SARAH WEINSTEIN, 
against defendants LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and PRUDENTIAL 
JAMES E. RISCH (ISB #1224) 
R. JOHN MSINGCR (ISB ti1678) 
-+*--+ 
.--, JASON S. MSCW (ISB Jf6655) 
"79 #.--=.- RISCH GOSS INSTNGER GUSTAVEL 
-"-.A- Attorneys at Law 
C9 407 West Jefferson Street 
--"- 
. , Boise, Idaho 83702-6049 
I" A*- 
_- Telephone: (208) 345-9974 
i - 
L - -J  Facsimile: (208) 345-9982 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
LESLIE WEI-NSTEIN and LINDA 
WETNSTEIN, Husband and Wife, 
individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for ) Case No. CV PI 04002802) 
SARAH R. WEINSTEIN, and SARAH R. ) 
WEmSTEIN, individually, MOTION FOR SUPPLEMENTAL OR 
1 AMENDED JUDGMENT IN FAVOR 
Plaintiffs, ) OF SARAH WEINSTEIN 
1 
VS. 1 
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND 
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY ) 
and PRUDENTIAL GENERAL 1 
INSURANCE COMPANY and LIBERTY ) 
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and ) 
LM PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 
INSURANCE, ) 
Defendants. 
) 
MOTION FOR SUPPLEMENTAL OR AMENDED JUDGMENT R\I FAVOR OF SARAH WEINSTEIN- Page I 
000232 
COME NOW, the plaintiffs above-named, and move for entry of a supplemental or amended 
judgment to be entered in favor of Sarah Weinstein. Plaintiffs seek either a supplen~ental judgment 
entered in conjunction with, or an amended judgment superseding, the Court's October 19, 2007 
judgment, in conformance with the October 15,2007 Affidavit of R. John Insinger regarding interest, 
and the October 15,2007 Memorandurn of Costs and Affidavit of Attorneys Fees. 
Oral a rguen t  is requested on this Motion. 
DATED This 26'h day of October, 2007. 
RISCH GOSS ZNSINCER GUSTAVEL 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
I hereby certify that on the 26Ih day of October, 2007,I caused to be served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR SUPPLEMENTAL OR AMENDED JUDGMENT M FAVOR 
OF SARAH WEINSTEIN as follows: 
Robert A. Anderson [ 1 U.S. mail (postage prepaid) 
Phillip J. Collaer [ I  Facsimile (344-55 10) 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL, LLP [ ] Hand Delivery 
Attorneys at Law [ 1  Federal Express 
G. W. Moore Plaza 
250 S. 51h Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
MOTION FOR SUPPLEMENTAL OR AMENDED JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF SARAH WEINSTEIN- Page 2 
Robert A. Anderson, 1SB ki2 124 
Mark D, Sebastian, ISB #6012 
ANDERSON, JULlAN & HULL r_r,p 
C. W. Moore Plaza 
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 7426 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Telephone: (208) 344-5800 
Facsimile: (208) 344-55 10 
E-Mail: randerson@ajhlaw.com 
NO. 
RM 
Attorneys for Defendmts 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
LESLIE WEnt'STEIN, and LINDA 
WEJNSTEZN, Husband and Wife, individually 
and as Guardians ad litem for SARAH R. 
WEINSTEM, and SARAH R. WEINSTEIN 
individually 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND 
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY and 
PRUDENTIAL GENERAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY and LIBERTY MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY and LM 
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV PI 0400280D 
DEmNDANTS' OBJECTION TO 
P L r n I F F S '  MEMORANDA OF 
COSTS AND FEES 
I 
COME NOW, Defendants in the above-entitled action by and through their counsel of 
record, Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP, and hereby object to Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs 
(Rule 54, L R. C. P.) As to Leslie and Linda Weinstein, and Memorandum of Costs and Attorney 
Fees (Rule 54, I. R. C.P.) As to Sarah Weinstein as follows: 
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDA OF COSTS AND 
FEES - I 000234 
Rule 54(e)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[iJn any civil action 
the court may award reasonable attorney fees . . . to the prevailing party or parties as defined in 
Rule 54(d)(l )(B), when provided for by any statute or contract." 1.RC.P. 54(e)(l) (emphasis 
added). Costs may only be awarded to the prevailing party. 1.RC.P. 54(d)(l). Where a request 
for attorney's -fees is unsupported by argment or authority, the court cannot award attorney's 
fees. See ~ g . ,  hminguerz v. Evergreen Res., Inc, 142 Idaho 7, 121 P.3d 938, 945 (2005); 
Myers v. W o r k m ~  '§Auto Ins. Go., 140 Idaho 495,5 1 I, 95 P.3d 977,993 (2004). 
Ir. mGmm 
As discussed more fully below, Plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney's fees as to Sarah 
Weinstein's claims because Plaintiffs have proceeded under the wrong statute in one ease, and 
have not satisfied the requirements of the other statute. Sarah is also not entitled to certain costs 
as more fully explained below. Plaintiffs also are not entitled to recover costs for Leslie and 
Linda Weinstein's claims because they were not the prevailing party. Leslie and Linda Weinstein 
also are not entitled to certain costs, as more fully explained below. 
A. PLAINTIFFS' ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE ATTORNEY'S FEES AND 
COSTS CLAIMED AS TO SARAH WlEINSmm. 
Plaintiffs have claimed attorney's fees of $114,823.27 as to Sarah Weinstein's claims, 
based on Idaho Code rj$ 12-120 and 41-1 839; as well as $2,958.15 in costs as a matter of right. 
As more fully set forth below, (i) because Idaho Code 9 41-1839 is the exclusive statute for 
attorney's fees in disputes between insured and insurers, Plaintiffs are not entitled to fees 
pursuant to $ 12-120; and (ii) because Plaintiffs never submitted a proof of loss as to the 
damages obtained through the suit, Plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney's fees under $ 41-1839. 
Finally, Plaintiffs are not entitled to all of the costs claimed as a matter of right. 
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' IMEMORANDA OF COST 
FEES - 2 
1. NOT ENTITLED TO FEES P W U M  TO IDAHO 
CODE 5 12-120. 
Plaintiffs are claiming attorney's fees on behalf of Sarah Weinstein pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 12-120.' Such fees are not allowed in actions of this type. See I.C. 5 41-1839(4). The 
statute m l ~ e r  emphasizes that "Section 12-120, Idaho Code, shall not apply to any actions 
between insureds and insurers involving disputes arising under any policy of insurance." Id The 
ldaho Supreme Court has also explained that "Idaho Code 5 41- 1839(4) provides the exclusive 
remedy for the award of statutory attorney fees in all actions between insureds and insurers 
involving disputes arising under policies of insurunce." Hayden Lake Fire Pro& Disk v. Almn,  
141 ldaho 307, 3 12, 109 P.3d 161, 167 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted; italics in 
original) (quoting I.C. tj 41-1839(4)). "This statute bars recovery of attorney fees under 
alternative statutory provisions, including specifically, I.C. 5 12- 120(3) . . . ." Id See also I d ,  14 1 
Idaho at 313 (discussing legislative history that indicated the purpose of subsection (4) was to 
make 5 41-1839 the exclusive attorneys' fees statute that applies to insurance disputes). In short, 
Plaintiffs are barred from recovering attorneys' fees pursuant to Section 12-120. 
2. PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO FEES PURSUANT TO IDAHO 
CODE 5 41-1839. 
Plaintiffs are also claiming attorney's fees on behalf of Sarah Weinstein pursuant to 
Idaho Code 5 4 1-1 839. That section states: 
Any insurer issuing any policy . . . of insurance . . . which shall fail 
for a period of thirty (30) days after proof of loss has been 
furnished as provided in such policy ... to pay to the person 
entitled thereto the amount justly due under such policy . . . shall in 
any action thereafier brought against the insurer ... pay such 
hrther amount as the court shall adjudge reasonable as attorney's 
fees in such action. 
I Although not clear &om their pleadings, Plaintiffs presumably seek attorney fees under section 12-120(3) relating 
to contracts and commercial transactions. 
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' M1EMORAMDA OF COSTS 
FEES - 3 m236 
I.C. # 41-1839(1). "'Before a plaintiff may recover aaorney fees under the stalute, it must be 
shown that: (1) the insured has provided proof of loss as required by the insurance policy; and 
(2) the insurance company failed to pay an mount justly due under the policy within thirty days 
of such proof of loss." Martin v, State F a m  Mutual Auto, Im, Ca., 138 Idaho 244,6 1 P.3d 60 1 
There is no statutory definition of what constitutes a proof of loss. "'[Plroof of loss' is a 
term of art in insurance law, meaning something more than notification of a potential claim." 
Certain Uitdemraem at Lloyd's v. WoUeson, 14 1 Idaho 740, 742, 1 1 8 P.3d 72, 74 (2005). The 
purpose for a proof of loss "is to allow the insurer to form an intelligent estimate of its rights and 
liabilities, to afford it an opportunity for investigation, and to prevent fraud and imposition upon 
it." Brinkman v. Aid Ins. Go., 1 15 Idaho 346, 349-50, 766 P.2d 1227, 1230-3 1 (1988) overruled 
in part on other grounds, Greenougk v. Farm Bureau MJ&. Ins. Co., 142 Idaho 589, 130 P.3d 
1127 (2006) (quoting 44 Am.Jur.2d Insurance 5 1323). Thus, "[tlhe insured, when required to do 
so under his policy, should provide the information reasonably available to him regarding his 
injury and the circumstances of the accident." BdmKman' 1 15 Idaho at 350. 
The amount of information provided should be proportional to the 
amount reasonably available to the insured. If the information 
provided is insufficient to give the insurer an opportunity to 
investigate and determine its liability, the insurer may deny 
coverage. Otherwise, the insurer must investigate andor determine 
its rights and liabilities. The documentation is the "proof." The 
explanation of physical andor financial injury is the "loss." "Loss" 
must be distinguished from liability. The insurer will determine its 
liability with the knowledge that it must be fair and accurate or 
suffer the consequences. 
Id "[A] submitted proof of loss is sufficient when the insured provides the insurer with enough 
information to allow the insurer a reasonable opportunity to investigate and determine its 
liability." Greenouglt, 142 Idaho at 593. The Idaho Supreme Court has also indicated that a 
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTWFS' MEMORANDA OF COST 
FEES - 4 8&237 
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expenses incurred on behalf of Sarah Weillstein through November 20, 2003" and indicated he 
would be working on a proof of loss as to future medical losses in the coming weeks. Even so, 
that notebook was incomplete, and a supplement was not sent to Defendants until May 20, 2004. 
In the May 20 letter, Piaintiffskomsel noted that he was working on updating bills and records. 
Neither the April 20, 2004 correspondence or the May 20, 2004 conespondence contained any 
mention, let alone a demand or supporling information, as to noneconomic damages. Mr. Bistline 
(or for that matter, current Plaintiffs' counsel) never forwarded a "proof of loss'hs to future 
medical damages. In short, Plainties never satisfied the statutory prerequisite for attorney's fees 
as to any future rneds (i.e., those exceeding the $14,500 incurred in 2002-2003) or to non- 
economic damages, and for that reason are not entitled to an award of attorney's fees for 
recovering those mounts. 
As to the medical expenses incurred in 2002-2003, Plaintiffs admitted in their Third and 
Fourth Amended Complaints that the total past medical bills totaled only $14,500 of which 
$5,000 had been paid under the medical payments provision of the policy, leaving only $9,500 
outstanding at the time of the April and May 2004 demands. As noted above, the April 2004 
demand was incomplete and only updated by a letter dated May 20, 2004. Defendants tendered 
$10,000 less than 30 days later, which tender was rejected by Plaintiffs. Thus, Defendants 
satisfied their obligations under Section 41- 1839, and are not liable for attorney's fees. 
Moreover, the Idaho Supreme Court has indicated that the timing and sufficiency of a 
proof of loss is a question of fact. See Greettough, 142 Idaho at 593. The issue of whether 
Plaintiffs had satisfied the requirements for attorney's fees under Section 41-1839 was never 
presented to the jury-i.e., the jury was never asked if a sufficient proof of loss had been made, 
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or whether the Bekndmts had tendered payment timely. Accordingly, there is no factual basis 
for awarding attorney's fees pursuant to Section 41-1 839. 
Plaintiffs are requesting a total of $1 17,823.27 in fees (less an offset of $3,000) on a 
$250,000 judgment. "When awarding aaomey's fees, a district court must consider the 
applicable factors set forth in 1,R.C.P. 54(e)(3) and may consider any other factor that the court 
deems appropriate." Hinm v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847, 855, 934 P,2d 20, 28 (1997). Rule 54(e)(3) 
provides the following factors: 
(A) The time and labor required, 
(J3) The novelty and difficulty of the questions. 
(G) The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and 
the experience and ability of the attorney in the particular 
field of law. 
(D) The prevailing charges for like work. 
(E) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
(F) The time limitations imposed by the client or the 
circumstances of the case. 
(G) The amount involved and the results obtained. 
(H) The undesirability of the case. 
(I) The nature and length of the professional relationship with 
the client. 
(J) Awards in similar cases. 
(K) The reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer 
Assisted Legal Research), if the court finds it was 
reasonably necessary in preparing a party's case. 
(L) Any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the 
particular case. 
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Id Based on these factors, Plaintiffs' request for fees is unreasonable for several reasons. 
First, as noted earlier, where a request for attorney's fees is unsupported by argument or 
authority, the court cannot award attorney's fees. See ~g., Dominguez v. Evergreen Res., Znc, 
142 Idaho 7, 121 P.3d 938,945 (2005); Myers v. Workmen's Aulo Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495,5 1 1, 
95 P.3d 977, 993 (2004). In this case, other than a brief statement that the Court can consider a 
contingent fee arrangement, Plaintiffs fail to address any of the proceeding factors. 
Second, the contingent fee arrangement of 40% of recovery is unreasonably high. CJ., 
Parsons v. Mu& ofEnuntclaw Zm. Co., - Idaho -, 152 P.3d 614, 619 (2007) (approving 113 
contingent fee arrangement for fees awarded pursuant to I.C. 9 41-1839). A one-third 
contingency fee is the standard and traditional rate. 
Third, Plaintiffs are requesting $1 17,823.27 in attorney's fees on a $250,000 judgment. 
This amounts to 47% of the award, which is interesting since Mr. Bistline's contingent fee 
agreement was only 25% and Mr. Risch's was 40%. See A r i a  of AtRomeys Fees Claimed as 
Cos& as to Sarah Weinstein, pp. 2 and 4. With offsets, the Plaintiffs are requesting $1 14,823 -27 
on a $165,000 judgment.' This is 69.6% of the judgment. Again, this is well in excess of the 
contingent fee agreements cited by Plaintiffs. Thus, the amount of fees requested is 
unreasonable. 
In short, Plaintiffs have not suficiently supported their argument for attorney's fees, have 
requested an excessive contingency fee, and are requesting fees in excess of the already 
excessive contingency fee. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees as to Sarah 
Weinstein should be denied. 
4. PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE INTEREST CLAIMED. 
3 No copy of this judgment was provided to Defendants prior to entry. This amount does not correctly calculate the 
offsets because it does not include additional medical bills paid prior to the $80,00&some $2,900. 
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First, Plaintiffs have demanded interest for the full amount of damages beginning at May 
19,2004, and continuing through the current date. In Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mui. Ins. Co., 
142 Idaho 589, 130 P.3d 1127 (2006), the Idaho Supreme Court addressed the issue of when 
interest begins to accrue on a judgment for money due under an insurance contract. The court 
noted that Idaho Code § 28-22-104 allowed for prejudgment interest at a rate of 12% per annurn. 
I d ,  142 Idaho at 592. The court also noted that interest did not begin to accrue until payment 
was due under the contract, which in that case was, per the contract, 60 days after receipt of a 
sworn proof of loss. Id,  142 Idaho at 592 and 593. As discussed earlier, Plaintiffs have never 
submitted a proof of loss as to Sarah's noneconomic damages or future economic damages 
(including fbture medical care), even though such information was requested by the company 
and promised by Plaintiffs. Thus, because Plaintiffs did not provide a complete proof of loss, 
Plaintiffs are not entitled to pre-judgment interest. 
Second, prejudgment interest is only allowable "where the amount claimed, even though 
not liquidated, is capable of mathematical computation." Greenough, 142 Idaho at 592 (quoting 
DiUon v. Montgomery, 138 Idaho 614,617,67 P.3d 93,96 (2003). In this case, the final damage 
award to Sarah far exceeded the future value of possible surgery or past medical expenses 
incurred, but includes non-economic damages such as pain and suffering and loss of quality of 
life. In fact, the jury merely went along with the suggestion by Plaintiffs' counsel to award the 
policy limits. The amounts of pain and suffering and loss of quality of life are not "capable of 
mathematical computation." See Acevedo-Garcia v. Monroig, 35 1 F.3d 547, 57 1 (1" f i r .  2003) 
("Damages for pain and suffering defy 'exact mathematical computation,' and 'are not 
susceptible to proof by a dollar amount."') (citations omitted). Thus, Plaintiffs are not entitled to 
pre-judgment interest. 
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Third, Plaintiffs interest calculations for post-judgment interest are based on the 
interest rate of 12% under I.C. $ 28-22-1 04(1). See Afl ofAmountr Due to Pfainhg 
Sarah Weimtein in Suppod of Judgment in Favor of P P t n t r r  Sarah Weimtein, p. 4 
(demanding $60.53 per day in interest since the day of judgment). However, once judgment is 
entered, the post-judgment interest rate of 1.C. 4 28-22-104(2) applies. See Cr&Mor, Inc. v* 
Butts, 109 Idaho 1020, 712 P.2d 721 (Ct. App. 1985). Currently, the rate on judgments is 
10.00%. Thus, Plaintiffs have used the wrong interest rate. 
5. PLAINTIFF SARAH mINSTEIN IS NOT EWITLED TO ALL TJ3E 
COSTS CLAIMED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT. 
In item #6 of Exhibit A to Memorandum ofcosts  and Attorney Fees (Rule 54, 1R.C.P.) 
As to Sarah Weinstein, Plaintiffs make a claim for $500 for "Costs for preparation of exhibits." 
Rule 54(d)(l)(C)(6) permits the prevailing party to recover the "[r]easonable costs of the 
preparation of models, maps, pictures, photographs, or exhibits admitted in evidence as exhibits 
in a hearing or trial of an action, but not to exceed the sum of $500 for all of such exhibits of 
each party." However, in this case, there is no receipts or other information supporting a claim 
that such costs equaled or exceeded $500. Given the paucity of evidence on Sarah's future 
medical expenses, Defendants question whether the costs of any necessary exhibits exceeded 
$500. (In this regard, Defendants would note that Sarah's prior medical expenses were not at 
issue, and the only purpose for those exhibits were to support her parents' claims of bad faith). 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs are not entitled to the costs claimed. 
In item #10 of Exhibit A to Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees (Rule 54, I. R. C. P.) 
As to Sarah Weinstein, Plaintiffs make a claim for multiple depositions of Linda and Leslie 
Weinstein, Nancy O'Connor, Anne Gorski, Judith Halverson, and Stephanie Abernathy. Mr. and 
Mrs. Weinstein's depositions pertained to the bad faith claims, not the claims for Sarah's 
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damages. Similasly, the depositions of Nancy OTomor, Anne Gorski, Judith Halverson, and 
Stephanie Abernathy related to the bad faith claims. Accordingly, it is inappropriate for these to 
be claimed as costs incurred in relation to Sarah's claims and, for that reason, should be denied. 
B. P L m I F F S  ARE NOT EmITLED TO THE COSTS CLAIMED AS TO LESLIE 
AND LINDA rnINSTEIET, 
Plaintiffs have not claimed attorney's fees as to Leslie and Linda Weinstein. See 
genera& Memorandum of Cosis: mule 54, I,ILC.P.) As to Leslie and Linda Weinstein. 
Plaintiffs have made a claim for $16,098.81 in costs as a matter of right. Because Plaintiffs were 
not the prevailing pasty, they are not entitled to costs as a matter of right. In addition, Plaintiffs 
are not entitled to specific costs for the reasons set forth below. 
1. P L m I F F S  ARE NOT THE PREVAILING PARTY AND, THUS, NOT 
ENTITLED TO COSTS. 
As noted, Plaintiffs are claiming $16,098.81 in costs as a matter of right as to the claims 
brought by Leslie and Linda Weinstein. The rules provide that "[elxcept when otherwise limited 
by these rules, costs shall be allowed as a matter of right to the prevailing party or parties, unless 
otherwise ordered by the court." 1.RC.P. 54(d)(l)(A). Rule 54(d)(l) indicates that "[iln 
determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial court 
shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the 
relief sought by the respective parties." 1.RC.P. 54(d)(l)(B). W e r e  one party prevails on one 
claim, but the other party prevails on another claim, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that the 
district court did not abuse it discretion in finding that there was no overall prevailing party, and 
therefore neither party was entitled to an award of court costs and attorney fees. See Adam v. 
hheger, 124 Idaho 74,  856 P.2d 864 (1 993); Znt'l Eng'g Co. v. Daum Indusk, Znc, 102 Idaho 
363,630 P.2d 155 (1981). 
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Leslie and Linda Weinstein brought claims for bad faith relating to claims handling of the 
med pay claims and the uninsured motorist (UM) claim. They did not prevail as to the bad faith 
for the med pay claims handling. Even as to the UM claim, Plaintiffskounsel asked the jury to 
award $75 million in punitive damages,4 but the jury only returned a verdict of $6 million in 
punitive dmages. In short, Plaintiffs only prevailed as to one of two claims, and recovered only 
about 8% of what they had asked for. Consequently, Plaintiffs are not the prevailing party and 
not entitled to costs as a matter of right. 
2. PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO EXBIBIT COSTS. 
Plaintiffs have asserted that they are entitled to $1,500 for "[c]osts for preparation of 
exhibits." See Memorandum of Costs (Rule 54, LRC.P.) As to Leslie and Linda Weinstein, 
Exhibit A. Rule 54(d)(l)(G)(6) permits the prevailing party to recover the "[r]easonable costs of 
the preparation of models, maps, pictures, photographs, or exhibits admitted in evidence as 
exhibits in a hearing or trial of an action, but not to exceed the sum of $500 for all of such 
exhibits of each party." For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiffs are not entitled to the $1,500. 
First, as with Sarah's claims discussed above, there are no receipts or information setting 
out the actual costs. Thus, neither Defendants or the Court know if these represents amounts 
actually incurred. Accordingly, the Court should deny the request. 
Second, the total cost permitted under the rule is $500 per party. Plaintiffs conceded that 
the bad faith claims only pertained to Leslie and Linda Weinstein, and that Sarah had no claim to 
such damages. The jury verdict form reflected this. Leslie and Linda Weinstein have presented 
the same claims and damages and, therefore, are a single party entitled to only $500 total. 
Specifically, Plaintiffs' counsel had put on proof that Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. had a net worth of $7.5 billion, 
and suggested to the jury that it award 1% of that amount as punitive damages. 
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However, even if counted as sepaate parties, they are entitled to recover only $500 each, or a 
total of $1,000. 
Plaintiffs are claiming $2,000 in expert fees for Wayne Soward, as well as $370.15 and 
$278.57 for a copy of his depositions, respectively. See Memorandum of Costs (Rule 54, 
LILC.P.) As to Leslie and Lhda Weimtein, Exhibit A. The rules permit recovery of the costs of 
"pleasonable expert witness fees for an expert who testifies at a deposition or at a trial of an 
action not to exceed the sum of $2,000 for each expert witness for all appearances." 1.RC.P. 
54(d)(l)(C)(8). The rules also permit "[c]harges for one (I)  copy of any deposition taken by any 
of the parties to the action in preparation for trail of the action." 1.RC.P. 54(d)(l)(C)(10). 
Mr. Soward was Plaintiffs' expert, which Plaintiffs' voluntarily withdrew as a witness 
prior to trial. In fact, Plaintiffs moved for an order in limine prohibiting any discussion 
concerning Mr. Soward or his testimony. Thus, Mr. Soward's testimony was not necessary to 
preparing for trial and, given the order preventing any mention at trial, it was as though Mr. 
Soward had never rendered testimony or an opinion in this case. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are not 
entitled to any costs related to Mr. Soward or his testimony, including expert witness fees or 
deposition costs. 
4. PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO DEPOSITION COPY CHARGES 
FOR MIKE LINDSTROM. 
Plaintiffs have requested $332.00 for a copy of the deposition transcript of Mike 
Lindstrom. The rules permit "[cJharges for one (1) copy of any deposition taken by any of the 
parties to the action in preparation for trail of the action." 1.RC.P. 54(d)(l)(C)(10). Mr. 
Lindstrom was originally named as a witness to support Plaintiffs' claims regarding 
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extracontractual dmages to Linda and Leslie Weinstein" credit rating and finances. Plaintiffs 
# 
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withdrew Mr. Lindstrom as an expert witness ostensibly because he was out of the country. In 
any event, Mr. Lindstrom's testimony or &dings were never used at trial. Like Mr. Soward, an 
order in litrzine was entered preventing any reference or use of Mr. Lindstrom's testimony. 
Consequently, Mr. Lindstrom's deposition was not used in preparation for trial, could not be 
used by Defendants at trial, and therefore, Plaintiffs should not be pemined to recover costs for 
the same. 
DATED this x '?%aa of October, 2007. 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
' /  Attorneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27 %ay of October, 2007,I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing D E m N D m S '  ~ C T I O N  TO PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDA 
OF COSTS AND FEES by delivering the same to each of the following attorneys of record, by 
the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
James Risch 91 U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
- 
RISCH GOSS INSINGER GUSTAVEL [ 1 Hand-De~~vered 
407 W. Jefferson Street [ ] Overnight Mail [ 1 Facsimile Boise, ID 83702 
KO bert A. Anderson 
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Robert A. Anderson, ISB #2124 
Mark D, Sebastian, ISB 556012 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
C. LV. Moore Plaza 
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 7426 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Telephone: (208) 344-5800 
Facsimile: (208) 344-55 10 
E-Mail: randerson@aj hlaw.com 
w ?JAl(iO NAVAHflO, 91er~ 
&y i. AMES 
JEPUN 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
LESLIE WENSTEIN, and LINDA 
WENSTEN, F$usbmd and Wife, individually 
and as Guardians ad litern for SARAH R. 
WENSTEm, and SARAH R. WEmSTEn\J 
individually 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND 
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY and 
PRUDENTIAL GENERAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY and LIBERTY MUTUAL 
mSURANCE COMPANY and LM 
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV PI 0400280D 
D E m m m S W S P O N S E  TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SZTPPLEMEWAL OR m m E D  
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF SARAH 
mINSTELN AND OaJECTION TO 
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT LN FAVOR 
OF SARAH WEINSTEIN 
COME NOW, Defendants in the above-entitled action by and through their counsel of 
record, Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP, and hereby respond to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Supplemental or Amended Judgment in Favor of Sarah Weinstein. For the reasons set forth 
below, Defendants object to the entry of judgment in favor of Sarah Weinstein because it does 
not correctly include all amounts to which Defendants are entitled as an offset. Defendants also 
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oppose Plaintiffs' motion to mend the Court's October 19, 2007 judgment to conform to the 
Affidavit of R. John Insinger regarding interest, and Memorandum of Costs and Affidavit of 
Attorney? Fees for the reason that the interest has been calculated incorrectly, and Plaintiffs are 
not entitled to attorney's fees. 
I. P R O C E D W  BACKGROW. 
On October 15, 2007, the Court was presented with a blank judgment in favor of Sarah 
Weinstein together with the Plaintiffs' pleading regarding interest- and attorney's fees arising in 
relation to Sarah Weinstein's claims. On October 19, 2007, without consulting Defendants' 
counsel as to the proper offsets to the damage award to Sarah, and prior to the hearing on costs 
and attorney's fees, the Court entered a judgment in favor of Sarah of $165,000, presumably 
representing the $250,000 awarded by the jury, less $5,000 received in medical payments and 
$80,000 previously paid by Defendants. Plaintiffs have now moved to amend that judgment. 
11. A R G r n W  
A. THE COURT FAILED TO INCLUDE ALL TEE OFFSETS TO WHICH 
DEFENDANT IS OWED. 
In addition to the $5,000 for medical payments, and the $80,000 payment, Defendants are 
also entitled to an additional $3,072.71 in medical bills paid after suit was filed. Defendants are 
entitled to this amount as an offset as well. 
B. PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE INTEREST AND ATTORNEY'S 
FEES REQUESTED. 
As set more fully in Defendants ' Objection To Plaint#s ' Memoranda Of Costs And Fees, 
which arguments are incorporated herein by reference, Plaintiffs are not entitled to the interest or 
attorney's fees demanded. More specifically, Plaintiffs are not entitled to the interest demanded 
because (i) the Plaintiffs never submitted a proof of loss sufficient to trigger a contractual 
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obligation to pay the underlying sum, and (ii) Plaintiffs have incorrectly used the pre-judgment 
interest rate to calculate post-judgment interest. Plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney's fees under 
I.C. $$ 12-120 and 41-1839 because (a) (j 12-120 is superceded by (j 41 -1 839 in suits between an 
insured and insurer, and (b) Plaintiffs did not provide a proof of loss as required under 5 41- 
1839. 
C. CONCLUSION. 
Defendants object to the Judgment entered in favor of Sarah Weinstein because it does 
not fully take into consideration the offsets owed to Defendants. Defendants' oppose Plaintiffs' 
motion to supplement or amend Sarah's judgment because Plaintiffs are not entitled to the 
interest or attorney's fees demanded. 
!3 
DATED this a day of November, 2007. 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILMG 
9 1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 6 day of November, 2007, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing DEFEND- RESPONSE TO P L m m y S  MOTION 
FOR S W P L E m W m  OR W m E D  m G m N T  IN FAVOR OF SARAH 
WEINSTEIN by delivering the same to each of the fo1IoMiling attorneys of record, by the method 
indicakd below, addressed as follows: 
James Risch [ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
RZSCH GOf S INSINCER GUSTAVEL [ I Hand-Delivered 
407 W. Jefferson Street [ ] Overnight Mail b] Facsimile Boise, ID 83702 
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Robert A. Anderson, ISB #2124 
Mark D. Sebastim, ISB #60 1 2 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
C. W. Moore Plaza 
250 South Fifih Street, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 7426 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Telephone: (208) 344-5800 
Facsimile: (208) 344-55 I0 
E-Mail: randerson@ajhlaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
n\;i THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAI-IO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
LESLIE WEICNSTEM, and LINDA 
WEINSTEW, Husband and Wik, individually 
and as Guardians ad litern for SARAII R. 
WEINSTEPN, and SARAH R. WEXNSTEIN 
individually 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND 
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY and 
PRUDENTIAL GENERAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY and LIBERTY MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY and LM 
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY NSURANCE, 
Case No. CV PI 04002801) 
D E F E m M S '  MOTION TO 
STRIKE THlE M m A V I T  OF 
JAMIES E. RISCH IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEmmANTS9 MOTION FOR 
ANEW TRIALRE: JUROR 
MSCONDUCT 
[Oral argument IS requested] 
Defendants. 
I. MOTION. 
COME NOW, Defendants in the above-entitled action by and through their counsel of 
record, Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP, and hereby moves this Court, pursuant to I.R.E. 402 and 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES E. RISCH IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDmS7 MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL RE: SURO 
MISCONDUCT - I 
- 
802, t'or its order striking the ,4fidavit OfJames E. Risch In Opposition To Defendants ' Motion 
For A Arew fiial Re: Juror Misconduct (hereinafter, "Asfidavit"), for the reasons set forth below. 
Oral arguent  IS reuuested. 
11. DISCUSSION. 
The AfJidavit of PlaintifPs counsel contains nothing but hearsay statements in paragraphs 
4-6. Without those paragraphs, the remainder of the Afldavit is irrelevant. For this reason, the 
AfJ;ciavit should be struck in its entirety. 
I.R.E. 802 provides that ""Clearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or 
other rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of Idaho." "Hearsay" is defined as "a statement, 
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence 
to prove the truth of the matter asserted." I.R.E. 801(c). The rules contemplate that a prior 
statement by a witness, or an admission by a party-opponent, are not hearsay. I.RE. 801(d). The 
rules also include certain exceptions. See I.RE. 803. 
The statements in Mr. Risch's Affidavit, contained in paragraphs 4 through 6 purport to 
report comments made to Mr. Risch by Mr. Barbo. These statements were not under oath, and 
are presented so as to establish the truth of the matter discussed in each statement. These 
statements are quintessential examples of hearsay, without exception under the rules, and should 
be stricken. 
Paragraphs 1 through 3 are simply asserting Mr. Risch's basis for testifying as to 
paragraphs 4 through 6. Because paragraphs 4 through 6 are inadmissible, paragraphs 1 through 
3 are irrelevant, and, therefore, also inadmissible. See I.RE. 401 and 402. 
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DATED this -day of November, 2007. 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day of November, 2007, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE TJZE A-F'FIDAVIT 
OF JAMES E. IUSCH IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A NEW 
TRIAL RE: JUROR MISCONDUCT by delivering the same to each of the following 
attorneys of record, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
James Risch [ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
RISCH GOSS INSINGER GUSTAVEL 1 Hand-Delivered 
407 W. Jefferson Street [ ] Overnight Mail yo] Facsimile Boise, ID 83702 
V 
obert 14. Anderson 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIST -& I 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
LESLIE WEINSTEIN and LINDA 
WEINSTEIN, Husband and Wife, 
individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for 
SARAH R. WEINSTEIN, and SARAH R. 
WEINSTEIN, individual I y, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND 
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY 
and PRUDENTIAL GENERAL 
LNSURANCE COMPANY and LLBERTY 
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and 
LM PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 
INSURANCE, 
~ U P M ~ Q ~  
Case No.- 
DECISION AND ORDER ON 
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL RE: JUROR MISCONDUCT 
Defendants. I 
Before the coun for decision is Defendants' motion for new trial based on alleged juror 
misconduct. Hearings were held on November 7. 19 and December 13,2007. Attorneys James 
Risch, John Insinger and Jason Risch appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs, with Mr. Risch arguing. 
Appearing on behalf of Defendants were attorneys Roben A. Anderson and Phillip I. Collaer, 
with Mr. Collaer arguing. 
BACKGROUND: 
This case arose out of the handling of claims for payment for medical expenses resulting 
from an automobile accident. This motion for new trial based on juror misconduct arises out of 
juror Mark Barbo's allegedly dishonest answer in voir dire regarding whether Defendant Liberty 
Mutual was his insurance company. 
Voir dire was conducted on September 14, 2007. The venire was asked as a group a 
number of questions, including whether anyone knew any of the parties personally. A few 
prospective jurors raised their hands and indicated that they were policyholders of the Defendant 
insurance companies. Mr. Risch suggested that such a relationship might present a problem due 
to a business relationship. The court removed those who stated that they were policyholders of 
the defendants to prevent potential conflicts of interest. Mr. Barbo did not raise his hand to 
indicate that he personally knew any of the parties. 
When asked about work conflicts, Mr. Barbo told the court that his presence was needed 
out in the wildfires, where he worked as a manager of fire weather remote stations that give early 
warnings for fire fighters. He said that he had orders for three fires at the time of voir dire, but 
because he was in Boise his team could not go out. At the time of voir dire, several wildfires 
were burning in Idaho. Mr. Barbo reiterated to the court that his work in the fires was very 
important, and that he would rather be working in the fires than in court. Ultimately, Mr. Barbo 
was selected to serve on the jury. 
The weekend after voir dire, Mr. Barbo asked his wife who they were insured with. She 
responded that their insurance company was Liberty Mutual. The next Monday before trial, Mr. 
Barbo informed the other jurors in the deliberation room that he had discovered that he was an 
insured of Liberty Mutual. He asked them if any one of them felt that his service on the jury 
would be inappropriate, and the other jurors indicated that so long as he was honest about his 
relationship, they did not have a problem with it. Mr. Barbo testified at the evidentiary hearing 
held on November 7 that he thought the appropriate channel for resolving his discovery was 
through asking the jury, because they had been sworn to hear the case. It did not occur to him 
that he should inform the court. Likewise, no other juror informed the court although they were 
all aware of this Mr. Barbo's status as one of Liberty Mutual's insureds. 
On October 1, 2007, the jury returned a majority verdict (9-3) in favor of plaintiffs and 
awarded damages. Mr. Barbo was one of the jurors who voted in favor of the Plaintiffs in this 
action, as shown by the Special verdict form. The court permitted counsel for the defendants to 
inquire from the jurors who heard the case, after juror consent was confirmed. 
During the course of the juror inquiries one of the jurors informed Phillip J. Collaer, co- 
counsel for the defendants, that Mr. Barbo had told the jurors that he is a policyholder of Liberty 
Mutual. Subsequent review of the business records of Liberty Mutual confirmed that Mr. Barbo 
is a current policyholder of an automobile liability policy issued by Liberty Mutual, and has been 
such since 1998. Records also revealed that he had made a claim against his policy iQ18@256 
When confronted wlth his omtssron, Mr. Barbo filed an affidavit in whlch he adm~tted 
that hts wrfe takes care of all family insurance oblrgatlons, and so at the trrne of volr d~re  he did 
nor know the tdenttty of his automobtle ~nsurance company. Mr. Barbo stated that he d ~ d  have 
an acctdet~t In 2004, and that he and h ~ s  wrle f~led a clatm w~th Liberty. He said that he was 
satisfied ~ l t h  the outcome of the cla~m, and had no blas against L~berty. Flnally, Mr. Barbo 
assured the court that he had acted as an imparttal juror and had not allowed his discovery that he 
was Insured by Llberty affect hls deliberattons or hls vote. 
To rebut Mr. Barbo' s testtmon y, Defendants submitted affidavits s~gned by Liberty 
Mutual employees containing notations recording all contacts wlth the Barbos regard~ng thelr 
~nsurance polley since 2001. Based on those notattons, wh~ch are abbreviated and kept 
electroi~ically, Defendants argue that Mr. Barbo was, in fact, the primary contact for his famlly. 
Speclhcally, Mr. Barbo was the one who called to report h ~ s  accident in 2004. Addtt~onally, 
L~berty Mutual employees noted repeated contacts with "Mark" or "Mr." Barbo. 
LEGAL STANDARD: 
The decision of whether or not to grant a new trial based on juror rnlsconduct 1s within 
the sound dlscretlon of the tnal court. Levinger 11. Mercy Med Ctr., 139 Idaho 192, 196,75 P.2d 
1203, 1206 (2003). The moving party must show juror misconduct by clear and convlnc~ng 
ewdence. id. The court must then determine that the movant showed that prejudice reasonably 
could have occurred. Id. 
A party 1s entltled to a new tnal for juror dishonesty In voir dire ]fit  shows that: 1) ajuror 
failed to answer honestly a material questlon on volr dire, and 2) a correct response would have 
prov~ded a valid basis for a challenge for cause. McDonough Power Equipnzerzt, inc. v. 
Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984). The Supreme Court emphasized that this standard 
ensures that the jurors are impartial, while recognizing that a perfect trial In whlch all jurors 
understand the voir dlre quest~ons completely and have perfect knowledge and memory of the 
relevant answers 1s unattainable. id. at 555 ("To Invalidate the result of a three-week trlal 
because of a juror's mistaken, though honest response to a question, is to insist on something 
closer to perfection than our judicial system can be expected to give."). The rule hinges on a 
juror's dishonesty, as the court recognized, "the motives for concealmg information may vary, 
but only those reasons that affect a juror's ~mpartlality can truly be sald to affect the falrness of a 
tnal." id. at 556; see also State v. Reutzel, 130 Idaho 88, 95, 936 P.2d 1330, 1338 (Ct. App. 
1997) (noting that a movant must show that the juror "did not glve an honest response to a 
questlon dunng voir dire [as opposed to a response that was slmply mistaken]."). ~ h e t h & @ M 5  7
a juror was dishonest is a question of fact for the trial court. Fields v. Brown, 503 F.3d 755, 766 
(9th Cir. 2007). 
The Idaho Supreme Court adopted the McDotzough standard in the criminal context in 
Stare v. Tolmun, 121 Idaho 899, 902, 828 P.2d 1304, 1307 (1992).' In that case, the court merely 
assumed that the juror had failed to answer a material question honestly without analyzing that 
issue, and instead focused on whether a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a 
challenge for cause. Id. at 1307, 828 P.2d at 902. The Court determined that the juror did not 
have a state of mind that "leads to the inference that he will not act with entire impartiality." lil.' 
Therefore, a new trial was not granted. The Idaho Supreme Court later applied this standard in 
the civil context. kvirzger v. Mercy Med Ctr,, 139 Idaho 192, 196,75 P.2d 1202, 1206 (2003). 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has dealt with the McDonough standard repeatedly. 
It has repeatedly held that juror dishonesty must be knowing and deliberate, rather than a mere 
oversight or mistake. U.S. v. Edmotzd, 43 F.3d 472, 474 (9th Cir. 1994) ("The district court 
abused its discretion when i t  concluded that [the juror's] simply forgetfulness fell within the 
scope of dishonesty as defined by McDanough."). See also Coughlin v. Tuilhook Ass'n, 112 
F.3d 1052, 1061 (9'h cir. App. 1997); Price v. Kramrr, 200 F.3d 1237, 1254 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that the district court did not err when it concluded that a juror's omission of an incident 
from 14 years prior was an innocent oversight); Fields at 766 (holding that the district court did 
not err in finding that a juror who described his wife's abduction and rape as an "assault" was not 
dishonest). 
Defendants urge the court to adopt the more exacting standard of the McDonough test 
that is used by the Fourth Circuit and several others. Under the proposed standard, innocent non- 
disclosures during voir dire are treated the same as deliberate concealments for purposes of 
determining juror misconduct. Jones v. Cooper, 331 F.3d 306, 310 (4th Cir. 2002). Because 
both the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Idaho Court of Appeals apply the same test. 
which is contrary to the test advanced by Defendants, this Court declines to apply the stricter 
version of the McDonough test. 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 47(h) provides various grounds on which to challenge 
jurors for cause. Had Mr. Barbo disclosed that he was a policyholder of Defendants, he may 
1. In that case, a man convicted of two counts of lewd and lascivious conduct and one count of sexual abuse 
moved for a retrial on the basis of a male juror who failed to disclose during voir dire that his wife had been sexually 
molested as a child. Id. at 901,828 P.2d at 1306. On the second day of trial, the man told the court of his wife's 
abuse, and advised the court that when the question was asked, he had not thought of his wife. Id. After revealing 
thls, he went on to say that he did not "think that it would affect [his] judgment in making the declslon." ld. at fn. 1 
2. This IS a criminal procedure standard under I.C. 19-2019. 000258 
1 have been challenged as being "united in business" with the defendants, (I.R.C.P. 47 (h)(3)). 
The trial court must ultimately determine whether or not a juror can render a fair and tmpaflral 
verdict. Quincy 1). Joitzt Scfzotjl Dist, No. 31, 102 ldaho 764, 768, 640 P.2d 304, 308 (1982). 
I Generally, a prospective juror 1s not automatlcail y subject to challenge due to any small 
business relat~onsh~p with a party. The concept of being "united in business" applies to business 
associates, and precludes someone from serving "as a juror in  a case where his business, 
moneyed, or other interests are at stake." Wall v. C'huttin, 1'7 Idaho 664, -, 106 P. 1132, 1133 
(1910). More recently, the Court held that a doctor-patient relationship does not create a clear 
risk of prejudice such that a court must disqualify from the jury all current patlents of the 
defendant-doctor. Morris v. Thornson, 130 ldaho 138, 140, 937 P.2d 1212, 1214 (1997). The 
Court based this on the observation that a doctor-patient business relationship does not implicate 
the financial interest of the potential patlent-juror. Id. Whether or not a particular juror is biased 
is a tactual decision for the tnal court. Qui~zcy v. Joirzt Sclzool Dist. No. 41, 102 Idaho 763, 768, 
640 P.2d 304,308 (1982). 
ANALYSIS: 
First the court must determine if Mr. Barbo was dishonest in voir dire. It is worth noting 
that the Court did not specifically ask the venire if anyone was a policyholder of Defendants 
Instead, the Court asked if anyone personally knew the parties, at which point a prospective juror 
noted that he was a policyholder. Mr. Barbo did not personally know Defendants; he did not 
even realize that he was a policyholder, therefore his lack of response was honest. Although 
Defendants argue that Mr. Barbo should have realized that the Court rnearzt to ask if anyone was 
a policyholder of Defendants, based on an inference from the answers of the other prospective 
jurors, this argument side-steps the i~nport of what the Court actually asked the venire. 
Defendants argue that the Court "obviously" concluded that a juror who was a 
policyholder of the defendants was sufficiently blased or at nsk of bias so as to preclude their 
ab~llty to act as Far and ~mpartial jurors. Thls does not accurately represent what happened 
during voir dire. At the request of Mr. Risch, the Court dismissed the jurors who indicated that 
they were policyholders, but it did so out of excess of caution rather than because a challenge for 
cause existed against such individuals. 
Even if Defendants are correct in stating that Mr. Barbo should have understood the 
Court's question to include insured-insurer relationships, they have not shown that Mr. Barbo 
intentionally lied to the Court. Defendants point out that Mr. Barbo was involved in a car 
accident that he personally reported in 2004, and that, according to their records, Mr. Barbo 
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himself contacted Liberty Mutual regarding the automobile policy on multiple occasions. 
However, Mr. Barbo stated in his affidavit that he did not know that he had an insurer-insured 
relationship with Liberty Mutual. This is corroborated by Liberty Mutual's records which 
indicate Janet Barbo as the primary contact for the policy. The court thoroughly questioned and 
evaluated Mr. Barbo's testimony at the evidentiary hearing, and although he was mistaken as to 
when he had contacted Liberty Mutual, the court did not find him to be dishonest. It is true that 
in 2004, nearly three years before this trial, he made a claim against the insurance policy, but Mr. 
Barbo stated that he was satisfied with the outcome and held no grudges or bias against Liberty 
Mutual. Since Mr. Barbo remained with Liberty after the accident, his statement that he was not 
upset with Liberty appears truthful. Mr. Barbo's failure to reveal his relationship with Liberty 
Mutual was an honest mistake. 
Although Defendants allege that Mr. Barbo lied to the court in voir dire, they have not 
alleged a credible motive to account for such behavior.%r. Barbo demonstrated a strong desire 
not to be a juror in this case. In fact, he asked the court to excuse him for his work duties. 
Despite Mr. Barbo's mistaken memory of his contacts with Liberty Mutual, the fact that he 
remains an insured shows his lack of bias against the company. Further, any implied prejudice in 
this situation would be against Plaintiffs, rather than against his own insurance company. 
Even if Mr. Barbo's omission in voir dire was not an honest mistake, it was not in regard 
to a material matter giving rise to a challenge for cause. As a mere insured of an insurance 
company, Mr. Barbo cannot be considered to be "united in business" with Liberty. Generally, 
the risk of an insured being on the jury is that the insured will not want an adverse verdict 
because i t  might cause his premiums to go up. Here, Mr. Barbo was clearly not influenced in 
that direction as his vote was against Liberty. Further, no evidence of bias exists. 
Defendants argue that other jurisdictions recognize that policyholders are biased in cases 
where the insurance companies are defendants, and cite Lopez v. Farmers Ins. Co. qf Arizoizu. 
868 P.2d 954 (Ariz. App. 1993). Defendants fail, however, to recognize that in that case, 
policyholders were dismissed because evidence was presented indicating that premiums would 
go up if the insurance company lost. Id. at 956. Therefore, the jurors should have been 
dismissed because the policyholders had a financial interest in the outcome of the case, and were 
3 .  "The motives for concealing information may vary, but only those reasons that affect a juror's impartiality 
can truly be said to affect the fairness of a trial." McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556. 
6 
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b~ased In favor of the insurance company. kd.' In this case, Mr. Barbo was clear1 y not b~ased in 
favor of the Insurance company, as he voted for the verdrct for the Weinsteins. 
CONCLUSION: 
Mr. Bat-bo's omisslon was an honest mistake that related to a non-mater-~al matter. The 
fact that he was an Insured of the defendant L~berty does not, by itself, glve rtse to a challenge 
for cause. Defendant's nlotlon for new trial for juror misconduct 1s denled. 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
Dated this 21" day of December, 2007 
*J 
Darla Williamson, District Judge 
I, J. David Navarro, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have mailed, by 
United States Mail, one copy of the Decision and order On Defendants Motion For New Trial 
Re: Juror Misconduct as notice pursuant to Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to each of the attorneys of record in 
this cause in envelopes addressed as follows: 
James E. Risch Robert A. Anderson 
R. John lnsinger Phillip J. Collaer 
Jason Risch C. W. Moore Plaza 
407 West Jefferson Street 250 S. 51h Street, Suite 700 
Boise, ID 83702-6049 P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
Daied r h l e d a y  of December, 2007 
4. The case also stated that the facts of each case must be analyzed on an individual basis in order to 
recognize such a small relationship as giving rise tu bias, instead of granting a blanket disqualification against ail 
jurors who are policyholders of an insurance company defendant. Id. at 957. 
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IN TEE DISTRICT COURT OF TEE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF DAWO, IN AND FOR TEE COUNTY OF ADA 
LESLIE WEINSTEIN and LINDA 
WEINSTEIN, Husband and Wife, 
individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for 
SARAH R. WEINSTEIN, and SARAH R. 
WEINSTEIN, individually, 
Plaintiffs, 
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND 
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY 
and PRUDENTIAL GEmRAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY and LIBERTY 
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and 
LM PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 
INSURANCE, 
Defendants. I 
CVP 
Case No.- 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
REGARDING AMOUNT DUE SARAH 
WEINSTEIN 
Wearing Date: December 13,2007 
Heas~nr! Pur~ose: Plain t l  ffs' Motion for Supplemental or Amended Judgment in 
Favor of Sarah Weinstein 
Appearances: For the Plaintiffs- James Risch, Jahn Insinger and Jason Risch 
(James Risch arguing) 
For the Defendants-Robert Anderson and Phillip Collaer (Robert 
Anderson arguing) 
Memorandum Decision Regarding Amount Due Sarah Weinstein 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs Linda and Leslie Weinstein purchased a policy of automobile insurance 
from Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company. This policy included 
medical payment coverage of $5000.00 and uninsured motorist coverage of $250,000.00. 
On September 30, 2002, Linda Weinstein was driving a covered vehicle which 
was struck by an uninsured motorist. Her daughter, Sarah Weinstein, was a passenger in 
the vehicle and suffered injuries. The fact that the cause of the accident was due to the 
conduct of the uninsured motorist has never been disputed. The Weinsteins ultimately 
filed this lawsuit on July 7, 2004 out of the handling of their claim under the policy. 
Among their causes of action was a breach of contract claim for damages to Sarah 
resulting from the accident. All causes of action were tried to a jury. The jury was 
presented with evidence indicating Prudential had breached the contract by failing to pay. 
The jury also heard evidence of Sarah's past and future pain and suffering, potential for 
future medical bills, and medical expenses incurred. On September 1, 2007 the jury 
returned a verdict of $250,000.00 on the breach of contract claim. The jurors were 
instructed they were not to consider in arriving at this verdict any amounts that were 
previously paid to the Weinsteins on behalf of Sarah. The court would subtract those 
sums from the verdict given. 
On October 19, 2007 the coust entered a Judgment in Favor Of Plaintiff Sarah 
Weinstein in the sum of $165,000.00. The court anived at this amount by subtracting 
from the $250,000.00 the sum of $5000.00 med pay, and an additional $80,000.00 paid 
prior to trial. Plaintiffs are now requesting the court to increase the judgment by an 
additional amount of $80,210.17 reflecting prejudgment interest and additional interest 
accruing after October 19, 2007, as well as $3000.00 that the court incorrectly included in 
the judgment that was allocated for attorney fees. Plaintiff's trial Exhibit 283 reflects a 
payment by defendants of $80,000.00 on January 10, 2005, of which $60,000.00 was 
allocated to defendant's evaluation of Sarah's injuries, $17,000.00 to prejudgment 
interest and $3000.00 attorney fees. Accordingly, the court should have subtracted 
$65,000.00 instead of $85,000.00.' 
1 According to the policy, the med pay is to be deducted from the uninsured motorist payment.(Pls trial 
Exhibit 3 1) 
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Defendants requested In thelr response that the court decrease the ~udgment by 
$3,072.71 for medical bllls paid afer suit was filed. In reviewing the trtal exhlblts the 
court finds add~tionally that defendants pald $264.57 on September 15, 2004 (Exhlblt 
2811 and $2,509.95 on September 29, 2004 (Exhlblt 282) for a total of $2,773.52 
addit~onul credit due on the judgment. The court cannot readlly ascertain the remalnlng 
balance of $298.19. There are substantral tnal exhib~ts. If defense counsel can wlthln 
thlrty days d~rect he court to the exhlblt reflecting this payment, the court wlll grant an 
addltlonal credit of $298.19. 
Defendants are opposlng any increase in the judgment for pretnal interest and 
Interest accruing after October 19,2007 for claims based on prejudgment interest. 
ANALYSIS 
The remaining issue is are the Weinsteins entitled to prejudgment interest on the 
$250,000.00. I.C. 28-22-104 allows for prejudgment interest at the rate of twelve percent 
per annum in cases where money is due on an express contract. "In insurance cases 
money becomes due as provided under the express terms of the insurance contract". Jury 
bz.strzactio~z No. 13; Greenouyh v. Farm Bureau Mut. I~zs. Co., 142 Idaho 589, 130 P.3d 
1127 (2006). "When a contract expresses no specific time for its performance, it is to be 
perlbrmed within a reasonable time, as determined by the subject matter of the contract, 
the situation of the parties, and the circumstances attending the performance". Jury 
lnstructiorz No. 13; Curzon v. Wells Cargo, Inc., 86 Idaho 38, 43, 382 P.2d 906; Itvine v. 
Perry, 78 Idaho 132, 143, 299 P.2d 97. Weinsteins' insurance policy with Prudential 
required the Weinsteins to provide a sufficient proof of loss before payment would be 
made. The jurors were instructed regarding a sufficient proof of loss.' The purpose for a 
proof of loss "is to allow the insurer to form an intelligent estimate of its rights and 
liabilities, to afford it an opportunity for investigation, and to prevent fraud and 
imposition upon it." Britzknzccrz v. Aid Irzs. Co., 115 Idaho 346, 349-50, 766 P.2d 1227, 
1230-31 (1988). "The insurer will determine its liability with the knowledge that it  must 
be fair and accurate or suffer the consequences". Brinkman, 115 Idaho at 350, 766 P.2d 
at 1231. Prior to suit being filed, Prudential had estimated the value of Sarah's claim to 
"nstruction No. 20 
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be approximately $150,000.00 and had set a reserve in  that amount. This sum was never 
paid to or offered to Sarah after the estimate was made. In fact the only payment received 
on behalf of Sarah prior to suit was the $5000.00 med pay. No additional amounts were 
paid to Sarah until after the lawsuit was filed on July 7, 2004, almost two years after the 
accident. 
The jury verdict awarded damages of $250,000.00. In order to award damages, 
the jury would have found that a sufficient proof of loss had been presented. The Verdict 
form for Sarah did not ask the jurors to determine the date a sufficient proof of loss was 
made and the date after which a reasonable time had lapsed for payment to be made. The 
evidence was debated by both sides at trial. 
Weinsteins argue at a minimum that prejudgment interest on $250,000.00 should 
be computed from May 19, 2004, thirty days after the Weinsteins' attorney Bruce 
Bistline sent a letter to Prudential demanding payment of medical bilk3 In that letter Mr. 
Bistline indicated total medical bills to date at $23,102.91 with $6,759.35 being paid for a 
balance of $16,669.64. 
In Greenough the insurance policy required payment for loss to be made sixty 
days after the insurer had received a proof of loss. Greerzough, 142 Idaho at 589. 
Greenough demanded payment of $50,000.00 under the policy. In Greenough, the 
insurer disputed liability but the amount of $50,000.00 apparently was not in conflict, if  
liability was shown. Later the insurer accepted liability and paid the full amount due 
under the policy. On summary judgment, the district court found Greenough was entitled 
to prejudgment interest from the date of the accident as contemplated in Brinknzutz v. Aid 
112s. CO., 115 Idaho 346, 766 P.2d 1227 (1988). The court overruled Brinkmarz and held 
that under Greenough's policy prejudgment interest did not begin to accrue, until sixty 
days after the insured was provided with a sufficient proof of loss. The case was 
remanded to the trial court to detesmine when the insured was provided with enough 
infomation to allow i t  a reasonable opportunity to investigate and determine its liability. 
"An analysis to detesmine when a proof of loss is sufficient is a question of fact." 
Greenclugh, 142 Idaho at 593. Justice Eismann in his specially concumng opinion noted 
that existing case law requires that "damages must be liquidated or capable of 
' Plaint~ff's Exhibit 128 
Memorandum Decision Regarding Amount Due Sarah Weinstein 
mathe~~~attcal omputation for prejudgment ~nterest to be awarded." kd. at 503. In 
C;reel-tougl.~ the damages were not disputed. 
The $250,000.00 jury verdict was not capable of mathematical computatron. The 
verdlct included pain and suffering. The court does not know how much of the 
$250,000.00 was allocated by the fact frnder to pain and suffering and how much for 
medical bills. The jurors could certainly have found based on the evldence that Sarah 
Welnstern's pain and sufknng was worth $250,000.00. The evidence indicated that Sarah 
will likely suffer discomfort for the rest of her life. The jurors likewise could have 
determined the amount of medical bills due and included that in the judgment and 
allocated the balance to pain and suffering. 
The jurors, not the court, were the fact finders. Unlike Grcleaough, the damage 
amount here was unliqurdated. 
CONCLUSION 
No prejudgment Interest IS awarded. Plarntlffs are entltled to additional judgment 
of $20,000. Defendants are entitled to an additional deduct~on of $2,774.52. If wlthln 
thlrty days defendants can point to the record where ~t paid an addltlonal $298.19 for 
rnedlcal bills after suit was filed the court w~l l  credit the judgment with that amount. The 
Judgment In Favor of Plaintiff Sarah Wernsteln entered by the cour-t on October 17, 2007 
1s amended nunc pro tunc by an Increase of $17,225.48. 
D$qd this 21" day of December, 2007 
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I, J .  Dav~ci Mavano, the uncierstgned authur~ty, do hereby certify that I have 
malied, by Untted States Mall, one copy of the Memorandum Decision Regarding 
Amount Due Sarah Weinstein as notice purauant to Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to each of the 
attorneys of record in this cause in envelopes addressed as follows: 
Jarnes E. Risch Robert A. Anderson 
R. John Insinger Phillip J. Collaer 
Jason Risch G.W. Moore Plaza 
407 West Jefferson Street 250 S. sth Street, Suite 700 
Bo~se, ID 83702-6049 P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
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IN TWE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
LESLIE WEINSTEIN and LINDA 
WEINSTEIN, Husband and Wife, 
individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for 
SARAH R. WEINSTEIN, and SARAH R. 
WEINSTEIN, individually, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND 
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY 
and PRUDENTIAL GENERAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY and LIBERTY 
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and 
LM PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 
INSURANCE, 
Case No. CV PI0400280D 
DECISION AND ORDER ON 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
CLAIMED AS TO SARAH WEINSTEIN 
Defendants. 
Before the coun for decision are Plaintiffs' claimed costs and attorney fees as to 
Sarah Weinstein and Defendants' objections thereto. Hearing was held on December 13, 
2007. Attorneys James Risch, John Insinger and Jason Risch appeared on behalf of 
Plaintiffs, with Mr. Risch arguing. Appearing on behalf of Defendants were attorneys 
Robert A. Anderson and Phillip J. Collaer, with Mr. Anderson arguing. 
Decision and Order on Attorney Fees and Costs Claimed as to Sarah Weinstein 
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BACKGROUND 
Platntlffs L~nda nd Leslie Welnstein purchased a policy of automobile insurance 
from Prudentla1 Property and Casualty Insurance Company. This pol~cy included 
medical payment coverage of $5000.00 and uninsured motortst (UM) coverage of 
$250,000.00. On September 30, 2002, Linda Wernstein was driving a covered vehtcle 
which was struck by an un~nsured rnotonst. Her daughter, Sarah We~nsrern, was a 
passenger In the vehicle and suffered injuries. The Weinsteins ultimately ftled th~s  
lawsurt on July 7, 2004 out of the handllng of their clalrn under the policy. Wernste~ns 
had I-ecerved $5000.00 rn med pay benefits from defendants prior to f~ling. Among their 
causes of action was a breach of contract claim for damages to Sarah resulring from the 
accident. All causes of action were tned to a jury. The jury was presented with evidence 
indicating Prudential had breached the contract by failing to pay. The jury also heard 
evidence of Sarah's past and future pain and suffering, potential for future medical b~lls, 
and medical expenses incurred. On September 1, 2007 the jury returned a verdict of 
$250,000.00 in favor of Sarah Weinstein. The court has reduced the judgment to One 
Hundred Eighty Two Thousand Two Hundred and Twenty-Five and 48/100 Dollars 
($182,225.48), after deducting amounts paid pre-trial to the plalntiffs. 
Plaintiffs are now requesting attorney fees and costs on behalf of Sarah 
Weinstein, to wh~ch defendants have objected. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Costs 
A prevailing party in an actlon is ent~tled to certaln costs as a matter of right and 
may also be awarded discretronary costs. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1). A determination that a party 
is the prevailing party in an actlon IS comm~tted to the sound d~scretion of the court. 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B); J.R. Siinplot Co. v. Chemetics Int'l, Irzc., 130 Idaho 255, 939 P.2d 
574 (1997). In malung that determination, the court must consider, among other thlngs, 
( I )  the result of the action and the rel~ef sought by the respective parties and (2) the 
extent to which each party prevaiied upon his or her clam. kd. Rule 54(d)(l)(C) outlines 
which costs the prevailing party IS  entitled to as a matter of right. 
Decision and Order on Attorney Fees and Costs Claimed as to Sarah Weinstein Oq0269 - 
Sarah Weinstein received the maximum due under the policy. Only after suit was 
filed did defendants pay more than the $5000.00 in med pay benefits. The defendants 
evaluated Sarah's injuries to be $60,000.00 and paid $80,000.00, including the 
$60,000.00 evaluation plus prejudgment interest and attorney fees on January 10, 2005. 
The jury verdict of $250,000.00 was substantially greater than defendant's evaluation of 
the injuries. 
The coun in its discretion finds Plaintiffs to be the prevailing party and entitled to 
costs. Rule 54(d)(l)(C) provides for costs as a matter of right. An award of costs is 
committed to the sound discretion of the district court. Zimrnemzuiz v. Volkswugen ofAnz., 
Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 920 P.2d 67 (1996). Attached to this decision is Exhibit "A" of 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum Of Costs And Attorney Fees As To Sarah Weinstein. No 
discretionary costs are requested. Defendants have objected to items 6 and 10. 
In item 6, Plaintiffs are requesting costs for preparation of exhibits in the sum of 
$500.00. Defendants contend that there are no receipts or other information supporting 
this claim. Plaintiffs supported the claim with the affidavit of their attorney R. John 
Insinger, which stated that the costs were actually incurred in the prosecution of this 
action. Although it would have been helpful to the court if receipts or itemization of the 
exhibit costs were provided, the court is aware that each side admitted a large volume of 
exhibits at trial. There were hundreds of exhibits admitted by the plaintiffs on behalf of 
Sarah and the Weinsteins' claims. In comparing the costs claimed on behalf of Leslie 
and Linda Weinstein, it appears the plaintiffs have allocated one fourth of the exhibit 
costs to Sarah. In reviewing the exhibits it  appears that many of the exhibits are of 
Sarah's medical bills. These bills helped establish the extent of Sarah's injuries and 
aided the jury in determining pain and suffering. Considering the number of exhibits 
admitted, the court in its discretion believes $500.00 exhibit costs are reasonable. 
In item 10, Plaintiffs are requesting deposition costs. Defendants are objecting to 
the depositions of Linda and Leslie Weinstein, Nancy O'Connor, Anne Gorslu, Judith 
Halverson, and Stephanie Abernathy. Defendants claim these depositions all pertained to 
the bad faith claim of Linda and Leslie Weinstein. By affidavit, Mr. Insinger has stated 
these deposition costs were incursed on behalf of Sarah. Sarah's claim was for breach of 
contract. The insurance policy required that the Weinsteins present sufficient proof of 
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loss to the insurance company before payment would be made on behalf of Sarah. At 
issue was whether the Defendants had breached the contract in failing to pay Sarah's 
claims. Although Sarah's issues may have overlapped with her parents' claim, Sarah had 
to prove that sufficient proof of loss had been presented to establish a breach of contract. 
Sarah also had to prove her medical condition and the effect that the accident had on her, 
both past, present and future. The court in its discretion approves the deposition costs. 
The remaining items on Exhibit A are not contested and are costs allowed as a 
matter of right. The court awards costs as a matter of right of $2,958.15. 
11. Attorney Fees 
a. Legal Basis 
Sarah Weinstein is requesting attorney fees of $1 17,823.27 (offset by $3000.00 
paid by defendants in January 2005), with a remaining amount of $114,823.27 as of 
October 15, 2007, plus interest at "24.22 per day after October 15, 2007, until judgment 
is entered." Under Rule 54(e)(l), the Court may award reasonable attorney fees to the 
prevailing party "when provided for by any statute or contract."' Defendants assert that 
Idaho Code Sections 41-1839 and 12-120 provide the statutory basis. 
Section 12-120 does not provide a basis for attorney fees in this case. I.C.41- 
1839(4) specifically states that Section 12-120 "does not apply to any actions between 
insureds and insurers involving disputes arising under any policy of insurance." I.C. 41- 
1839(4) is the exclusive remedy for the award of statutory attorney fees in all actions 
between insureds and insurers involving disputes arising under policies of insurance. 
Huyden Lake Fire Pro?. Dist. v. Alcom, 141 Idaho 307,3 12, 109 P.3d 16 2 ,  167 (2005) 
I.C. 41-1839(1) states: 
Any insurer issuing any policy . . . of insurance . . . which shall fail for a 
period of thirty (30) days after proof of loss has been furnished as 
provided in such policy . . . to pay to the person entitled thereto the 
amount justly due under such policy . . . pay such further amount as the 
court shall adjudge reasonable as attorney's fees in such action. 
The purpose of this statute is to provide incentive to insurers to settle just claims and 
avoid the high costs associated with litigation. Hunsen v. State F u m  Mut. Auto. hls. Co., 
I Aftidavit of Attorneys Fees Claimed as Costs as to Sarah Weinstein, p. 4. 
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112 Idaho 663, 735 P.2d 974 (1987). An Insured may recover attorney fees under this 
statute lf ~t 1s shown that the insured has provided proof of loss as reyu~red by the 
Insurance pol~cy and the Insurer faled to pay an amount justly due under the pollcy 
wtthrn thlr-ty days of such proof of loss. Manirz v. State firm Mut. Auto. 1rzs.C~. 138 
Idaho 234,247, 61 P.3d 601 (2002). 
Welnsteins' Insurance policy reyulred them to give Prudential “written proof of 
the~r loss In a form contarnlng any relevant lnfurmatron" requested by Prudential withln 
30 days of Prudential" request." (Plal~~tiffs' Ex. 20). However, 'Ynsurance poltctes 
cannot require proof any greater than that which is required in u prima &cie cuse." 
Brirzkrnurz v. Aid Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 346, 349,766 P.2d 1227(1988). 
The amount of information provided should be proportional to the amount 
reasonably available to the insured. If the information provided is 
insufficient to give the insurer an opportunity to investigate and determine 
its liability, the insurer may deny coverage. Otherwise, the insurer must 
investigate andor determine its rights and liabilities. The documentation 
is the "Proof." The explanation of physical and/or financial injury is the 
"loss." "Loss" must be distinguished from liability. The insurer will 
detennine its liability with the knowledge that i t  must be fair and accurate 
or suffer the consequences. 
ld. at 350. 
Defendants argue that the timing and sufficiency of a proof of loss is a question of 
fact for the jury to decide. Because the jury in this case was never asked in the verdict to 
determine when a sufficient proof of loss was presented, defendants argue plaintiffs are 
not entitled to attorney fees. In suppor-t of their argument they cite to Gree~zough v. Furril 
Bureu~t Mut. Irzs. Co. 142 Idaho 589, 130 P.3d 1127 (2006). However, Gree~zough 
focused on the timing of a proof of loss as i t  relates to prejudgment interest, not attorney 
fees, and held merely that prejudgment interest did not begin to accrue until sixty days 
after the insurer was provided with a sufficient proof of loss. 
In determining whether the insured is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to I.C. 41- 
1839(1), the proper focus for the court is ~ihether plaintiffs presented a prin~u,fucie cuse 
that a sufficient proof of loss was presented. Plaintiffs' trial exhibits reflect that 
defendants knew on October 1, 2002, of the September 30, 2002 accident and that the 
accident was caused by an uninsured motorist. (Exs. 45,46, & 47) Exhibit 49 shows that 
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Prudential incorrectly advised plaintiffs on October 1, 2002 that the policy required a 
Coordination of Benefits coverage (COB) through their health carrier before the Medical 
Payment provision of the policy would apply.2 This practice of denial continued into 
August, 2004 (Ex. 77) until Prudential recognized their mistake. The policy also carried 
$250,000.00 in UM coverage. On October 14, 2002 Prudential received the police 
reports. (Ex. 52). Prudential was provided with medical bills for services rendered on 
October 8, 2002, and September 30, 2002. (Exs. 55 & 57). A letter from Prudential on 
November 11, 2002 asked the Weinsteins to provide copies of all medical expenses and a 
report relating to the incident, and to sign and return a medical authorization form. (Ex. 
61). The signed authorization was provided. (Ex. 63). Mrs. Weinstein testified at trial 
that she provided all that Prudential requested. On November 15, 2002 Prudential was 
aware of billings from St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center. (Ex. 62). On January 2, 
2003 the Weinsteins advised Prudential that they were getting threatening phone calls 
from medical providers for bills not being paid. Again Prudential incorrectly advised that 
they would not pay because of the COB requirement. Prudential acknowledged receiving 
medical bills and is aware of treatment and ongoing problems with Sarah's injuries. (Ex. 
64). On January 4, 2003 Prudential was aware of bills from McMilliam Medical Center. 
(Exs. 65 & 66). On January 21, 2003, Mrs. Weinstein notified Prudential that she was 
unhappy and felt Prudential was denying her claim. Prudential advised her that they were 
not denying her claim and incorrectly told her again that bills must first be denied by her 
health care provider. (Plaintiffs' Ex. 67). On February 12, 2003, without paying anything 
on Sarah's bills, Prudential told the Weinsteins that they had not received any medical 
bills for quite some time and, unless notified within 30 days, they would assume that all 
medical bills have been paid. (Plaintiffs' Ex. 70) Twelve days later on February 24, 
2003, Prudential noted they had received no response to their thirty day letter and placed 
the file in inactive status. (Exhibit 71) On April 8, 2003, Mrs. Weinstein advised 
Prudential that Sarah had an MRI showing labial tear in her hip and may need 
arthroscopic surgery and would need another MRI. Exhibit 74 shows that Prudential was 
aware of these services and the amount charged. On May 12, 2003 Mrs. Weinstein told 
2 This was incorrect as the policy did not require a coordination of benefits. The policy required Prudential 
to pay, without regard to other health insurance, the medical bills up to $5000.00 under its med pay 
coverage. 
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Prudentlai that Sarah was scheduled for hip surgery with 6 to 9 months of recovery. (Ex. 
75). On June 17, 2003 Prudent~al dented payment to Idaho Sports Med~cine Institute. 
Trlal restimolly by defendants indicated they never contested the legit~macy of any of the 
medical bi 11s presented. 
Gonsldenng all the infomation prov~ded to Prudentlal, the court finds that the 
piaintlffb have made a prrma f'ac~e showlng that by the end of 2003, or by early 2003, a 
suffic~ent proof of loss was presented to Prudentral. Prudentla1 fa~led to pay within thirty 
days the amount justly due under the polrcy. The evidence submitted durlng thls tlrne 
was sufficient to glve Prudentlal an opportunrty to ~nvestlgate and detemlne ~ t s  liab~llty 
and to pay the amount the jury detennlned to be justly due. 
The tnai exhlbits contlnue to show non payment by Prudentlal and threats by 
collection agencies against the Weinsteins, and requests for information that had already 
been presented to Prudentlal. The evidence presented at tnal indtcates that the 
Welnste~ns did everyth~ng requested of them by Prudent~al. The tnal evidence also 
indicated that Prudentlal never questioned the val~dity of the medical bills presented. 
Finally in October, 2003 the Welnstelns sought the assistance of an attorney with a 
lawsuit being filed on thelr behalf on July 7, 2004. Prror to fillng the lawsu~t the only 
amount rece~ved by the Weinste~ns under thelr policy was the $5000.00 pa~d under the 
med~al payment benefit of the policy. ' 
The amount justly due is the amount ult~rnately determined by the jury. Brinkmart 
v. Aid Ins. C'o., supra, at 350. The jury found this amount to be $250,000.00. The 
Insurance company never tendered this amount to the plaintiff within thirty days of proof 
of loss. The plaintiff 1s entitled to attorney fees pursuant to I.C. 41-1839(1). 
B. Amount of Attorney Fees 
"The calculat~on of reasonable attorney fees is withln the discretion of the tnal 
court." Bott v. Idaho State Bldg. Auth., 128 Idaho 580, 592, 917 P.2d 737, 749 (1996). 
"When awarding attorney's fees, a distr~ct court must consider the applrcable factors set 
forth In I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)." Nirzes I?. Nz~ze.i, 129 Idaho 847, 855, 934 P.2d 20, 28, (1997). 
"Rule 54(e)(3) does not require the d~strlct court to make specific findlngs In the record, 
only to conslder the stated factors In determining the amount of the fees. When 
3 Payment was made after Prudential realized their mistake. 
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factors tn reachtng an award amount.'Y~ltttrtz v. Mitfolz, 140 Idaho 893, 902, 104 P.3d 367, 
376 (2004). The ""court need not specifically address all of the Zactors contained in 
1.R.G.P. 53(e)(3) in writlng, so long as the record clearly indicates that the court 
cons~dered them all." Bvel v. Stewart Rtle Cuur.Co., 137 ldaho 9, 16, 43 P.3d 768, 775 
(2002). 
One of the applicable factors ~n detemrntng an award pursuant to Rule 54(e)(3), 
1s whether the fee 1s flxed or contingent. Plaintiff 1s requesting attorney fees based on a 
contingent fee agreement with her attorney. Her agreement with the law firm of Gordon 
Law Ot-fllces required her to pay attorney fees of 25% of all monies recovered by Gordon 
Law Offtces. After suit was filed, the amounts recovered for Sarah We~nste~n u der the 
poltcy (excfud~ng medical payment benef~ts) by Gordon Law Offlces totaled $79,800.00. 
Of this sum Prudential allocated $3000.00 In attorney fees, wlth the balance applied to 
principal and ~nterest. Gordon Law Offlces was entitled to receive 25% or $19,950.00. 
Subtractrng the $3000.00 leaves a balance of $16,950.00 in fees due Gordon Law 
Offlces. On January 10, 2005 plaint~ffs retained the firm of Risch Goss Inslnger Gustavel 
to recover the balance owed under the policy. Plaintiff became contractually obligated to 
pay this firm the sum of forty percent (40)% of the amount recovered for Sarah 
We~nstein. The jury returned a verdict of $250,000.00. After considering the amounts 
previously paid, the court found Sarah entitled to judgment of $182,225.48. For the 
purpose of attorney fees to be awarded the court determines the contingent fee should 
apply to the amount of $182,235.48. Forty percent (40%) of thls amount 1s $73,890.19. 
Pla~ntiffs have not prov~ded an ltemlzatlon of hourly work by her attorneys. 
However, the court is painfully aware of the large volume of work by counsel and the 
court on this case. Much of the work had to do with the bad faith claim and punitive 
damages requested by Leslie and Linda Weinstein. However, considerable work was 
also done on behalf of Sarah. Defendants have fought tooth and nail over the Issue of a 
sufficient proof of loss and the award of any damages to Sarah. For Sarah to recover she 
had to prove that there was a breach of contract, requiring that she prove that a sufficient 
proof of loss was presented. She also had to prove past and future medical bills and paln 
and suffertng. 
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In the affidav~r of Mr. Insinger he states that beginning October 2004 Sarah's 
attorneys undertook a substantial axnount of work in gathering medical records, assessing 
amounts due, submitting several detailed proofs of loss (in addition to the numerous pnor 
proofs of loss submitted directly by plaintiff), engaged in negotiations with the 
defendants, commenced lit~gation, and thereafter continued in unsuccessful discussions 
and efforts regarding mediation and settlement. The trial lasted approximate1 y 12 days. 
Approximately one day, or more, ~rlcluded opentng and closlng statements, including 
arguments on sufficient proof of loss. The court: estimates the medical evtdence and 
other testimony on behalf of Sarah was one full day. The jury instructions took 
considerable tlme and there was debate on the issue of sufficient proof of loss. 
The novelty and difficulty of the questions in dealing with insurance policies is 
complex. The law firm of Risch Goss Insinger Gustavel are skilled plaintiffs' attorneys 
on these questions. This case would not be considered desirable because of its 
complexrty and the large resources available to an insurance company to mount a 
sizeable defense. 
The awarding of the contingent attorney fees would make Sarah whole. Making 
the insured whole is the intent of I.C. 41-1839(1). Penrose v. Comntercial Travelers 1~z.s. 
Go., 75 Idaho 524, 539, 275 P.2d 969, 978 (1954); Parsons v. hf~t t .  qf 'Enunzc.1~~ Ins. Co. 
143 Idaho 743,748, 152 P.3d 614 (2007) (approvtng award of contingent attorney fees). 
After considering all the factors set forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3), the court awards 
attorney fees of $72,890.19 for Risch Goss Insinger Gustavel and attorney fees of 
$16,950.00 for Gordon Law Offices. 
Plaintiff is also requesting prejudgment interest on the amount of attorney fees 
awarded. The court is unaware of any authority to grant prejudgment interest and 
plaintiff has not provided the court with authority. 
CONCLUSION 
The court finds plaintiffs to be the prevailing parties on the claim of Sarah 
Weinstein. Plaintiffs are entitled to costs claimed as to Sarah in the sum of $2,958.15. 
000276 
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The court tinds and concludes that there is pnma fac~e evidence that a sufficient 
proof of loss was presented to Prudential. Prudential was required to pay the amount 
justly due wlthln thirty days of this presentation. Prudentlal failed to do so. Dekndants 
are therefore Itable for attorney fees incurred on behalf of Sarah Welnsteln. The court 
finds this sum to be $89,840.19. 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
Dated this 21'' day of December 2007 
. - 
Darla ~il l iamson, District Judge 
I, J .  Davld Navano, the understgned authority, do hereby certlfy that I have 
mailed, by linlted States Mall, one copy of the Decls~on And Order On Attorney Fees 
And Costs Cia~med As To Sarah We~nstein as nome pursuant to Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to 
each of the attorneys of record In thts cause In envelopes addressed as follows: 
James E. Risch Robert A. Anderson 
R. John Insinger Phillip J. Col taer 
Jason Risch C. W. Moore Plaza 
407 West Jefferson Street 250 S. 5th Street, Suite 700 
Boise, LC) 83702-6049 P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
Dated t h i f 3  day of December, 2007 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDIClAL Dl 
THE STATE OF IDAI-lO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY 
LESLIE WEINSTEIN and LINDA 
WEINSTEIN, Husband and Wife, 
Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for 
SARAH R. WEINSTEIN, and SARAH R. 
WEINSTEIN, individually, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PRGrDENPr1AL PROPERTY AND 
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY 
and PRUDENTIAL GENERAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY and LIBERTY 
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and 
LM PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 
INSURANCE, 
Case No. CV PI 0400280D 
AmNDED JUDGmNT IN FAVOR OF 
SARAH WETNSTEIN 
Defendants. 1 
The above-entitled matter having been tried to a jury verdict and the Court having 
entered Judgment on October 17,2007, and now having made appropriate adjustments 
thereto, 
Judgment is hereby entered in favor of plaintiff Sarah Weinstein against 
defendants L~berty Mutual Insurance Company and Prudential Property and Casualty 
Insurance Company, in the amount of One Hundred Eighty Two Thousand Two Hundred 
and Twenty-Five and 481100 Dollars ($1 82,225.48) and attorney fees of $84,150.00 and 
costs of $2,958.15. 
IT IS SO ORDERED that the Judgment entered on October 17,2007 is amended 
nunc pro tunc to reflect Judgment in this amount. 
Amended Judgment In Favor Of Sarah Weinstein 
Dated thls 31" day of December, 2007 
I - 
Darla Williamson, District Judge 
I, J. Davld Navano, the undersigned authority, do hereby cert~fy that I have 
rnallcd, by United States Mall, one copy of the Amended Judgment In Favor Of Sarah 
Welnsteln as notlce pursuant to Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to each of the attorneys of record In th~s  
cause In envelopes addressed as follows: 
James E. R~sch Robert A. Anderson 
R. John Insinger Phillip J. Gollaer 
Jason Risch C.W. Moore Plaza 
407 West Jefferson Street 250 S. 5th Street, Suite 700 
Boise, ID 83702-6049 P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
day of December, 2007 
Amended Judgment In Favor Of Sarah Weinstein 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
LESLIE WEINSTEIN and LINDA 
WEZNSTEIN, Husband and Wife, 
individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for 
SARAH R. WEINSTEIN, and SARAH R. 
WEINSTEIN, tndi vldual l y, 
Plaintiffs. 
VS.  
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND 
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY 
and PRUDENTIAL GENERAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY and LIBERTY 
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and 
LM PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 
INSURANCE, 
CI 
Case No.- 
DECISION AND ORDER ON COSTS 
CLAIMED AS TO LESLIE AND LINDA 
WEINSTEZN 
Defendants. 1 
Before the court for decision are Plaintiffs' claimed costs and attorney fees as to 
Leslie and Linda Weinstein and Defendants' objections thereto. Hearing was held on 
December 13,2007. Attorneys James Risch, John Insinger and Jason Risch appeared on 
behalf of Leslie and Linda Weinstein, with Mr. Risch arguing. Appearing on behalf of 
Defendants were attorneys Robert A. Anderson and Phillip J. Collaer, with Mr. Anderson 
arguing. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs' Linda and Leslie Weinstein purchased a policy of automobile insurance 
from Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company. This policy included 
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medical payment coverage of $5000.00 and uninsured motorist (UM) coverage of 
S2SO,OOO.00. On September 30, 2002, Llnda Weinstein was dnving a covered vehlcle 
whtch was struck by an uninsured motonst. Her daughter, Sarah Welnsteln, was a 
passenger In the vehicle and suffered injuries. The Welnsteins ultimately flled thls 
lawsuit on July 7, 2004 out of the handling of then claim under the policy alleglng the 
tort of bad falth. The jury returned a verdict of $210,000.00 on the bad Path claim and 
awarded $6,000,000 in punitive damages. 
Lesl~e and Llnda Welnsrern are now requesting costs to whlch defendants have 
objected. 
ANALY SlS 
A prevailing party in an action is entitled to certain costs as a matter of right and 
may also be awarded discretionary costs. I.R.C.P. 54(d) (1). A determination that a party 
is the prevailing party in an action is committed to the sound discretion of the court. 
I.R.C.P. 54(d) (I)  (B); J.R. Simplot Co. v. Chemetics I~zt'l, Inc., 130 Idaho 255, 939 P.2d 
574 (1997). In making that determination, the court must consider, among other things, 
(1) the result of the action and the relief sought by the respective parties and (2) the 
extent to which each party prevailed upon his or her claim. Id. Rule 54(d)(l)(C) outlines 
which costs the prevailing party is entitled to as a matter of right, 
The court in its discretion determines that Leslie and Linda Weinstein are overall 
the prevailing party. They proved their bad faith claim and received compensatory 
damages of $210,000.00. They also received $6,000,000 in punitive damages. Leslie and 
Linda were required to file this suit in order to recover on their claim. 
An award of costs is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. 
Zim~nevmurz v. Volkswagen qf Am., Inc., 128 Idaho 85 1, 920 P.2d 67 (1996). Attached to 
this decision is Exhibit "A" of Plaintiffs' Memorandum Of Costs (Rule 54, I.R.C.P.) As 
To Leslie and Linda Weinstein. No discretionary costs are requested. Defendants have 
objected to items 6, 8.b, and 10.d. 
In item 6, Leslie and Linda are requesting costs for preparation of exhibits in the 
sum of $1500.00. However, Rule 54(d) ( I )  (C) allows only $500.00 for exhibit costs as a 
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mattes of nght, Defendants contencl that there are no recelpts or other lnformat~on 
support~ng this cldtm. Leslle and L~nda supported the cla~m w~th the aff~davtt of thelr 
attorney R .  John Insinger, stat~ng that the costs were actually Incurred In the prosecut~on 
of thls actlon Although ~t would have been helpful to the court ~f recelpts or ltemizatron 
of the exhibit costs were provtded, the court 1s aware that each slde adm~tted a large 
volume of exhlblts at trial. There were approx~mately 1000 exhlbits admitted by the 
plalntlffs on behalf of Sarah and the Wetnsteins' clatms. In comparing the costs clalrned 
on behalf of Leslie and Llnda We~nsteln, t t  appears the plaintiffs have allocated one 
fourth of the exhlbrt costs to Sarah. The substantlal number of exhrb~rs helped establish 
the bad farth clam and the award of punrt~ve damages. Considenng the large volume of 
exhiblts admltted the court in ~ t s  discretion belleves $500.00 exhlblt costs are reasonable. 
Also In respect to Item 6, defendants claim that the court should not award greater 
then $500.00 total for a11 pla~ntlffs. The court prevrously awarded Sarah Welnsteln 
$500.00 in exhrb~t costs. However, Sarah 1s a different party and her clalm was 
Independent of the Leslle and Linda Welnsteln's7 bad Path claim. 
In item 8.b., Lesl~e and Ltnda are requesting expert witness fees of $2000.00 for 
Wayne Soward. A prevailing party IS ent~tled to costs as a matter of rlght for reasonable 
expert wltness fees for an expert who testifies at a deposttion or at a mal, but not to 
exceed $2000.00. Rule 54(d) (I) (C) 8. Defendants argue that Leslie and Linda are not 
entltled to the fees related to Wayne Soward because they voluntanly wlthdrew him as a 
w~tness and moved for an order in limine prohlblttng the dtscusslon of hrs testimony. 
Therefore, Defendants argue that Mr. Soward's testlmony was not necessary to preparing 
for trral. Pre trlal heanngs before the court lndlcated that Mr. Soward became 1 1 1  and 
unable to be used as plaintiffs' expert. He was deposed by defendants because they 
understood he would be a pla~ntlff expert wltness. The Court agrees that Leslle and Ltnda 
should not be allowed $2000 in expert wltness fees for an expert who dld not appear at 
trlal and further for the reason the Welnstein's requested an order in linziize prohlbltlng 
any reference to hts deposition testlmony. However, as Rule 54(d) ( I )  (C) (10) expla~ns, 
a depostt~on that 1s not entered into evidence 1s allowable as a cost ~f ~t was reasonably 
taken for preparation in tnal. Therefore, Leslie and Linda are entttled to the cost of 
report~ng and transcribing Mr. Soward's depos~tlon, the cost of one copy of hls 
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depositions, but not to the expert w~tness fees. Defendants have not objected to the 
deposttion fee. 
In item 10.d. Leslie and Llnda are requesting $332.00 for a copy of the 
deposition of Mike L~ndstrom. Defendants argue that the Weinste~n's are not enti tled to 
the deposition copy charge related to Mlke Llndstrom because h s l i e  and Linda 
voluntartly withdrew h ~ m  as a witness and moved for an order in l imi~e  preventing 
reference to his testimony. As mentioned above, the mere fact that a deposttion is not 
entered Into evtdence does not establish that ~ t s  taktng was unreasonable. Therefore, 
Leslie and Linda are entitled to the deposition copy charges for Mike Lindstrom. 
The rema~ning items on Exhibit A are nor contested and are costs allowed as a matter of 
nght. The court awards costs as a matter of right of $13,098.81. 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
Dated this 2 ? day of January 2008 
Darla Williamson, District Judge 
I, J. David Navarro, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the Decision and Costs Claimed as to Leslie 
and Linda Weinstein pursuant to Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to each of the attorneys of record in 
this cause in envelopes addressed as follows: 
James E. Risch Robert A. Anderson 
R. John Inslnger Phillip J. Collaer 
Jason Risch C. W. Moore Plaza 
407 West Jefferson Street 250 S. 5" Street, Suite 700 
Boise, iD 83702-6049 P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
Dated r h i a  day of January 2008 
Decision and Order on Costs Claimed as to Leslie and Linda Weinstein 
EXHIBIT "A'" 
(Leslie and Linda Weinstein) 
COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT: 
I .  Filing Fee 
2. Service of Complaint and Summons on Defendants $ 0.00 
3. Witness Fees (except as stated below) 
4. Travel Expenses at -30 per mile one-way or actual travel 
expenses not to exceed .30 per mile one-way 
a. James Wadhams 
b. Norma Nielsen 
5. Expenses for certified copies admitted $ 0.00 
6. Costs for preparation of exhibits 
7. Costs of Bond premium 
8. Expert Witness Fees: 
a. James Wadhams $ 2,000.00 
b. Wayne Soward $ 2,000.00 
C. Norma Nielsen $ 2,000.00 
d. Buddy Paul $ 122.50 
e. David Childers $ 297.50 
9. Charges for reporting and transcribing depositions: 
a. KempzcenskilBensingeriMcLaughlin/quim $ 1,218.18 
b. Kent Dav 
, $ 268.83 
C. Buddy Paul $ 141.50 
d. Gary Olmsted $ 168.00 
e. David Childers $ 229.60 
f. Ken Hooper $ 150.50 g. Julie Kippenhan and Michael McDonough $ 2,241.10 
EXHIBIT "A" (LESLIE AND LINDA WEINSTEIN) - Page I 
10. Charges for one copy of any deposition: 
a. Bruce Bistline 
b. WapeSoward 
c. Wayne Sowad Vol. I1 
d, Mike Lindstrom 
e. James Wadhms 
f. Norma Nielsen 
g. James Wadhams 
TOTAL COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT: 
EXHIBIT '*A (LESLIE AND LINDA WEINSTEIN) - Page 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TEE FOURTH JUDICIAL DlSTRI a= 
f4 --- 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND ITOR THE COUNTY OF ADA JAN 2 3 2008 
LESLE WEINSTEIN and LINDA 
WEENSTEIN, Husband and Wife, 
lndivldually and as Guardian Ad Litem for 
SARAW R. WEINSTEIN, and SARAW R. 
WEINSTEIN. indlviduall y, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS.  
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND 
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY 
and DEENDANTS GENERAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY and LIBERTY 
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and 
LM PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 
INSURANCE, 
~ V P Z D Y W ~ ~ D  
Case No. 
DECISION AND ORDER ON 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
REMImITUR OR, IN TEE 
ALTERNATIVE, NEW TRIAL 
Dekndants. I 
Hearing on Defendants' Motion For Remittitur Or, In The Alternative, New Trial was 
held on December 13, 2007. Attorneys James Risch, John Insinger, and Jason Risch appeared on 
behalf of Plaintiffs, wluh Mr. Risch arguing. Appearing on behalf of Defendants were attorneys 
Robert A. Anderson and Phillip J .  Collaer, with Mr. Anderson arguing. 
Before the Court is the above-named Defendant Insurance Companies' motion for 
Remittitur or, in the alternative, New Trial, based on several grounds. Linda and Leslie 
Weinstein (the "Weinsteins") sued Defendant insurance companies ("Defendants") for breach of 
contract and bad faith based on Defendants' handling of their claim. All causes of action were 
trled to a jury. On October 1, 2007, the jury found bad faith in the handling of the uni BS(Y828 7 
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motorists ("UM") claim, but not in the med pay claim. The jury awarded $210,000 damages to 
Linda and Leslie Weinstein for bad faith, and $6,000,000 in punitive damages. The jury also 
determined that the total amount of damages sustained by Sarah Weinstein was $250,000. 
On September 30, 2002, Linda Weinstein was driving a covered vehicle which was 
struck by an uninsured motorist. Her daughter, Sarah Weinstein ("Sarah"), was a passenger in 
the vehicle and suffered injuries. At the time of the accident, the Weinsteins carried automobile 
insurance with Defendants. This policy included medical payment coverage of $5000.00 and 
UM coverage of $250,000.00. 
The Weinsteins timely reported the accident. Defendants immediately concluded, based 
on the police report and other information, that an uninsured dnver was 100% at fault. 
Defendants contacted the Weinsteins and explained that since an uninsured driver caused the 
accident, Med Pay and UM coverage would apply to the claim. The UM portion of the Policy 
states: "Our payment is based on the amount that an insured is legally entitled to recover for 
bodily injury but could not collect from the owner or operator of the uninsured motor vehicle." 
On November 11, 2002, the Defendants asked the Weinsteins to send them copies of all 
medical bills and a signed medical release form. Mrs. Weinstein signed the release on December 
5 ,  2002 with a list of medical providers. Defendants incorrectly informed the Weinsteins that a 
coordination of benefits ("COB") clause required them to submit bills first to their health 
insurance before Defendants would pay anything. Defendants continued to notify the Weinsteins 
and Sarah's medical providers that a COB clause prevented them from paying anything on the 
medical bills until this mistake was caught and corrected in April of 2003. No investigation or 
gathering of medical records was done on the claim during this time. 
Medical providers sent bills resulting from the accident to the Weinsteins. When neither 
the Weinsteins health insurance provider, nor Defendants would pay the bills, the 09@28 8 
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providers sent the overdue notices to the Weinstelns. The Wetnstelns could do llttle about the 
b~lls, srnce Rilr. We~nstetn's bussness was not doing well. Mr. Welnstein owned his own bustness 
proc~dlng scrvlces to the a ~ r l ~ n c  Industry, wh~ch bas struggling In the wake of the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001. The family was struggling financially. 
On January 2, 2003, Mrs. Welnstesn told Deferrdants that she was recelvlng thi-eaten~ng 
phone calls from the ambuiance company and hospital regarding unpald bills. She also told them 
that she and her daughter were st111 receiving medical treatment for their lnjunes. Despite thls 
continued contact from Mrs. Welnstein, on February 12, 2003, Defendants sent a letter to the 
We~nstelns statlng that ~f they d ~ d  not receive new medlcal bllls withln 30 days, the file would 
close. Twelve days later the file was inact~vated "since there has been no response to [the] 30 
day letter." 
In the meantime, Sarah's doctor recommended physical therapy. She began her physlcal 
therapy program with the goal of prepanng her to play soccer-her favorite sport-in December 
2002. Her program advanced as anticipated, and in February, 2003 her physical therapist 
released her to resume physical act~vities as tolerated. When she began training for and playlng 
soccer, her hip pain returned. She was only able to play ten minutes per half, and ultimately had 
to stop playlng entirely. Her mother sought further medical treatment for her. 
In Aprrl 2003 Mrs. Welnsteln notifled Defendants that Sarah had an MRI showlng a h ~ p  
injury that might require surgery. After a second MRI, medical doctors deterinined that Sarah 
had suffered a labial tear in her hip, resulting from the accident, which required arthroscopic 
surgery. Mrs. Weinstein called Defendants to advise them that Sarah was scheduled for 
arthroscopic surgery on May 19, 2003 and that her recovery time would be approximately six to 
nine months. By this time, Defendants determined their mistake regarding the COB and pald a 
handful of bills that had been incurred right after the accident. 
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Sarah's surgery was perfomed as scheduled, and she began another round of physlcal 
therapy. Her progress was slow and required numerous visits to medical providers to assess her 
recovery. Sarah's frtends and family observed that she appeared depressed and withdrawn after 
#' her surgery. Sarah was unable to retum to play soccer for more than ten minutes per half, had to 
restnct her runnlng, and suffered constant discomfort and pain. She st111 suffers pain when she 
runs and engages In sports, and can only pafitcipate In high-impact phystcal actlvlties for lim~ted 
periods of time. Medrcal doctors testif~ed at trlal that, due to the accident, she will probably 
reyurre h ~ p  surgery sometrme tn the future, and will most likely develop arthnt~s In her hlp. 
From May 2003 on, Mrs. Wernstein continued to recelve regular phone calls and letters 
from medical bt lllng departments and collection agencles regarding overdue medical bl 1 Is. 
These events caused her to feel depressed and cry. The grief, stress, and constant embarrassment 
resulted in manta1 discord and family turmotl. On one occasion, as Mrs. Welnstein was leaving 
a doctor's office following Sarah's vislt, a staff member informed her that if she dld not pay her 
outstanding bill In full immediately, Sarah would no longer receive treatment. This was stated at 
a loud volume in front of other staff and patients, and Mrs. Weinste~n was very upset to have her 
tlnancial afpalrs publtc~zed. Although Mrs, Welnstein notlfied Defendants of thls ~ncident, they 
d ~ d  nothlng. Thls Court observed Mrs. Welnsteln's demeanor at tnal and the court belleves she 
was deeply d~sturbed by the harassment of bill collectors and Defendant's unresponsiveness to 
her pleas for assistance. 
In July 2003, Mrs. Weinsteln again called Defendants to complaln about Sarah's 
outstandlng medical bllls.' This resulted in the payment of a number of overdue bills under the 
Med Pay coverage. In September, 2003, Mrs. Welnstern demanded that UM coverage pay 
Sarah's outstandlng med~cal bills, many of which were in collection. Mrs. Welnsteln told 
1 .  All b11ls cons~dered after the exhaustion of med pay were responded to wth a form that explained the 
denial by stating "Pitlicy benefits have been exhausted." (Plf's Exs. 83, 84, 11 1, 113, 119, 121). 000290 
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Defendants that she was afrald the doctors would stop treating Sarah due to unpald medlcal bills. 
Uefefer~dants informed Mrs. Weinstctn that the Med Pay benefits were exhausted, and that UM 
coverage does not pay untll final settlement, whlch occurs after the end of treatment. Dekndants 
then faxed Mrs. Welnstern a MIPAA compliant medlcal authorlzatlon to allow thzm to get the 
med pay file and information from the medical providers."rs. Welnstein signed and faxed the 
medlcal authonzation form to Defendants that day. The list of medical providers was faxed on 
September 23,2003. 
Frustrated by Defendants' slow progress on Sarah's claim, the Welnsteins hired attorney 
Bruce Btstline to deal with ~efendants .~  On October 10, 2003, Mr. Bistline sent a letter to 
Defendants notifying them that he had been retalned by the Weinsteins to represent Sxah's 
interest regarding the 2002 accrdent. A few days later, Defendants sent a letter to Mr. Blstllne 
requesting "complete medlcal and wage loss documentation'' In order to evaluate Sarah's claim. 
On October 28, 2003, Mr. Bistline wrote to Defendants and asked whether Defendants intended 
to dlspute the llabillty of the un~nsured motorist, and if so, who Defendants contended was 
negligent. Defendants did not respond to this letter. Mr. Bistline also demanded payment of 
several medical bills amounting to nearly $2,000, which Defendants did not pay. 
On November 3, 2003 Mr. Bistline called Defendants and demanded payment of the 
medlcal bills. Defendants told Bistline that a current medical authonzation form was needed to 
get the b~lls, and that Defendants did not know what was wrong w~th Sarah. Mr. Bistline stated 
that he wo~ild gather the current bills if Defendants would get the med pay file and share ~t w~th 
him. Defendants sent a letter the same day requesting copies of all medical expenses and reports, 
a s~gned medlcal authorlzat~on form, and a llst of medical providers. Mr. Bistllne recelved 
2 HIPAA came into effect on Apr~l 14,2003 
3 On September 30.2003, the Welnste~ns old a prece of property for $175,000. Then, in 2003, they 
rece~ved an inheritance The rpec~fic date and amount of th~s  lnherltrnce has not been polnted out to the c o g  0 0 2 9 1 
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noth~ng from Defendants until March 9, 3004, when he received a two page summary of the med 
log, and nothing else. 
On November 5 ,  2003, Defendants' employees discussed the demand for med~cal blll 
payment under UM coverage, and confened with an in-house auorney. The attorney advised 
Defendants that he was unaware of any law In Idaho requiring payment of medical b~lls before 
sctrlement. Dekndants concluded that the policy required only one payment. 
On March 3, 3004 a lten was placed on the We~nstelns' propfly for failing to pay bills 
fron-1 the accident. On Apr~l 30, 2004, Btstl~ne sent another letter to Defendants requesting 
payment of $16,669.64 In outstanding medical bills. He also stated that he would gather up-to- 
date medical records arid a prognosis from a physician to provide a proof of loss as to future 
medical expenses. On May 20, 2004, Bistline sent the medical records to Defendants. The next 
month, Defendants flnally began evaluating the clam. Defendants noted that Sarah had 
treatment through February 20, 2003 and resumed soccer without problems, but had residual hip 
pain, and then suggested that she resumed soccer too soon and caused additional problems. 
Defendants observed that Sarah told the doctor in March, 2003 that she had a clicklng sensation 
in her hip for two to three weeks and significant pain while running and kicking the ball. 
On June 10, 2004 Defendants decided that they would offer a payment in advance of 
$10,000 due to the Weinsteins' hardship. Defendants noted their desire to further review the 
medical file records because Sarah's physical activities might have aggravated the injury. On 
June 11, 2004, Defendants sent a letter with the payment in advance agreement ("PIA 
Agreement"). On July 7, 2004, Bistline sent a letter to Defendants rejecting the PIA Agreement, 
and indicating that the Weinsteins had filed suit for breach of contract and bad faith handling of 
their claim under the policy. 
At trial Defendants argued that in UM cases, their policy was to wait until after receiving 
all information at the end of treatment and recovery, and then evaluate the claim and make off r 
069292 
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1 of treatment to gather records and evaluate was In accordance with corporate pollcles. 
Addltlonally, Defendants' log notes reflect &hat when supervrsors revtewed the We~nsre~n file, 
they reporled that the file was "properly directed." Defendants had no mechan~sm for e~ther 
pay~ng und~sputed amounts In UM cases before the end, or for earlier investlgat~on and 
evaluation in cases of prolonged lnjury and recovery. 
The Wernsteins' experts testified that insurers had a duty to investigate and evaluate 
clalms w ~ t h ~ n  a reasonable time and that, I n  therr oplnion, Defendants had breached those duties. 
The Weinste~ns also presented Defendants' claims handllng manuals whlch lndlcated that 
investigat~on of claims should begin when the insurer recelves notlce of a claim. The 
Welnstetns' experts also test~fied that In UM cases, as In other first party Insurance cla~ms, 
Insurers have a duty to pay undisputed amounts In a reasonable tlrne. They op~ned that the 
treatment of the Welnste~ns by Defendants was lntentlonal and unreasonable, and contrary to 
Industry practice In Idaho. 
At tnal the Weinstelns presented Dr. Norma Nielson, a professor of Insurance. She 
testified about the bas~c purpose of the insurance ~ndustry, and how it works. She discussed 
Idaho's regulation of the insurance Industry, and described the department as small and under- 
resourced. She testfled that when state departments regulattng the Insurance Industry are under- 
resourced they are not very effective In regulat~ng the conduct of the ~ndustry. She oplned that 
state regulatory act~on may not be as effect~ve In controlling Industry behavtor as pun~tlve 
damage awards. Add~tlonally, she test~f~ed as to the finance of L~berty Mutual. 
I. REMITTITUR 
Defendants request a 1-emitt~tur of the damages awarded by the jury. First, they argue that 
there 1s insufficient evidence for the award. Second they argue that the statutory cap on punltlve 
damages should be implemented. Finally, they argue that the punitive damage award violates 
000293 
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Defendant's due process rights. 
Should the Court cond~t~onally deny a new trlal subject to a remittitur, "the party to 
whom ~t 1s drrected shall have 42 days from entry of the order in whlch to accept or reject the 
same. If such party files a notlce of appeal, the appeal shall not constitute an acceptance nor 
rejection of . . . the remittltur and such party shall not be requlred to accept or reject the . . . 
remittitur untll the determination of the appeal." I.R.C.P. 59.1. 
A. INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
A motlon for remittltur based on insufficiency of the evidence must be considered under 
Rule 59(a)(5). Prutton v. Gage, 122 Idaho 848, 851, 840 P.2d 392, 295 (1992). Because 
Defendants base part of thelr motion for new trial on thls rule as well, both remittltus and new 
tnal will be discussed in  sectton I1.D. 
B. THE STATUTORY CAP ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES DOES NOT APPLY 
Defendants argue that the punltlve damage award should be limited to $250,000 In 
accordance wlth the statutory cap found at Idaho Code, 6-1604. That amendment took effect on 
July 1, 2003, In the mlddle of the Weinstelns' claim process. Defendants argue that the cause of 
action for bad falth regarding the UM clalms did not accrue until after the amendment took 
place, and thus the punitlve damages should be reduced to $250,000. The Weinstelns argue that 
the evidence establishes that the bad faith handling of the claim began before July 1,2003. 
Idaho Code chapter 6, section 1604 was amended, effective July 1,2003, to ltmlt punltlve 
damages awards to the lesser of either three times the compensatory award, or $250,000. The 
leg~slature noted: "th~s act shall be In full force and effect on and after July 1, 2003. Sectlons 1 
through 3 of this act shall apply to all causes of action which accrue thereafter." Idaho Sess. 
Laws Ch. 122, sec. 6, p. 372; see also Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 501,95 
P.3d 977, 983 (2004) ('in. 1 ) .  
The time that a cause of actlon accrued nlay be a questlon of law or of fact, de e d bb8294 
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upon whether any dtsputed tssues of matenal fact extst. Kimbrollgh v. Reed, 130 Idaho 512, 516, 
943 P.3-d 1232, 1236 (1997). Where there IS no dlspute over any lssue of matenal fact regarding 
when the cause of actlon accrues, the questlon is one of law for deteminatlon by the court. Id. 
However, where there IS confl~ctlng evldence as to when the cause of actlon accrued, the lssue 1s 
one of tact tor the ti-ler of fact. M.; Nrrco Mirz~rat.~ C'o. I*. Mc~rrison fiudsetz Gorp., 140 Idaho 
144, 150,90 P.3d 894, 900 (2004). Under Idaho law, a cause of actlon generally accrues when a 
party may malntain a lawsuit against another. Galbruith v. Vatzgus, Inc., 103 Idaho 912,915, 655 
P.2d 119, 122 (Gt. App.1982). See Corbriltge v. Clark Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 85, 88, 730 P.2d 
1005, 1008 (1986) (Cause of actton does not accrue until aggrieved party suffers damages); 
Western Corp. v. Vunek, 144 Idaho 150, 158 P.3d 313 (Ct. App. 2006). 
Punltlve damages do not constitute a cause of action, standing alone. Rather, punlttve 
damages depend f~rst on a successful underlying cause of actlon. See I&ho First Nut'l Bank v. 
Bliss Valley Food Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 287, 824 P.2d 841, 862 (1991); YucFzt Clctb Sales & 
Service, Irzc. v. First Nut'l Barzk of N. Idaho, 101 Idaho 852, 864,623 P.2d 464 476 (1980). 
When consldenng a continuing tort, one involving wrongful conduct that is repeated untll 
desisted, accrual is treated differently. Glaze v. Deffenbuugh, 2007 W L  4166234 (Idaho 2007); 
Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 616, 850 P.2d 759, 767 (1993); In such cases, plaintiffs "can 
reach back to its beginning even if that beginning lies outside the statutory limitations penod, 
when ~t would be unreasonable to require or even permit him to sue separately over every 
lncldent of the defendant's unlawful conduct." McCabe v. Cravelz, 2007 W L  1229095 (Idaho Ct. 
App. 2007) (cltlng Hectrd v. Sheahan, 253 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 2001)). In a contlnulng tort 
case, ~t is the cumulative effect of a continuous chain of tortious activity that causes injury. 
Curtis, 123 Idaho at 616, 850 P.2d at 767. The wrongful acts must be so numerous and 
continuous that i t  is impractical to allocate damages across them. Heard, 253 F.3d at 318-19. 
"Since usually no single incident in a continuous chain of tortious activity can 
'fa'8~Q 2 9 5 
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realistically he identtf~ed as the cause of slgnif~canr harm,' 1t seems proper to regard the 
cuinulatjve ettect of the conduct as actionable." Curtzs, 123 Idaho at 603, 850 P.2d at 754 
(quoting Page, 729 F.2d 818, 821-22 (D.G. Clr. 1984)). 
Defendants urge the court to base its decision on the facts set forth In the Complarnt. The 
Complaint specified examples of bad faith that occurred after July 1, 2003. Because ~t does not 
speclfy acts before that date, Defendants argue that the bad faith claim on the UM settlement 1s 
I~rnited by the statutory amendment. However, Idaho law has long abandoned technical rules of 
pleadtng, and does not require a plaintiff to set forth every potentla1 fact in the complalnt. Clark 
v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 325, 715 P.2d 993, 995 (1986). I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1) provides: "a pleading 
whlch sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contam . . . a short and plain statement of the claim 
showlng that the pleader is entitled to relief." Therefore, the Welnsterns are not llmited to the 
evldentlary examples In the Complaint but may cite any evldence on the record to support their 
argument that the statutory cap does not apply. 
Next, Defendants argue that the Court's comments at an Apnl 25, 2007 hearing on a 
motlon to amend the complaint requlre the Court to apply the statutory cap. The Court noted 
that, by allowing the Weinsteins to amend their complalnt to add a Med Pay clalm, the cause of 
actlon clearly contemplated punltlve damages before the statutory cap was effective. Thts 
comment was not meant to restrict the Weinsteins from presenting evidence at tnal to alter that 
oplnlon. After heanng the evidence in its entirety, the Court determined that the pre-amendment 
statute applied to the UM portion of the claim as well. 
The Court deems the bad faith treatment of the Weinsteins' UM claim to be a continuous 
tort that began when Mrs. Weinstein reported the accident and provided Defendants wlth medical 
authorizations. It is neither fair nor realistic to pinpoint the exact moment when the bad fa~th 
delay claim arose. However, there are many reasons for applylng the pre-July 2003 statute. 
Defendants determined that the uninsured motorist was 100 percent at fault almost immediately 
000296 
Decision And Order On Defendant's Motion For Remittitur Or, In The Alternative, New Trial 10 
after the accident. At that polnt, Defendants began to deliberately delay settlement of the UM 
clarrn, ptlrsuant to the existing policy to pay nothing on UM claims unt11 the end-regardless of 
how long the Welnsterns would have to wait. The UM adjusters did nothlng with the medlcal 
releases, and nunlerous bills were denied before July 1, 2003. Mrs. Weinsreln received calls 
froin bill collectors In January, 2003. The LlM claim received no  attent~on, desplte Mrs. 
Welnstetn's complaints, and the Med Pay portron was inactivated. 
Further, Defendants were on notzce In 2002 that bad faith handling of the claim could 
result In punltive damages for which there was no cap In Idaho. 
Defendants argue that because med pay was not exhausted until July 2003, no bad faith 
on the UM claim could have occurred. Both the UM and med pay claims were actlve when 
Defendants determined that an uninsured motonst was 100 percent liable for the accident. Thus, 
the UM clalms process should have begun, and there is no reason why Defendants should have 
waited until the Med Pay limits were spent, particularly when the seriousness of Sarah's injury 
was apparent. 
C. DUE PROCESS 
Defendants raise three arguments alleging that the punitive damages award violates due 
process. They first argue that evidence and argument was impermissibly admitted relating to 
out-of-state actions and lnjunes to non-parties, and that the jury improperly considered that 
evldence when reaching the punltlve damages award. Second, they argue that admitting 
evidence of Defendants' net worth was improper and violated their due process r~ghts. Lastly, 
they argue that the damages are excessive In llght of the three guideposts ldentlfied by the United 
States Supreme Court. 
1. Evidence of out-of-state conduct andfor injury to non-parties 
Defendants first argue that Mr. Risch ' s references to the "insurance industry" were not 
limited to Idaho and that Dr. Nielson's testimony about the insurance industry, considered 
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together, demonstrate that the jury improperly considered evidence of out-of-state conduct and 
harm to non-parties when reaching the punitive damages award. Plaintiffs argue that no 
evidence of out-of-state conduct or harm to non-parties was presented to the jury for 
conslderatlon, and thus Defendants' due process rights were not violated. 
States have a legitimate interest in imposing punitive damages for deterrence and 
retnbutlon of wrongful conduct. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 
408, 416 (2003) ("Campbell"). A state has no power to punish a defendant for conduct that was 
lawful where i t  occurred and had no impact on the state. BMW of North Arnericu v. Gore, 51 7 
U.S. 559, 572-73 (1996) ("Gore"). Generally, a state has no "legitimate concern In imposing 
punitive damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts committed outside of the state's 
jurisdiction." Canlpbell, 538 U.S. at 421. 
'The Due Process Clause forbids a state to use a punitive damages award to punish a 
defendant for injury that i t  inflicts upon nonparties." Philip Morris USA v. Williams. 127 S. Ct. 
1057, 1063 (2007). In Philip Morris, a widow sued Philip Morris, the manufacturer of Marlboro 
cigarettes, for negligence and deceit, because her husband died from smoking cigarettes. Id. at 
1060. Dunng the course of the trial, plaintiff's counsel told the jury to "think about how many 
other [smokers like decedent] in the last 40 years in the state of Oregon there have been . . . . 
[Cligarettes . . . are going to kill ten [of every hundred]." Id. at 1061. Defendant Philip Moms 
then requested a jury instruction stating "you are not to punish the defendant for the impact of its 
alleged misconduct on other persons." Id. The trial court refused this instruction. Id. The jury 
then awarded $821,000 in compensatory damages and $79.5 million in punitive damages. Id. at 
1061. On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, Philip Moms argued that it was unconstitutional for 
the trial court to allow evidence of harm to non-parties without providing an instruction to the 
jury prohibiting them from punishing a defendant for harm to non-parties. Id. at 1062. The 
Court agreed with Philip Morris. Id. at 1064. The Court further stated that when evide@@fJ298 
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harm to non-parties has been admitted or suggested, tnal courts must issue jury instructions that 
explatn what evidence can be cons~dered In determining a punit~ve damage award. Id. at 1065. 
In this case, Mr. Risch argued In his opening statements and closing arguments that the 
insurance tndustry In Idaho would be listening to the results of the case. On a few occasions, he 
drd not say '3n Idaho" immediately after h ~ s  reference to the Insurance ~ndustry. However, glven 
that such omlsslons were made In the context of d~scusstng the insurance industry In Idaho, 
anyone listening to the ent~rery of his argument would understand that his references were 
limited to Idaho. Further, the jury was instructed that the punitive damages award could not be 
used to punish Defendants for out-of-state conduct, or for ham to non-parties. 
Dr. Nielson qualified as an expert witness in this case. To the extent her knowledge 
could asslst the tner of fact In deciding a fact in issue or understanding the evidence, her 
testimony was admissible. IRE 702; Stczte v. Mewi t z ,  131 Idaho 642, 646, 962 P.2d 1026, 1030 
(1998). The operations of the insurance industry are beyond the experience of the average juror. 
I 
Dr. N~elson's testimony about the Insurance Industry and its regulation was properly admissible 
because i t  helped the jury understand the evidence. Her explanation of how and why Insurance 
companies operate helped the jury understand what happened in this case, and whether or not the 
Defendants' actions were reasonable. Dr. Nielson clearly testified that she had no knowledge of 
the Welnstelns' clam or how it was handled, and that her testimony related to how insurance 
works and why ~t exists. None of her testimony was offered as evidence of out-of-state conduct 
or ham to non-parties, and thus no reason exists to overturn the punitive damages award for 
violating Defendants' due process rights on these grounds. 
2. Evidence of Defendants' Wealth 
Defendants argue that permitting the jury to consider evidence of Defendants' wealth 
violated their due process nghts. Plaintiffs argue that juries are not prohibited from considering 
evidence of a defendant's wealth, but rather from basing awards on a defendant's wealth @@0299 
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In Cilfitpbell, Mr. Campbell caused an auton~obilc accident resulting in the death and 
serjous ~njury uf others. 538 U.S. at 413. Mr. Campbell was deemed liable. Id. Desplte a 
I settlement offer w~thln Campell's policy Itrnlts, h ~ s  insurance company, State Farm, refused to I 
F g 
i settle and ~nstead chose to ltttgate hls I~ability. M. Thls resulted In a jury verdict against 
E 
Campbell tdr rn excess of hls polley llmlts and the proffered settlement. Id. After sufferrng 
financial and emotional distress resulting from the enormous ~udgment agalnst him, Campbell 
sued State Farm. Id, at 414-15. At tnal wttnesses testtfied regarding State Farm's nationwide 
practices, many of which were unrelated to Campbell's claim. Id. The jury awarded Campbell 
$2.6 million in compensatory damages and $145 million In punitive damages. 538 U.S. at 415. 
The tnal court: reduced these awards, but the Utah Supreme Court retnstated the award, statlng 
that Stare Farm's enormous wealth just~fied the damages. 538 U.S. at 426. On appeal to the 
U.S. Supreme Court, the case was reversed and remanded because the damage awards were 
excessive and because the tnal court had admitted evidence of d~ssrm~lar nd potentially legal 
out-of-state conduct. 538 U.S. at 429. The Court stated: "the wealth of a defendant cannot 
justify an otherwise unconstitutional punitive damages award." 538 U.S. at 427. Following that 
statement are two quotes from Gore: the first recognizing that wealthy corporattons possess due 
process nghts the same as individuals; and the second from Justlce Breyer's concurrence in Gore 
statlng that "[wealth] provldes an open-ended basis for tnflattng awards when the defendant I S  
wealthy . . . . That does not make its use unlawful or Inappropriate; i t  simply means that thls 
factor cannot make up for the failure of other factors." Id. at 428. 
Contrary to Defendants argument in this case, Campbell does not stand for the 
proposition that a defendant's wealth cannot be considered by the jury in determining punitive 
damages. The relevant holding of Campbell is that an unconstitutional punitive damages award 
cannot be justified solely by the defendants' wealth. 538 U.S. at 427. Defendants' wealth was 
relevant to determining the size of the award necessary to deter Defendants, and others similarly 
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situated, from engaging in similar conduct in the future. See Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 
140 ldaho 495, 507, 95 P.3d 977,988 (2004) (holding that, when determining whether a punitive 
damages award is excessive, the court should consider "the prospective deterrent effect of such 
an award upon persons situated similarly to the defendant."). 
3. Ratio of Compensatory Damages to Punitive Damages 
Defendants argue that the punitive damages award is excessive because the award is 28.5 
times the compensatory award, and 600 times the maximum statutory penalty. Plaintiffs argue 
that award is not excessive, and cite Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, (2004). 
The compensatory damages awarded to the Weinsteins were $210,000 and the punitive damages 
award was $6 million. 
In determining whether a particular punitive damage award comports with due process, 
the court considers three guideposts: 1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's 
misconduct; 2) the ratio between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the 
punitive damages award; and 3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the 
jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 
418. Under ldaho law, punitive damages are not favored and should be cautiously awarded only 
in the most compelling circumstances. Cheney v. Palos Verdes Inv. Corp., 104 ldaho 897, 905, 
665 P.2d 661,669 (1983). 
Reprehensibility is the most important guidepost. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 409. In 
Cumpbell the Court set forth several factors for consideration in determining the reprehensibility 
of a defendant's conduct. 538 U.S. at 410. These include: (1) whether the harm caused was 
physical or economic; (2) whether the conduct showed indifference to or a reckless disregard for 
the health or safety of others; (3) whether the target of the conduct was financially vulnerable; 
(4) whether the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and (5) whether 
the harm was a result of intentional conduct or of an accident. Id. 
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The initial result of Defendants' denial of the Weinsteins' claim was economic and 
emotional. The Weinsteins agreed to pay monthly premiums to Defendants in  exchange for 
Defendants' promise to protect them from financial ruin in an emergency. To the shock and 
disappointment of the Weinsteins, when catastrophe struck, Defendants did not investigate but 
denied benefits, answered phone calls, and made no progress on the claim. 
Insurance companies such as Defendants are in the business of dealing with physically 
and financially injured people in crisis. To expect insureds to wait for years before making 
payment certainly evinces a reckless disregard for the health and safety of others. In this case, 
Mrs. Weinstein told Defendants that medical providers were threatening to stop treating Sarah, 
even though she still needed medical treatment. Defendants did nothing. After automobile 
accidents, the parties involved are likely to be financially vulnerable-especially when the 
physical injuries require surgery and physical therapy. 
Defendants repeatedly treated the Weinsteins dismissively, and failed to investigate their 
claim or progress in settling for a year and a half. In fact, the Weinsteins were forced to hire an 
attorney to collect money on their UM claim. Defendants' experts testified that after an 
insurance company offered a settlement for a UM claim, the insured could either accept it, or 
hire an attorney. Such methods have been considered a way to "starve out" insureds until they 
will accept a lower payment than they would otherwise have done. Chester v. State Fumi Ins. 
Co., 117 Idaho 538,  541, 789 P.2d 534, 537 (Ct. App. 1990) (noting that the prolonged and 
confusing claims process was to encourage insureds to settle for a smaller amount than they 
otherwise would). According to the evidence, this method of waiting until the end of a UM 
claim was established policy that adjusters were instructed to follow. Finally, the jury found that 
the harm was the result of intentional conduct, and the Court agrees. 
In assessing whether the difference between a compensatory award and a punitive 
damage award violates due process, the United States Supreme Court has not established a 
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bnght-line rule for punitive damages. However, the Court noted that "few awards exceeding a 
single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will 
satisfy due process." Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425. See ulso Gore, 5 17 U.S at 581. In cases where 
the compensatory award is nominal, the ratio between the nominal award and the punitive award 
provides no assistance in determining whether or not the award violates due process. Myers v. 
Workmens Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 5 10, 95 P.3d 977, 992 (2004). The court must also 
consider the prospective deterrent effect of the punitive damages award on others similarly 
situated to the Defendant. id. at 506. 
In this case, compensatory damages of $210,000 and punitive damages of $6 million 
were awarded. This award amounts to seventy-six ten-thousandths (0.00076) of Defendants' 
$7.9 billion net worth, and just over one percent of Defendants' 2005 net income of $584 
million. The Court deems the $6 million punitive damages award to be an appropriate amount, 
in that it adequately serves as a deterrent to future bad acts by Defendants and others similarly 
situated. The amount, while large to many individuals, is a tiny fraction of Defendants' assets 
but enough to secure their attention. 
However, the punitive damage award is 28.5 times the compensatory award, and thus 
outside the limits the United States Supreme Court has set regarding punitive damages. The 
Weinsteins argue that this ratio is not determinative of whether the punitive damages award is 
unconstitutional, and base this argument on Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co. However, as the 
Defendants point out, that case involved nominal damages, while here the $210,000 was 
intended to compensate the Weinsteins for their damages resulting from Defendants' bad faith. 
In light of the limitations expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Campbell, the punitive 
damage award is excessive, and a remittitur should be entered reducing the award to within a 
single digit ratio of the compensatory award. 
Finally, punitive damages should also take into account the maximum statutory penalty 
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lor wrongful conduct. Core, 517 U.S. at 583. Pun~tlve damages greatly rn excess of a c~vll 
2 
t penalty for similar misconduct may vlolate the defendant's due process nghts. Campell, 538 
U.S. at 429. However, In Idaho, where a de-fendant has clearly tgnored the existence of a statute, 
comparing the c ~ v ~ l  penalty to the pun~tlve damage award IS not helpful or necessary. Myers, 
140 ldaho at 510. In that case, Myers sued Workmen's Auto Insurance Company for breach of 
contract based on Workmen's failure to defend her In a lawsuit ansing out of an automobile 
accident. Id. at 498. Despite Myers repeated requests for representation by Workmen's, whlch it  
was contractually obligated to prov~de, Workmen's failed to defend her. Id. at 499. This breach 
of contract resulted In a default judgment against Myers, the revocation of her dnver's license, 
and significant burdens upon her family. Id. at 500. She repeated her attempts to convince 
Workmen's to pay the default judgment and settle the claims, but Workmen's did noth~ng. Zd. 
Ultimately, a jury awarded Myers $735 In nom~nal damages and $300,000 in pun~tlve damages. 
Id. On appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, Workmen's argued that the punitive damages award 
was excessive, In part, because ~t was 30 times greater than the maximum statutory penalty set 
forth under the Idaho Unfair Claims Practices Act. Id. The Court held that because Workmen's 
was not Influenced by the existence of the act, monetary penalties, or the threat of losing State 
Ilcensure, the ratlo between the statutory penalty and the punitive damages award was not 
controll~ng. Id. at 510. 
Thls case involves the same statute that Myers considered. The maxlmum penalty for 
v~olatlon of the Unfalr Clalms Pract~ces Act is $10,000. I.C. 41-1329A. However, as In  Myers, 
Defendants were not ~nfluenced by the ex~stence of the statute, and therefore a cornpanson 
between the award and the statutory penalty is not helpful, 
The Court deems the $6 million punitive damages award to be appropriate to deter 
Defendants from engaging in similar conduct in the future. However, because the United States 
Supreme Court has limited punitive damages awards, the Court reduces the award to a single 
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digit ratio of one to nine, which is $1.89 million ($1,890,000). 
11. NEW TRIAL 
Defendants move for new trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a) subsections (1)(3)(5)(6) and (7). 
Each of these subsections requires the court to consider a different standard in determining 
whether or not to grant a new trial. Therefore, after laying out the general standard applicable to 
motions for new trial, each basis will be considered separately. 
GENERAL EGAL STANDARD FOR NEW TRIAL: 
A motion for a new trial under LRCP 59(a) may be brought in the alternative to a motion 
for JNOV. IRCP 50(b); Quick V. Crune, 1 1  1 ldaho 759, 766, 727 P.2d 1187, 1194 (1986). On a 
motion for new trial, the court has broad discretion and, unlike a motion for JNOV, "weighs the 
evidence and the credibility of the witness." Id. On a motion for new trial, the trial judge may set 
aside the verdict even though substantial evidence exists to support it. Id. at 767. Additionally, 
the trial judge is not required to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing 
party. Id. The rule that a verdict will not be set aside when supported by substantial but 
conflicting evidence has no application to a trial court ruling upon a motion for a new trial. 
Wilsoiz v. J.R. Simplot Co. 143 Idaho 730, 731, 152 P.3d 601, 602 (2007) (citing Dineen v. 
Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 625-26, 603 P.2d 575, 580-81 (1979)). The Idaho Supreme Court has 
held that "respect for the function of the jury prevents [a court from granting] new trial except in 
unusual circumstances. Pratton v. Gage, 122 Idaho 848, 850, 840 P.2d 392, 394 (1992). 
Where counsel fails to make a proper objection to evidence or testimony offered at trial 
the issue is not preserved for appeal. Gillinghum Const., Inc. v. Newby- Wiggins Const., Inc., 142 
ldaho 15, 12 1 P.3d 946 (2005). See Wheaton v. Irzdus. Special Indem. Fund, 129 Idaho 538, 54 1, 
928 P.2d 42, 45 (1996). In order to assert such alleged errors after trial, defendants must first 
object to those issues at trial. Rojas v. Lindsuy, 108 Idaho 590, 592, 701 P.2d 210, 212 (1985); 
First Realty & Inv. Co. v. Rubert, 100 ldaho 493,497,600 P.2d 1149, 1153 (1979). 
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A. Irregularity in the Proceedings 
Defendants argue that they are entttled to a new trial based on several alleged 
tnegulantles in the proceedings. A new trial may be granted due to "irregulanty In the 
proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party or any order of the court or abuse of dlscretlon by 
which elther party was prevented from havlng a fatr trtal." I.R.G.P. 59(a)(l). In evaluating 
whether an rrregularity tn the proceedrngs merlts a new tnal, a dlstnct court must conslder 
whether the lrregularjty had any effect on the jury's deciston. See Wiizman v. Morrison-Knudsen 
Co., 115 Idaho 869, 872,771 P.2d 533,536 (1989). 
When the motion is based on on the prevailing party's misconduct, the movlng party has 
the burden to prove that m~sconduct occulred. Sluathuug v. Allstute Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 705, 
710, 979 P.2d 107, 112 (1999). The opposing party must then show that the conduct could not 
have affected the outcome of the trial or caused prejudice. Id. 
1. Plaintiffs' Annotated Exhibit List 
Defendants allege that the Wetnstelns comml tted misconduct by distributing an lmproper 
exhiblt to the jury. On September 21, 2007, Defendants discovered that the exhibit notebooks 
Plaintiffs had distributed to the jury contatned an exhibit list annotated with commentary. The 
Court collected the llsts from the jurors and instructed them to disregard the lists. In arguing that 
the 11sts were prejudicial, Defendants provided an example of a notation that read: "[Mrs. 
Welnsteln] mails back medical authorization. [the claims adjuster] never used it." Defendants 
allege that such notations constitute inadmissible argument, and that a new tnal should be 
granted because the jury had several days to read the exhl b~ t list. 
First, Piaintlffs assert that Defendants dld not object when the exhibit lists were admitted. 
Thls IS correct, however, Defendants objected to the exhibits later on. Plaintiffs argue that 
Defendants could not have been prejudiced because the court collected the exhibit lists and 
instructed the jurors to disregard anything they had read in them. The court also noted after 
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examlntng the documents that only one, from an alternate juror, bore any mark~ngs. Defendants 
argue that the lurors might have read the list wlthoitt marklng on the list, considering that the list 
was in the~r possession for days. However, because the jury was Instructed to disregard the 
exh~btt Ilst, and the jury instructrons l~kewise limited their conslderattons to the adm~tted 
evidence, the Court: presumes the jury dld as they were told and properly d~sregarded ~ t .  
2. Court's Comments Regarding Defendants' Exhibit Notebooks 
Defendants argue that the Court made comments in the presence of the jury that 
prejudiced the jury agalnst the Defendants and prevented a falr tnal. The comments referred to 
occurred when Defendants moved to adm~t helr exhlb~t notebooks and have them d~stnbuted to 
the jury. The Court asked Plalntlffs' counsel ("Mr. Rlsch") IC he had any objections, and he 
stated that he d ~ d  not know what exhlblts Defendants' counsel was refernng to, but that he had 
no objections. After Mr. Risch's comments, the Court admitted the exhibtts and stated: "Mr. 
Rlsch you are free to look at them later if you want to, make sure that those are the exh~blts in 
there, so we aren't glving the jurors anythlng we shouldn't be g~vlng them." Defendants argue 
that the Court's statement created an ~nference that Defendants' counsel was untrustwoi~h y . No 
objecrlon was made at tnal, and thus this Issue may not now be ralsed as a basis for new trial. 
3. Plaintiffs' Closing Argument 
Defendants argue that they are entltled to a new tnal because Mr. Rlsch argued In closlng 
that Defendants had schemed to use the PIA agreement to cause pla~nt~ffs to mlss the two year 
statute of l~m~tatlons. Defendants allege that thls argument was h~ghly prejudlclal and 
tnflammatory. However, Defendants failed to object to thls issue at tnal, and thus they may not 
assert ~t as a basis for new tnal. The Pallure to object during trial, even ~f the alleged error 
occurred dunng closlng arguments, precludes the court from grantlng new tnal on that bas~s, no 
matter how mentonous. Slaathaug, 132 Idaho at 592,979 P.2d at 219. 
4. Plaintiffs' References to the Insurance Industry 
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Defendants argue that they are entitled to a new tnal because Mr. Rrsch repeatedly made 
refretences to the Insurance rndustry as a whole. A stlpulation on the record and a standlng 
objection from Defendants ltinlted arguments and evidence to the insurance industry in Idaho. 
Although Mr. Rlsch occastonally made statements regard~ng "the lnsurance rndustry," these were 
all made In the context of discussing the Insurance tndustry In Idaho. 'The emphasis he placed on 
Idaho's power Lo control the Insurance industry w~thln the state took precedence over the 
occasional statement referring to the lnsurance ~ndustry, wrthout expllcrtly llmlttng 11 to that "in 
Idaho." Defendants have not met thelr burden to show that Mr. Risch vlolated the stlpulation. 
Anyone llstentng to Mr. Risch's arguments In their entlrety would understand that hls references 
to the ~nsurance Industry were lim~ted to Idaho. 
5. Jury Instruction on the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act 
Defendants argue that they are entitled to a new tnal because Plaintiffs submitted, and the 
Court gave, an Instructton settlng out the text of the Unfatr Glalms Settlement Practices Act, 
Idaho Code 41-1329. Thts argument IS more properly considered In sectlon II.F, as an alleged 
error of law. 
6. Plaintiffs' Opening Statement 
Defendants argue that when, In opening statements, Mr. Risch told the jurors that the 
verdlct would change the way Insurers do bustness in Idaho by requinng progress payments for 
UM clalms, he encouraged the jurors to ignore the jury instructions stating that they cannot 
reform the tnsurance pollcy. Defendants have failed to carry the burden of provlng misconduct 
by the prevalllng party. Mr. Rlsch openlng statement dld not encourage the jury to Ignore the 
jury ~nstructlons, especially consldertng that ~t was made at the beglnnlng of a two week tnal. 
The jury lnstructlons addressed how the jury should determine the meanlng of the pollcy 
language in Issue. The jury interpreted the contract in conformance with the instructions; tt did 
not reform the pollcy. Further, although Defendants made many objections during Mr. Rlsch's 
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opening statement, none were premlsed on the theory that the jury was bang encouraged to 
Ignore the ~ury  Instructtons. 'I'herehrc, Defendants cannot raise this Issue post-trral for purposes 
of reyuestlng new tr~al. 
B. Surprise 
A rnotron for a new tnal based on I.R.C.P. 59(a)(3) requtres a two-part showing. The 
movlng party must f~rst show prejudice, and second, that the alleged accident or surprlse 1s one 
that "ordinary pr~idence could not have guarded against." Nznglzes v. State, 129 Idaho 558, 929 
P.2d 120 (1996). Idaho cases discuss~ng this basis for new tnal lnvolve sttuations where 
testimony or evldence was allegedly a surpnse. See, e.g. id. (holding no surprise when surprtse 
testtmony was that of the movlng party), Cutt.rpillur v. WestjFull, 120 Idaho 9 18, 921, 821 P.2d 
973, 976 (1990) (holdlng no surprise when other party's expert wltness changed his testimony 
and court granted a two day conttnuance in order to prepare rebuttal testtmony); Alderson v. 
Borzrzer, 142 Idaho 733, 743, 132 P.3d 126, 127 (Ct. App. 2006) (finding no surpnse for contents 
of videotape that moving party had access to during the tnal). 
Defendants argue that they are entitled to a new tnal because Mr. Rtsch's clos~ng 
argument that the PIA agreement was offered to cause Plaintiffs to miss a statute of limitations 
deadl~ne was a surpr~se justtfyrng a new tnal. Dunng the proceeding, Plaintiffs contended that 
the PIA agreement constituted bad fa~th because ~t conditroned payment of the $10,000 advance 
payment. During Buddy Paul's testimony, Mr. Risch inquired ~ n t o  the statute of Iimitations. 
Also, the letter from Mr. Bistllne to Defendants dated April 2004 referred to the statute of 
Itmitations for torts. 
Plaint~ffs argue that reasonable inferences from the evidence support the closing 
argument. The handling adjuster, her supervisor, and the office claims unit manager met and 
worked out a "plan" to deal with the We~nstelns' claim. Part of that plan was to present the PIA 
agreement. The PIA agreement language granted and reserved unto defendants all defenses 
Decision And Order On Defendant's Motion For Remittitur Or, In The Alternative, New Trial 
available to the uninsured driver, even though UM llab~lity and fault was established. The poltcy 
prov~ded that the defendants were only obligated to pay the amount the Weinsteins were "legally 
entitled to recover" from the uninsured driver. 
a 
There was no surprise or lrrconslstency with platntiffs' position on the PIA agreement. 
Plalnt~ffs' argument at tr~al showlng the effect of the PlA agreement in relation to the statute of 
limitations was well-founded. The mere fact that the plaintiffs' interpretation of' the evidence 
was not anticipated by the defendants is not sufficient surprise to grant a new trial. Mr. Paul's 
testimony initiated discussion and evidence relating to the statute of limitations and opened the 
door for plaintiffs to further clarify the significance of that statute of limitations. 
C. Excessive Damages 
When evaluating a motion for a new trial based on excessive damages, the trial court 
itzust weigh the evidence and then compare the jury's award to what the Court would have given 
as fact finder. Wilsorz, 143 Idaho at 731, 152 P.3d at 602 (citing Dineen, 100 Idaho at 625-26, 
603 P.2d at 580-81). If the difference is so great that it appears to the trial court that the award 
was given under the influence of passion or prejudice, the verdict should be set aside. Id.; see 
I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5). A motion for remittitur should be considered under this rule as well. Pratton, 
122 Idaho at 85 1, 840 P.2d at 395. 
Defendants argue that the jury verdicts of $250,000 for Sarah Weinstein, and $210,000 in 
extra-contractual damages and $6 million in punitive damages to Leslie and Linda Weinstein are 
excessive. They request remittitur or a new trial. 
1. Sarah's Damages 
Defendants argue that the evidence as to Sarah's future medical expenses is speculative, 
and were not proved with reasonable certainty, and therefore her damages are excessive. 
Plaintiff's argue that Sarah's damages are not excessive because they were not limited to her 
future medical expenses but also included pain and suffering. Sarah's damages were not limited 
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suffered a stgnlficant Injury to her h ~ p  which requlred surgery and long pertods of recovery. She 
missed many days of school due to surgery and paln and could no longer partlclpate tn her 
favunte actlvltles of soccer and rurtnlng. She continues to experience pain, her usual actlvltles 
are Iirnlted, and she w1l1 likely develop a~hnt i s .  Additionally, she will probably requlre future 
hip surgery. The Court found Sarah's testimony believable and, after weighlng the evrdence, the 
court has detellnrned that ~t would have awarded a slmllar amount of damages to Sarah. 
Therefore, the award of $250,000 1s not excesslve. 
Defendants additionally argue that Plaintiffs' counsel improperly suggested to the jury 
that they award the Pollcy llmlts of $250,000, in violation of I.G. 10-1 11. However, no objection 
was made to thls at tr~al, and therefore the court cannot conslder ~t as a basis for new tr~al. 
Quick, 11 1 Idaho at 782, 727 P.2d at 1219. 
2. The Weinsteins' Damages 
Defendants argue that the $210,000 award to Leslie and Linda for extra-contractual 
damages was excesslve. These damages were due to emotional dlstress. A bad falth clalm 1s a 
tort clalm ansing out of a breach of contract, for whlch an Insurer can recover damages normally 
recoverable in tort, including emotional dlstress. Wulston v. Monumerztul Li$e Ins. Co, 129 
Idaho 21 1, 219, 923 P.2d 456, 465 (1996). As described in the memorandum declslon for 
JNOV, Wulstorz suggests that the court apply the elements of the tort of emotional dlstress to 
welgh the evidence. After dolng so, the Court determines that the seventy of Defendants 
misconduct coupled with the Weinstein's expectation of the contract justifies the award. 
Defendants denied the Weinsteins' requests for payment and defended a policy of delaying the 
settlement of the UM claim until the end of all treatment, regardless of length. The Defendants 
knew that the Welnsteins were receiving phone calls from bill collectors and belng threatened by 
medlcal providers. The Weinsteins entered into the contract expecting that Defendants would 
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protect them in their time of need. The Weinsteins presented evidence that they suffered from 
embarrassment, harassment by bill collectors, from internal family turmoil, and overall 
misfortune and distress in their life as a result of the defendants failing to meet their contractual 
obligations. Mrs. Weinstein experienced depression and crying. The court would have set a 
similar amount of damages and therefore, the $210,000 award is not excessive. 
Defendants argue that the $6 million punitive damages award is excessive and the result 
of passion or prejudice. Defendants argue that several events during trial prejudiced the jury 
against the Defendants. First, Defendants point to Mr. Risch's closing argument that discussed 
the PIA Agreement as a "scheme" to get the Weinsteins to settle for a mere $10,000. Next, 
Defendants suggest that Mr. Risch repeatedly told the jury that the State could not effectively 
police insurance companies, and that this award would send a message to the insurance industry 
in the entire country. Defendants also point to the Court's comments suggesting that Defense 
counsel was dishonest or could not be trusted. Defendants argue that these factors combined to 
produce an at~nosphere where the jury would act with passion or prejudice in  deciding the 
amount of damages. None of these alleged errors have any merit, as discussed throughout this 
decision. Mr. Risch's closing argument was based on the evidence, and his references to the 
insurance industry were properly limited to Idaho, when taken in the context of his argument. As 
the Court has discussed herein, it would have awarded a similar amount of punitive damages as 
the jury did. Only in consideration of the U.S. Supreme Court's limitation on the ratio of 
compensatory damages did the Court reduce the award to $1.89 million. 
D. Insufficiency of the Evidence 
A new trial may be granted "when [the trial court is satisfied the verdict is not supported 
by, or is contrary to, the evidence, or is convinced the verdict is not in accord with the clear 
weight of the evidence and that the ends of justice would be served by vacating it, or when the 
verdict is not in accord with either law or justice." Quick v. Crane, 11 1 Idaho at 767. ( uoting 
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Blaine v. Byers, 9 1 Idaho 665, 67 1,429 P.2d 397,403 (1967)). District courts apply a two- 
part test when considering motions for new trial based on the ground of insufficient evidence. 
Heir; v. Curroll, 117 Idaho 373, 378, 788 P.2d 188, 193 (1990). First the court considers 
whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and that justice would be served by 
vacating the verdict; and, second, the court considers whether a different result would follow 
upon retrial. Gillinghum Const., Inc. v. Newby- Wiggins Const., Inc. 142 Idaho 15, 23, 121 P.3d 
946, 954 (2005); Heitz v. Carroll, 117 Idaho 373, 378, 788 P.2d 188, 193 (1990). The second 
prong requires more than a mere possibility of a different result, but rather a probability that a 
different result would follow. Sheridan v. St. Luke's Reg'l Med Ctr., 135 Idaho 775, 782, 25 
P.3d 88,95 (2001). 
Defendants argue that there was insufficient evidence of each of the elements of a prima 
facie case for bad faith. Specifically, Defendants argue that there was insufficient evidence that: 
1) Defendants intentionally and unreasonably denied or delayed payment; 2) that the claim was 
not fairly debatable; 3) that the denial or delay was not the result of an honest mistake; and 4) 
that the plaintiffs suffered extra-contractual damages. 
As to the first three elements, the Court does not deem the verdict to be against the 
weight of the evidence. In this case, the evidence showed that months went by with no action on 
the claim. Defendants' internal departments disregarded requests for information from another 
department. Experts testified that delays were intentional and unreasonable. The record indicates 
there was no or little investigation of the UM claim until almost one and a half years after the 
accident, although defendants had the releases allowing them to do an investigation shortly after 
the accident. The med pay and UM claims both existed when Defendants recognized that an 
uninsured motorist caused an accident with their insureds. The company had developed clear 
policy to delay payment of UM benefits until the end of all treatment and refused to pay 
undisputed amounts. Defendants' witnesses testified that the handling of the Weinsteins' claim 
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was in accordance with established policy, demonstrating that no "honest mistake" occurred. 
The court does not find the verdict to be against the clear weight of the evidence. 
As to the fourth element, based on the facts and law discussed in the JNOV and above in 
section II.C.2, the Court does not find the verdict to be against the weight of the evidence. 
Defendants argue that there is insufficient evidence that the PIA agreement was offered 
for an improper purpose. The Court agrees that the suggestion that the PIA agreement was 
offered to trick the Weinsteins into settling for $10,000, with the intent to deny further payment 
after the statute of limitations ran against the uninsured motorist, is not supported by the weight 
of the evidence. However, the weight of the evidence does establish that the Defendants failed to 
investigate the claim from the beginning, which resulted in the wrongful denial of UM benefits 
for Sarah's medical bills. Even without the PIA Agreement, sufficient evidence supports the 
Weinsteins' claim that their UM claim was intentionally and unreasonably denied and delayed. 
Defendants argue that the evidence was insufficient to support the excessive amounts of 
damages awarded. Defendants argue that their conduct was not reprehensible, especially when 
considering that they tried to quickly get $10,000 to Plaintiffs once the medical records were 
received. However, as Plaintiffs point out, Defendants made virtually no effort to pay under 
UM, apart from the meager PIA agreement, until after plaintiffs sued them. Even the PIA 
Agreement was not offered until one and a half years after the accident, after the Weinsteins had 
suffered months of harassment, and a lien was placed on their house. The Defendants' claims 
adjusters and supervisors testified that the written documentation in the claims file show that the 
Defendants' established policy and practice was not to pay medical bills or any other amounts 
until after treatment. This was so even when liability was established early on and the insured 
communicated suffering. Plaintiffs offered rebuttal testimony presented by three practicing 
attorneys who all acknowledged the common Idaho industry practice of insurers is to pay 
undisputed UM benefits in advance of a final settlement. Defendants' misconduct and its refusal 
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The verd~ct is not agalnst the we~ght of the evidence. 
E. Errors of Law 
1. Defendants' argue that the Court elred by f a ~ l ~ n g  to grant either- of Defendants' 
motions for directed verdict. Even if refusing to grant Defendants' motions for directed verdict 
was error, the court sees no reason why Defendants would be entitled to a new trial on that basis. 
Defendants have re-argued most of the issues it  raised in their motion for directed verdict in their 
motion for JNOV. 
2. Defendants argue that the court erred by permitting Norma Nielson to testify. 
Defendants argue that her testimony concerning the insurance industry was irrelevant and that 
she was not qualified to provide testimony concerning Defendants' financial condition or the 
efficacy of punitive damages versus regulatory actions. Further, Defendants argue that her 
testimony violated Defendants' due process rights by encouraging the jury to award damages 
based on Defendants' financial condition. 
A district court has broad discretion in determining whether a witness is qualified as an 
expert and whether such expert's testimony is admissible, and its decision will only be 
overturned for abuse of discretion. IRE 104(a); Wurren v. Slzurp, 139 Idaho 599, 605, 83 P.3d 
773, 779 (2003). The test for determining whether a witness is qualified as an expert is "not 
rigid." West 12. Sonke, 132 Idaho 133, 138-39, 968 P.2d 228, 233-34 (1998). "If scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence 
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." IRE 702. 
To qualify as an expert, the witness must have specialized knowledge beyond the 
competence of the average juror. West, 132 Idaho at 138-39, 968 P.2d at 233-34. Formal 
training is not necessary to qualify as an expert, but experience or special knowledge must be 
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shown to qualify a witness as an expen. Wurretz, 139 Idaho at 605, 83 P.3d at 779. The 
proponent of the testimony must lay foundational evidence showing that the individual is 
qualified as an expert on the topic of his or her testimony. State v. Burrow, 142 Idaho 328, 330, 
127 P.3d 23 1,233 (Ct.App.2005). 
Once a witness is qualified as an expert, her testimony is admissible if her knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact in deciding a fact in issue, as per IRE 702. State v. Menuin, 131 Idaho 642, 
646, 962 P.2d 1026, 1030 (1998). Expert opinion which is speculative, conclusory, or 
unsubstantiated by facts in the record is of no assistance to the jury in rendering its verdict and is 
inadmissible as evidence. Weeks v. Eastern Iduho Heulttz Services, 143 Idaho 834,153 P.3d 
1 180 (2007). 
The operations of the insurance industry are beyond the experience of the average juror. 
Dr. Nielson's testimony about the insurance industry and its regulation was properly admissible 
because i t  helped the jury understand the evidence. Her explanation of how and why insurance 
companies operate helped the jury understand what happened in this case, and whether or not the 
Defendants actions were reasonable. 
Her opinion that regulatory action is less effective against insurance companies than 
punitive damages has credible foundation. Her opinions are based on news accounts and 
conversations with commissioners over the last 25 years. Even without strict empirical research 
on the topic, her personal experience, background, and knowledge of the insurance industry 
allows her to form opinions based on facts that other experts in her field based their opinions on. 
Dr. Nielson is qualified to testify as an expert concerning the Defendants' finances 
because she has a solid background in insurance industry operations. Dr. Nielson holds both a 
master's and a doctorate degree in insurance, she also has long-term involvement in the industry, 
that give her substantial relevant experience and education in interpreting published insurance 
industry financial statements. The financial status of an insurance industry is a large part of 
Decision And Order On Defendant's Motion For Remittitur Or, In The Alternative, New Trial 
insurance industry operations, and her testimony helped the jury to understand the evidence 
regarding Defendants' financial reports. 
3. Defendants argue that the court erred by refusing to grant Defendants' motion 
for a mistrial when the annotated exhibit lists were discovered in Plaintiffs' juror notebooks. The 
court addressed t h~s  issue above. The alleged error is not enough to warrant a new trial. 
Alleged Errors in the Jury Instructions 
The Court's review of jury instructions is "limited to a determination of whether the 
instructions, as a whole, fairly and adeyuately present the issues and state the law." Newberry v. 
Manens, 142 Idaho 284, 287, 127 P.3d 187, 190 (2005). "When the instructions, as a whole, do 
not mislead or prejudice a party, an erroneous instruction does not constitute reversible error." 
Id. The appellant has the burden to clearly show prejudicial error from an erroneous jury 
instruction. Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 159, 45 P.3d 810, 815 (2002). An erroneous 
instruction 1s prejudicial when it could have affected or did affect the outcome of the trial. 
Garcia V. Windley, 144 Idaho 539, 164 P.3d 819, 823 (2007). Whether a jury instruction should 
have been given depends on whether there is evidence at trial to support the instruction. 
Vu~zderjbrd Co. v. Knudsun, 144 Idaho 547, 552, 165 P.3d 261, 266 (2007). The determination 
of whether the instruction is supported is committed to the discretion of the court. Id. A court 
may refuse an instruction that erroneously states the law, is adequately covered by other 
instructions, or is not supported by the evidence. Craig Johnson Const., LLC v. Floyd Towrz 
Architects, 142 Idaho 791, 800, 134 P.3d 648, 651 (2006). Additionally, a tardy jury instruct~on 
need not be honored. S d z ~ ~ u n ' s  Sales Enters., 142 Idaho at 831, 136 P.3d at 301. See I.R.C.P. 
51(a)(l) (providing that any requested instructions not filed and served upon the parties five days 
before the commencement of the trial need not be considered by the court). 
4. Defendants argue that the Court erred by giving Jury Instruction 3 of the 
Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Act, and thereby creating a de facto private cause of action for 
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a vtolatlon of the Act as well as introducing evidence of an lndusrry standard that was not 
presented or explained by any of the witnesses or introduced per a strpulatron of the partles. 
There 1s no pnvate cause of actlon under the Act. Sinzper v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Clo., 132 
Idaho 471, 375, 974 P.2d 1100, 1104 (1999). An expert may use the Act in  a bad fa~th case to 
show industry standard practices In Idaho. Iriland Group of Gus. v. Proviclerzce Witsh. 111s. Co., 
133 Idaho 243, 258, 985 P.2d 674, 683 (1993). Although none of the experts discussed the 
Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act, evidence was sublnitted demonstrating that Defendants 
had committed a number of violations under the act, and was not acting in accordance with 
standard practices of the insurance industry in Idaho: When an issue 1s a matter of law, expert 
testimony on that ~ssue 1s not necessary. Noivurd v. Or. Mut. lns. Cu., 137 ldaho 214, 46 P.3d 
510 (2002). The Unfair Clalms Settlement Practices Act is statutory law in Idaho, and the 
instruction stated that the Act does not give rise to a right to sue. The instruction demonstrates 
industry standards and was limited to the issue of punitive damages. 
5. Defendants argue that the court erred by failing to provide Defendants' 
supplemental requested jury instruction no. 9, which read: "a defendant is liable for emotional 
distress only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable person could be expected 
to endure it." Defendants cited Davi,c v. Gage, 106 Idaho 735, 741, 682 P.2d 1282, 1288 (Ct. 
App. 1984), for thls standard, which relates to the tort of ~ntent~onai infliction of emot~onal 
distress. As discussed in the motion for JNOV, the Wulston decision controls on the issue of 
emotional distress damages in a bad faith case. Although the elements of the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress are used as a guidepost in assessing emotional damages in a bad 
faith situation, the decisions on the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are not 
relevant in these circumstances. The jury was provided with those elements, and still found that 
the Weinsteins had suffered emotional distress that was cornpensable. Therefore, the court's 
refusal of the instruction was not error. Furthermore, the requested instruction was untimely, 
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6. Defendants argue that the court erred by failing to provide Defendants' 
requested Instruction No. 23 setting out the defense of advice of legal counsel. Idaho courts have 
not recogn~zed the "advice of legal counsel'defense in the context of bad faith cases. The 
Defendants csted two cases from other jurssd~ct~ons on the issue. In Larsert v. Allstutc. Intrurutzce 
C;_1~?2pany, 857 P.2d 263, (Utah. App. 1993), the Utah Court of Appeals held that the claim was 
"'fa~rly debatable," in  part, because Allstate sought legal counsel on a un~que Issue of law before 
denylng coverage. 857 P.2d at 266. The case did not establish that relsance on the advice of 
counsel alone negates allegations of bad faith. Id. Likewise, the case Stute Furriz Mzituul Auto 
I~~suruutce Gomparzy v. Superior Court, 228 Cal. App. 3d 721 (CA. Fourth Distnct 1991), held 
that evldence of rcilance on the advice of counsel is admissible because it goes to the issue of 
whether the insurer acted reasonable, and relates to allegations of malice. 228 Cal. App. 3d at 
725. Therefore, in Idaho law, evidence of advice of legal counsel relates to whether or not the 
claim was "falrly debatable." Instruction No. 24 adequately defined the element of "fa~rly 
debatable" cla~rns; the refusal to prov~de Defendants' requested Instruction No. 23 was not error. 
7. Defendants contend that the court erred by providing Plaintiffs' requested jury 
instruction No. 17, which read: "an honest mistake means an innocent mistake which was made 
despite the presence of procedures to prevent the making of such mistakes. It is a mistake that 
occurs despite reasonable care to prevent it. A mistake which is the result of negltgence or 
inattention or indifference is not an honest mistake." This instruction was explicitly approved by 
the Idaho Supreme Court in Robirzson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Compuny, 
137 Idaho 173, 178,45 P.3d 829, 834 (2002). Defendants likewise argue that i t  was error for the 
court to not provide Defendants' requested instruction no. 25. Defendants requested instruct~on 
no. 25 was substant~ally similar to the instruction the court actually gave in instruction no. 26. 
However, it changed the language of the Court-approved instruction slightly. The court properly 
opted to use the precise language approved by the Idaho Supreme Court. 
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8. Defendants contend that the court erred by providing Plaintiffs' requested jury 
~nstructlon no. 18 as to the standard for delay. The language of that instructton was approved by 
the Idaho Srrpreme Court In Irzlunrl Group of C'iis. v. Provi~kilce Washington Ins. Co., 133 ldaho 
239, 257,985 P.2d 674, 682 (1999). The ~nstruction was proper. 
9. Defendants argue that the court erred by providing lnstri~ctlon No. 35, 
tnfoimtng the jury that it could consrder Defendants' wealth and financial condit~on in 
determining punitive damages. Defendants argue that this ~nstruct~on was contrary to the 
holding of Cumpbell and violated Defendants' nght of due process. For the same reason, 
Defendants argue that the court erred in giving Defendants' requested instruct~on no. 31. 
Instruct~on No. 35 was taken verbatim from Plaintiff's requested instruction no. 23 and 
Defendants' requested ~nstruction no. 3 1. The language was taken directly from IDJI 9.20.5. 
Ca~rlpbell does not stand for the proposition that a defendant's wealth cannot be considered by 
the jury In determining punitive damages. The relevant hoidlng of Cun~pbell is that an 
ur~constituttonal punltlve damages award cannot be justlfied by the defendants' wealth. 538 U.S. 
at 427. lnstructlon No. 35 was proper. 
LO. Defendants argue that the court erred by ruling that it was not a matter of f~rst 
tmpresslon under Idaho law as to whether advance partla1 payments on a UM claim are 
mandatory As discussed In the JNOV, ldaho law establishes a duty to invest~gate clalms, and to 
pay undisputed portlons of claim w~thin a reasonable tlme. The Court's ruling was proper. 
Defendants similarly argue that it  was error for the court to refuse Defendants7 requested 
supplemental jury instruction nos. 6 and 7. Instruction No. 6 stated: "When a claim lnvolves a 
legal questlon of first Impression, an insurer does not commit bad faith by lit~gatlng the cla~m 
even ~f the lnsurer does not prevail." Thls toplc was adequately covered by Instruction No. 24, 
whtch set forth the definition of fairly debatable. 
Instruction No. 7 stated: "An insurer is not bound by or required to take notice of a 
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tmpression even if a district court has previously ruled on that question," Defendants argue that 
~nsurers need not heed court rulings to which ~t is not a party, and base this argument on Vuugfzt 
V. Dutrylurzd fn~. Co., 131 Idaho 357, 362, 956 P.2d 674, 679 (1998). The relevant holdlng In 
Vu~rglzt was that an msurer who 1s not a pasty to a lawsu~t hat detemtnes the relative fault and 
negligence ot ~ t s  Insured is not bound to that detemrnat~on when the insurer later settles the 
clam wlth the Insured, and may dlspute the percent tault attributed to the ~nsured. Vuught, 131 
Idaho at 361. Vurtght does not stand for the proposltlon that an insurer may disregard a court's 
detemlnatton of what types of conduct constitute bad falth In the insured-insurer relationship. 
11. Defendants argue that the court erred by failing to glve the llmlt~ng 
lnstructlon on pun~trve damages requested by Defendants. Defendants asked the court, in ~ t s  
second supplemental request for jury Instructions, to add instructions contalnlng specific 
language from N~nth Clrcu~t Court of Appeals cases. Merrick v. Puul Revere L$e Ins. Co., 500 
F.3d 1007 (C.A. 9"' 2007); White v. Ford Motor Co., 500 F.3d 963 (C.A. 9th 2007). 
Were, Instructions Nos. 33 through 37 dealt wlth the Itm~tatlons on punltlve damages. No 
evldence directly related to Defendants' out-of-state conduct was adm~tted, and any extrapolat~on 
by the jury that the Defendants' acted out-of-state was neutralized by Instruction No. 34, whlch 
told the jury that punltlve damages may not be assessed to change Defendants' out-of-state 
conduct. Instruction No. 36 rnstructed the jury that punltive damages could not be assessed 
agalnst Defendants to punlsh them for Injury to non-parties. That Instruction exceeded the 
requirements of Plzillip Morris, wh~ch allowed the jury to conslder harm to non-parties when 
determ~n~ng the reprehenslblllty of defendants' conduct. T h ~ s  Court gave no ~nstructlon to the 
jury telling them to conslder harm to non-part~es as ~t relates to the reprehens~b~llty prong. The 
Court dld not err In refuslng to glve Defendants' requested second supplemental lnstructlons 
because they were sufficiently covered, and they were untimely requested. 
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Defendants argue that the Court erred tn gtvtng lnstruct~ons Nos. 33 and 34, which 
~nstructed the jury it could award punitive damages to deter other parties not related to thls 
Irt~gut~on. One of the factors that Idaho Courts must conslder when determlnlng ~f a punltlve 
damages award 1s excessive 1s "the prospective cleterre~~t effect of such an award upon persons 
situated s~rnllarly to the defendant." Myers, 140 Idaho at 507, 95 P.3d at 988. One of the 
purposes of punttlve damages IS to deter others h m  engaging in similar behav~or as the 
defendant by mak~ng such conduct unprofitable. Zd. at 503. Instruction No. 33 was taken from 
ID31 9.20, and Instruction No. 34 properly limlts the punitive damages to address only conduct In 
the State of Idaho as required by Gore. The instructions were proper. 
12. Defendants argue that i t  was error for the court to refuse to glve the last 
sentcnce of Defendants' requested Instructlon No. 21, statlng that the covenant of good falth and 
fa r  deallng "does not add new terns to the contract or require the partles perform duties contrary 
to the terns of the contract negot~ated and executed by the parties." See Idaho First Nut'l Baizk 
v. B1is.u Vulley Foods, 121 Idaho 266, 824 P.2d 841, 863-64 (1991). That case, however, dealt 
with contract cla~ms between a bank, guarantors, and borrowers in a foreclosure proceeding. 
The claim was general breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, rather than bad faith 
In a first party insurance contract. The holding of that case is not controlling in this case. 
13. Defendants argue that the Court erred by faillng to glve Defendants' 
requested Instructlon No. 28, or otherwise falling to Instruct the jury as to the need to value 
Sarah Welnsteln's damages on a present cash value basis. Instruction No. 28 read: "When I use 
the phrase "present cash value" as to any damage that may accrue in the future, I mean that sum 
of money determined and paid now which, when invested at a reasonable rate of interest. would 
be sufficient to pay the future damages at the time and in the amount the future damages will be 
~ncurred." This instruction that defined the phrase "present cash value" was not given because 
no other instruction used that phrase, and neither party requested the phrase be used. 
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14. Defendants argue that the court erred in refusing Defendants' requested 
Supplemental Jury Instruction No. 14, setting forth the "clear and convincing" evidence standard 
for punitive damages. As discussed previously, because the claim was reported before the July 
1, 2003 statutory amendment, and the Defendants' policies and procedures were in  place at the 
time the claim was made, the pre-July 1,  2003 punitive damages standard was proper1 y applied. 
Further, i t  was untimely requested. 
15. Defendants argue that the Court erred by failing to give the last sentence of 
the Defendants' requested Supplemental Jury Instruction No. 2, which read: "even if an 
investigation could have been completed more expeditiously, there is no bad faith unless the 
company delayed, intending to achieve delay for delay's sake." Roper v. State Faml Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 131 Idaho 459, 462, 958 P.2d 1145, 1148 (1998). This statement was made in  the 
context of discussing whether a claim was "fairly debatable" and both Instructions Nos. 23 and 
24 deal with that legal concept. Therefore, the instruction is adequately covered. 
16. Defendants argue that it  was error to refuse to give Defendants' requested 
Supplemental Jury Instruction No. 5, which read: "When a claim is fairly debatable, the insurer 
is entitled to dispute the claim and will not be deemed liable for failure to pay the claim." 
Defendants are correct that several Idaho Supreme Court cases have made this statement. See, 
e.g., McGilvrey v. Farmers New World Ins. Co., 136 Idaho 39, 28 P.3d 380 (2001). However, it 
is merely a rewording of the third element of a bad faith claim, which was laid out in Jury 
Instruction No. 23. Therefore, the instruction was adequately covered. 
17. Defendants argue that the failure to give Defendants' requested Supplemental 
Jury Instruction Nos. LO and 11 (pertaining to ratification by a corporate officer or director in 
order to sustain punitive damages against a corporation) was error. In Idaho, the plaintiff must 
show that the directors or managing officers of a corporation participated in, authorized, or 
ratified the alleged bad acts of the agent in order to recover punitive damages from that 
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corporation. Munning v. Twin Fulls Clinic & Hosp., 122 Idaho 47, 53, 830 P.2d 1185, 1191 
(1992). Although defendants argue that no ratification occurred, sufficient evidence of 
authorization exists to justify the recovery of punitive damages against the corporations. 
Defendants' witnesses testified that the corporate policy, which was created and/or approved by 
corporate officers andfor directors, was to wait until treatment was done to investigate and 
evaluate. It is reasonable to infer that the corporation authorized its own policies. Further, 
Defendants did not affirmatively argue that ratification was absent, and the submission of the 
jury instruction for consideration was untimely. 
18. Defendants argue that giving Instruction No. 25 to the jury was error because 
it rnisstates the policy provisions regarding the timing of the payment. Instruction No. 25 read: 
A fairly debatable dispute as to a portion of a claim does not relieve an insurance 
company from paying the undisputed portion of a claim within a reasonable period 
of time after it has assessed the monetary value of the undisputed portion of the 
claim. 
As discussed in the motion for JNOV, the contract's provision regarding timing of 
payment was ambiguous, and if not ambiguous, no time was stated as to when payment 
was due. Further, the instruction was given with regard to the bad faith claim, not the 
contract claim. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires the insurer to fulfill 
several affirmative duties, one of which is to pay undisputed portions of claims within a 
reasonable time after assessing those claims. 
19. Defendants argue that giving Instruction No. 31 was error, because i t  does not 
reflect the standard for bad faith actually enunciated by the Idaho Supreme Court. It read: 
In order to prove plaintiffs' bad faith claim, the plaintiffs do not have to establish 
that the insurance company acted with an evil or fraudulent intent, or with actual 
malice towards the plaintiffs. It is sufficient if it is proven that the defendant was 
aware of the nature, content, and probable consequences of its actions, and that it 
acted with conscious disregard of such consequences. 
This instruction is nearly verbatim from Inland Group v. Providence Wush. Ins., 133 Idaho 249, 
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257, 985 P.?d 674. 681. That case held that, although a bad Faith jury instruction contained 
language suggesting that negligent conduct was sufficient to find a bad faith claim, the presence 
of the language that this Coun put in Instruction No. 31, along with a punitive damages 
instruction and a jury verdict for punitive damages rendered the error of including negligence 
language harmless. The Idaho Supreme Court approved the language of lnstruction No. 3 1. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court Orders a remittitur reducing the punitive damages award from $6 million to 
$1.89 million as a condition of denying the motion. Should Plaintiffs refuse to accept the 
remittitur, the Coun GRANTS Defendants' Motion for New Trial as to punitive damages. The 
Court DENIES the remainder of the motion. 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
DATED this 2Yd day of January 2008. 
/\ 
Darla Williamson, 
District Court Judge 
I, J.  David Navarro, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have mailed, by 
United States Mail, one copy of the Decision and Costs Claimed as to Leslie and Linda 
Weinstein pursuant to Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to each of the attorneys of record in this cause in 
envelopes addressed as follows: 
James E. Risch Robert A. Anderson 
R. John Insinger Phillip J. Collaer 
Jason Risch C. W. Moore Plaza 
407 West Jefferson Street 250 S. 5th Street, Suite 700 
Boise, ID 83702-6049 P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
Dated th@ day of January 2008 
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IN TEE DISTRICT COURT Of"' T W  FOURTH JUDICIAL 
THE STATE OF U)AHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
LESLIE WEINSTEIN and LINDA 
WEINSTEIN, Husband and Wife, 
rndr vrdually and as GuardIan Ad Lltem for 
SARAH R. WEINSTEIN, and SARAH R. 
WEINSTEIN, indt vtduall y, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND 
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY 
and DEmNDANTS GENERAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY and LIBERTY 
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and 
LM PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 
INSURANCE, 
Case NoKX: ,'C 
C ~ p s T o ~ W o  A 
DECISION AND ORDER ON 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
JUDGWNT NOTWITHSTANDING 
T I E  VERDICT 
Defendants. 
Hearing on Defendant's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict was held on 
December 13, 2007. Attorneys James R~sch, John Insinger, and Jason Risch appeared on behalf 
of the Weinsteins, with Mr. Risch arguing. Appearing on behalf of Defendants were attorneys 
Robert A. Anderson and Phillip J. Collaer, with Mr. Anderson arguing. 
Before the Coun is the above-named Defendant Insurance Companies' motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (JNOV). Linda and Leslie Weinstein (the "Weinsteins") 
sued Defendant insurance companies ("Defendants") for breach of contract and bad faith based 
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on Defendants' handling of their claim. All causes of action were tried to a jury. On October 1 ,  
2007, the jury found bad fa1 th tn the handltng of the uninsured motorists ("UM") claim, but not 
In the med pay claim. The jury awarded $210,000 damages to Linda and Leslie Welnsteln for 
bad fatth, and $6,000,000 In punltive damages. The jury also determ~ned that the total amount of 
damages sustarned by Sarah Weinstein was $250,000. 
LEGAL STANDARD ON JNOV: 
A jury verdict must be upheld if there is evidence of sufficient quantity and probative 
value that reasonable minds could have reached a similar conclusion as that of the jury. N U ~ S O I Z  
V. Cobbs, 118 Idaho 474, 478, 797 P.2d 1322, 1326 (1990). The judge may not weigh the 
evidence, pass on the cred~bility of w~tnesses, or make independent findings on factual issues. 
Grig Inc. v. Curry Beun Co., 138 Idaho 3 15, 3 19, 63 P.3d 441, 445 (2003). Instead, the judge 
must determ~ne whether the evidence is of suff~cient quality and probative value that reasonable 
minds could amve at the same conclusron as d ~ d  the jury. Sclzwaizn's Sules Erztei-s., lnc. v. Idaho 
Tratzsp. Dep't, 142 Idaho 826, 830, 136 P.3d 297,301 (2006). The party seeking a JNOV adm~ts 
the truth of all the other side's evidence and every legitimate inference that can be drawn from ~ t .  
Quick v. Crurze, 11 1 Idaho 759,764,727 P.2d 1187, 1192 (1986). 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND: 
On September 30, 2002, Linda Weinstein was driving a covered vehicle which was 
struck by an uninsured motorist. Her daughter, Sarah Weinstein ("Sarah"), was a passenger in  
the vehlcle and suffered injuries. At the time of the accident, the We~nsteins carned automob~le 
insurance wrth Defendants. T h ~ s  policy ~ncluded medical payment coverage of $5000.00 and 
UM coverage of $250,000.00. 
The Weinsteins timely reported the accident. Defendants immediately concluded, based 
on the police report and other information, that an uninsured driver was 100% at fault. 
Defendants contacted the Weinsteins and explained that since an uninsured driver caused the 
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accrdent, Med Pay and UM coverage would apply to the clatm. The UM portton of the Pol~cy 
states: "'Our payment IS  based on the amount that an tnsured ts legally entitled to recover tor 
bodily lnjury but could not collect from the owner or operator of the un~nsured motor vehicle." 
On November 11, 2002, the Defendants asked Weinsterns to send them copies of all 
nredlcal b~lls and a signed medlcal release form. Mrs. We~nstein slgned the release on December 
5 ,  2002 w~th a list of medical providers. Defendants ~ncorrectly Informed the Weinsteins that a 
coordtnat~on of benefits ("COB") clause required them to submlt bills first to their health 
~nsurance before Defendants would pay anyth~ng. Defendants continued to notify the Weinste~ns 
and Sarah's medical providers that a COB clause prevented them from pay~ng anyth~ng on the 
medrcal brlls unt~l thls mistake was caught and corrected In Apn1 of 2003. No tnvest~gation or 
gathering of medlcal records was done on the cla~m dunng this tlme. 
Medleal providers sent bills resulting from the accident to the Weinsteins. When ne~ther 
the Weinsteins health insurance provider, nor Defendants would pay the bills, the medlcal 
prov~ders sent the overdue notlces to the Welnste~ns. The Weinsteins could do llttle about the 
bills, since Mr. Weinstein's business was not do~ng well. Mr. We~nstein owned h ~ s  own buslness 
prov~ding serv~ces to the airline ~ndustry, which was struggling in the wake of the tersonst 
attacks of September 11, 2001. The family was struggling financially. 
On January 2, 2003, Mrs. We~nstern told Defendants that she was recelvlng threatening 
phone calls from the ambulance company and hosp~tal regarding unpaid b~lls. She also told them 
that she and her daughter were still receiving medlcal treatment for their injuries. Despite this 
continued contact from Mrs. Weinstein, on February 12, 2003, Defendants sent a letter to the 
Weinste~ns statlng that if they did not receive new medical bills within 30 days, the file would 
close. Twelve days later the file was Inactivated "since there has been no response to [the] 30 
day letter." 
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In the meanttme, Sarah" doctor recommended physical therapy. She began her ph ys~cal 
therapy program w~th the goal of preparing her to play soccer-her favorite sport---in December 
2002. Her program advanced as anticipated, and 111 February, 2003 her physlcal therapist 
released her to resume physlcal act~vlt~es a  tolerated. When she began tralning for and play~ng 
soccer, her hip paln rcturned. She was only able to play ten m~nutes per half, and ultimately had 
to stop piaylng enr~rely. Her mother sought further medical treatment for her. 
In Apnl 2003 Mrs. Weinsteln notlfled Defendants that Sarah had an MRI show~ng a hrp 
Injury that might require surgery. After a second MRI, medical doctors determined that Sarah 
had suffered a labial tear in her hip, resulting from the accident, which requlred arthroscopic 
surgery. Mrs. Weinstein cailed Defendants to advise them that Sarah was scheduled for 
arthroscopic surgery on May 19, 2003 and that her recovery time would be approximately SIX to 
nine months. By t h~s  time, Defendants determ~ned their mistake regarding the COB and pald a 
handful of bills that had been ~ncurred right after the accident. 
Sarah's surgery was performed as scheduled, and she began another round of physical 
therapy. Her progress was slow and requ~red numerous vtsits to medical providers to assess her 
recovery. Sarah's friends and family observed that she appeared depressed and withdrawn after 
her surgery. Sarah was unable to return to play soccer for more than ten minutes per half, was 
advlsed to restrict her running, and suffered constant discomfort and pain. She still suffers aches 
and pains when she runs and engages in sports, and can only participate in high-impact physical 
actlvitles for lim~ted periods of time. Medical doctors testified at trial that, due to the acc~denr, 
she w~ll probably requlre hip surgery sometime in the future, and she w~l l  most likely develop 
arthr~t~s in her hlp. 
From May 2003 on, Mrs. Weinste~n continued to receive regular phone calls and letters 
from medical billing departments and collection agencies regarding overdue medical bllls. 
These events caused her to feel depressed and cry. The grief, stress, and constant embarrass To0329  
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resulted in marital discord and fam~ly turmoil. On one occasion, as Mrs. Weinstein was leavlng 
a doctor's office followrng Sarah's vrstt, a staltf member Informed her that ~f she did not pay her 
outstanding brll In full rmmedrately, Sarah would no longer rece~ve treatment. "I'hrs was stated at 
a loud volume In front of other staff and patients, and Mrs. Weinsfein was very upset to have her 
flnanclal affa~rs public~zed. Although Mrs. Wernstein notified Defendants of thls ~ncldent, they 
did noth~ng. This Court observed Mrs. Wetnstein's demeanor at trial and the court believes she 
was deeply disturbed by the harassment of blll collectors and Defendants' unresponsiveness to 
her pleas for assistance 
In July 2003, Mrs. Weinstein again called Defendants to complain about Sarah's 
outstanding medical bills.' This resulted in the payment of a number of overdue bills under the 
Med Pay cover-age. In September, 2003, Mrs. Welnstein demanded that UM coverage pay 
Sarah's outstanding medical bills, many of which were in collection. Mrs. Welnstein told 
Defendants that she was afraid the doctors would stop treating Sarah due to unpaid medical bills. 
Defendants informed Mrs. Weinstein that the Med Pay benefits were exhausted, and that UM 
coverage does not pay until final settlement, which occurs after the end of treatment. Defendants 
then faxed Mrs. Weinstein a HIPAA compliant medical authorization to allow them to get the 
med pay file and information from the medical providex2 Mrs. Weinstein signed and faxed the 
medical authorization form to Defendants that day. The list of medical providers was faxed on 
September 23, 2003. 
Frustrated by Defendants' slow progress on Sarah's claim, the Weinsteins hired attorney 
Bruce Bistline to deal with ~e fendan t s .~  On October 10, 2003, Mr. Bistline sent a letter to 
Defendants notifying them that he had been retained by the Weinsteins to represent Sarah's 
1. All bills considered after the exhaustion of med pay were responded to with a form that explained the 
denial by stating "Policy benefits have been exhausted." (Plf's Exs. 83,84, 11 1, 113, 119, 121). 
2. HIPAA came into effect on April 14,2003. 
3. On September 30,2003, the Weinsteins sold a piece of property for $175,000. Then, in 2004, they 
received an inheritance. The specific date and amount of this inheritance has not been pointed out to the co t 000330 
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Interest regarding the 2002 accident. A few days later, Defendants sent a letter to Mr. Bistline 
requestlng "complete medical and wage loss documentation" in order to evaluate f arah's claim. 
On October 28, 2003, Mr. Bistl~ne wrote to Defendants and asked whether Defendants intended 
to dispute the liability of the un~nsured motonst, and i f  so, who Defendants contended was 
negligent, Defendants d ~ d  not respond to t h~s  letter. Mr. Bistline also demanded payment of 
several rnedlcal bllls amounting to nearly $2,000, which Defendants did not pay. 
On November 3, 2003 Mr. Blstltne called Defendants and demanded payrnent of the 
medical bills. Defendants told B~stline that a current medical authorization form was needed to 
get the bills, and that Defendants did not know what was wrong with Sarah. Mr. Bistline stated 
that he would gather the current bills if Defendants would get the med pay file and share i t  with 
him. Defendants sent a letter the same day requesting copies of all medical expenses and reports, 
a slgned medical authorization fosm, and a list of medical providers. Mr. Bistline rece~ved 
nothlng from Defendants until March 9, 2004, when he received a two page summary of the med 
log, and nothing else. 
On November 5 ,  2003, Defendants' employees discussed the demand for medical bill 
payment under UM coverage, and conferred wlth an in-house attorney. The attorney advised 
Defendants that he was unaware of any law in Idaho requiring payment of medical bills before 
settlement. Defendants concluded that the policy required only one payment. 
On March 4, 2004 a lien was placed on the Weinsteins' property for failing to pay bills 
from the accident. On April 20, 2004, Blstline sent another letter to Defendants requestlng 
payment of $16,669.64 in outstanding medical bills. He also stated that he would gather up-to- 
date medical records and a prognosis from a physician to provide a proof of loss as to future 
medical expenses. On May 20, 2004, B~stllne sent the medical records to Defendants. The next 
month, Defendants finally began evaluating the clalm. Defendants noted that Sarah had 
treatment through February 20, 2003 and resumed soccer without problems, but had residual hi 
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pain, and then suggested that she resumed soccer too soon and caused additional problems. 
Defendants observed that Sarah told the doctor in March, 2003 that she had a c11cklng sensation 
in her h ~ p  for two to three weeks and s~gn~fleant pun whtle runnlng and klcktng the ball. 
On June 10. 2004 Defendants declcled that they would offer a payment In advance of 
$10,000 due to the Welnste~ns' hardsh~p. Defendants noted their desire to further revlew the 
medical ftle records because Sarah's physical activities might have aggravated the injury. On 
June 11, 2004, Defendants sent a letter with the payment in advance agreement ("PIA 
Agreement"). On July 7, 2004, Bistline sent a letter to Defendants rejecting the PIA Agreement, 
and ~ndicating that the Weinsteins had filed suit for breach of contract and bad faith handling of 
their claim under the policy. 
At trral Defendants argued that in UM cases, their policy was to wait until after receiving 
all information at the end of treatment and recovery, and then evaluate the claim and make offers 
to settle. Defendants had several representatives and supervisors testify that waiting until the end 
of treatment to gather records and evaluate was in accordance with corporate policies. 
Additionally, Defendants' log notes reflect that when supervisors reviewed the Weinstein file, 
they reported that the file was "properly directed." Defendants had no mechanism for either 
paying undisputed amounts in UM cases before the end, or for earlier investigation and 
evaluation in cases of prolonged injury and recovery. 
The Wcinsteins' experts testified that insurers had a duty to investigate and evaluate 
claims within a reasonable time and that, in their opinion, Defendants had breached those duties. 
The Weinsteins also presented Defendants' claims handling manuals which indicated that 
investigation of claims should begin when the insurer receives notice of a claim. The 
Weinsteins' experts also testified that in UM cases, as in other first party insurance claims, 
insurers have a duty to pay undisputed amounts in a reasonable time. They opined that the 
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treatment of the Weinsterns by Defendants was intentional and unreasonable, and contrary to 
lndustry practice In Idaho. 
Notably, during the entire course of events up until trial, defendants never disputed the 
amount of or necessity of the medlcal bills subm~ttcd for payment. 
ANALYSIS: 
BKEACH OF CONTRACT 
I. Payment was due in a reasonable time because the contract failed to specify the 
time for payment. 
First, Defendants argue that they are entitled to JNOV because no contract provis~on 
requlres piecemeal payments, therefore, there was no breach of contract as to the UM benefits. 
The Weinsteins argue that because no contract provision specifies a time when payment 1s due, 
payment must occur within a reasonable tlme. 
When the meaning of a contract 1s In dispute, a court must first deternine whether or not 
the contract is ambiguous. Borzdy v. Levy, 121 Idaho 993, 997, 829 P.2d 1342, 1346 (1992). In 
resolving thls question, the Court must construe the policy "as a whole, not by an lsolated 
phrase." Cascade Auto G l u s ~ ,  Ilzc. v. Idulto Fum? Bureau Iizs. Co., 14 1 Idaho 660, 663, 1 15 P.3d 
751, 754 (2005) (c~ting Selkirk Seed Co. v. State Ins. Fund, 135 Idaho 434, 437, 18 P.3d 956,959 
(2000)). In order to determine whether the contract is ambiguous, the court must detesrn~ne 
whether its terms are reasonably susceptible to conflicting interpretations. Id.; City of Chubbuck 
v. City of Pacatello, 127 Idaho 198, 899 P.2d 41 1 (1995). 
If the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, the interpretation of the contract's 
meaning 1s a question of law. See e.g., Ada Counry Assessor v. Taylor, 124 Idaho 550, 553, 861 
P.2d 12 15, 1218 (1993). The meaning of the terms of the insurance policy must be determined 
according to the plaln meaning of the words used. Cuscade Auto Glass, 141 Idaho at 662-63, 
115 P.3d at 753-54. Common words are given the meaning applied by laymen in daily usage, as 
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opposed to the meanlng derived from legal usage, in order to effectuate the Intent of the partles. 
AID lrzs. C ~ I .  v  Arnzstro~tg, 119 Idaho 897,900, 81 1 P.2d 507, 510 (Ct. App. 1991). 
If, on the other hand, the terms of a contract are ambiguous, the interpretallon of that 
contract's meanlng 1s a questlon of fact. Id.; Borzdy, 122 Idaho at 997, 829 P.2d at 1346. When 
language In the policy 1s amb~guaus, the finder of fact "must determ~ne what a reasonable person 
would have understood the language to mean." Mur. of E~zurrzclaw Ins. Co. v. Pedersen 133 
Idaho 135, 139,983 P.2d 208, 212 (1999). Insurance contracts are contracts of adheslon and are 
not typically negotiated by the parties, thus the finder of fact must construe any ambiguity most 
strongly against. the insurer. Mason v. State Farm Mut. Iizs., 2007 WL 4472244 (Idaho S. Ct. 
Dec. 24,2007). 
In thls case, Defendants dispute when UM benefits are due under the contract. The 
relevant portlon of the Policy states: "Our payment is based on the amount that an insured is 
legally entitled to recover for bodily injury but could not collect from the owner or operator of 
the uninsured motor vehicle . . ." Policy, Part 4, section A. Defendants argue that the singular 
words "payment" and "amount" in the policy clearly indicate a single recovery at the end of the 
claim process.4   he court is not persuaded by this argument. Based on the plain meaning of the 
words used, this portion of the policy describes how the total amount of payment is determined, 
but not when money becomes due or whether it will be paid as a single amount or at intervals. 
The language is not ambiguous, but rather fails to specify the time when payment will occur. 
When the time for performance is not specified in a contract, performance must occur in a 
reasonable time. Ujdur v. Thonzpson, 126 Idaho 6, 9, 878 P.2d 180, 183 (1994). Whether or not 
a reasonable time has passed is an issue for the jury. Sufficient evidence shows that many 
5 .  Defendants argue that this language is consistent with Idaho's uninsured motorist statute, the purpose of 
which "is to afford the same protection to a person injured by an uninsured motorist as would have been enjoyed had 
the tortfeasor carried liability insurance." Ryals v. State Farm Mut. Itzs. Co., 134 Idaho 302, 307, 1 P.3d 803, 808 
(2000). This argument is irrelevant to this inquiry. The interpretation of the contract does not hinge on whether or 
not the language is consistent with a statute, but rather goes to the intent of the parties at the time they entered into 
the contract. 
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months passed after the submission of uncontested med~cal b~lls before payment occurred and 
oniy $5000.00 of the uncontested amount was paid pnor to sult be~ng filed. Defendants falled to 
pay w~thln a reasonable tlme after payment was due. 
11. The insurer's duty to pay undisputed amounts relates to the bad faith claim and 
not the breach of contract claim. 
Defendants argue that they are entitled to JNOV because no independent duty requlres 
insurers to make piecemeal payments of UM claims. Because any Independent duty requlnng 
~nsurers to do so would be based on the covenant of good faith and falr deallng, the breach of 
such a duty would not result rn a breach of contract, but rather In bad falth. Thls issue will be 
discussed under the bad falrh sectlon. 
111. Sufficient evidence supports the jury's finding that the Weinsteins did not 
prevent Defendants from performing under the contract. 
Defendants argue that the Weinsteins prevented them from performing by falling to 
provide a proof of loss. As a consequence, Defendants argue they were not obligated to pay 
because they could not conduct a comprehensive investigation. The Welnsteins argue that proof 
of loss was submitted on multiple occasions, and that Defendants falled to Investigate the clalm. 
The proof of loss reyulred by an ~nsurance company cannot be more than what 1s 
necessary to show a psima facie case. Briizkman v. Aid Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 346, 349, 766 P.2d 
1227, 1230 (Ct. App. 1988). Specifically: 
The amount of information provided should be proportional to the amount 
reasonably available to the insured. If the information provided is insufficient to 
give the insurer an opportunity to investigate and determine its liability, the insurer 
may deny coverage. Otherwise, the insurer must investigate andlor determine its 
sights and liabilities. 
Id. A proof of loss is sufficient when the insured provides the insurer with enough information 
to allow the insurer a reasonable opportunity to investigate and determine the value of the claim. 
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Grerrzcltagh v. Farm Bttreuu Mut. Ins., 142 Idaho 589, 593, 130 P.3d 1127, 1131 (3006). 
Whether a proof of loss 1s suff~cient 1s a questlon of fact. ld.  
The Policy required the Wetnsterns to glve Defendants "written proof of their loss In a 
form oontalnlng any relevant ~nfomat~on [Defendants requested] w ~ t h ~ n  30 days of [that 
request]." Policy, General Provlston, sect~on S. The We~nsteins filled out multiple medical 
releases autl-ronzing the Defendants to gather medrcal ~nformatlon. The jury considered an 
~nstructlon on proof of loss and found that the Weinstelns provided Defendants wlth adequate 
proof of loss and sufficient evldence supports that finding. 
In their reply, Defendants argue that the Weinsteins prevented defendants from 
performing by faillng to sign WIPAA compliant medical releases after the new HIPAA rules took 
effect on Aprrl 14, 2003. Defendants provide no explanation as to why or how HIPAA affected 
the Weinstein's claims process, nor do they provide the Court wlth the statute. Mrs. We~nsteln 
testified that she slgned a medical release every time Defendants requested one. After the new 
rules took effect, Defendants did not notlfy Mrs. Welnstein that the previously signed releases 
were vo~d due to MIPAA. Mrs. Welnstein was not responsible for ensuring that the release she 
signed was still effect~ve under federal law, and ~t was not her fault that Defendants dld not 
request new releases until September, 2003. In short, sufficient evidence supports the finding 
that the Weinstelns did not prevent Defendants' performance. The jury considered the 
instruction on prevention of performance and found agalnst Defendants on that issue. 
BAD FAITH 
I. Elements of the Prima Facie Case 
The plaintiff in a bad faith action bears the burden of proof as to all elements of the prima 
facie case. Robinsort v. State Farm Mat. Auto. Irzs. Co., 137 Idaho 173, 177, 45 P.3d 829, 833 
(2002). In order to prevail in a bad faith action on a first-party claim, the plaintiff must show 
that: 1) the insurer intentionally and unreasonably denied or withheld payment; (2) the claim was 
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not talrly debatable; (3) the denial or failure to pay uas not the result of a good faith mistahe, 
and (3) the resulting harm was not ful ly  compensable by contract damages. The insured must 
also show that the clalm was covered under the pol~cy. I d  Defendants argue that the 
We~nste~ns faled to bear the burden of proof on all elements of a bad faith claim. 
A. Intentional and Unreasonable denial or delay 
Defendants argue rhat there 1s no evldence of Intentional or unreasonable denla1 or delay. 
Defendants argue rhat, In bad falth delay cases, there must be evtdence of "delay for delay's 
sake," and clte Greene v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 114 Idaho 63, 68, 753 P.2d 274, 279 (Ct. 
App. 1988), for that proposttlon. In that case, Greene, an insured, sued hls insurer for bad faith 
delays In tnvestlgatlon and evaluation, and Inadequate offers of payment. Id. Greene filed a 
claim under hls wild animal attack insurance for losses resulting from mastitis in hls dairy herd 
that he claimed resulted from a w~ld  cougar attack. I .  The insurer spent a long tlme 
investigating the claim, and the file demonstrated that the insurer's representatives were 
concerned about the unique nature of the claim and the few verifiable facts supporting it. Id. 
The court noted that the evidence did not indicate that the company intended to delay, but 
showed that the company took its time considering the claim for legitimate purposes. Id. 
Nowhere did the court hold that plaintiffs must prove a new element of "delay for delay's sake7' 
In order to preva~l on a bad faith claim. Nor does ~t disttnguish between bad t-alth denial and bad 
fa1 th delay cases. 
In this case, the evidence showed that months went by with no action on the claim. 
Defendants7 lntemal departments disregarded requests for information from another department. 
Experts testified that delays were intentional and unreasonable. The record indicates there was no 
or little investigation of the UM claim until almost one and a half years after the accident, 
6. It should be noted that Defendants repeatedly argue that, in order for a bad faith claim to stand, there must 
also be a breach of contract. That argument is contrary to the law on bad faith in Idaho. Inland Group of Cos. v. 
Providatcc Wash. Ins. Co., 133 Idaho 249,985 P.2d 674 (1999) (holding that a bad faith claim may exist even in the 
absence of a technical breach). 
Decis~on and Order on Defendants' Motion for Judgment Notw~thstanding the Verdlct 12 
although defendants had the releases allowlng them to do an ~nvestigatton shortly after the 
acc~dent, The company had developed clear polrcy to delay payment of UM beneflts until the 
end of all treatment, no matter how long that took. Unllke Greene, t h~s  case did not Involve a 
unique situation where the underlying facts of the claim were disputed or susp~cious, but rather 
one where litab~llty was clearly established from the beginning. Sufflclent evtdence ex~sted to 
sat~sly the first element of a bad falth clairn. 
B. The claim was not Fairly Debatable 
Defendants argue that the claim was fairly debatable. In bad faith cases "fa~rly 
debatable" means that at the time the claim was under conslderation, there existed a legltlmate 
questlon or d~l"ference in opinion over the eligibility, amount or value of the clalm. Robinson v. 
Stute Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 173, 178, 45 P.3d 829, 834 (2002). An 
Insurer is entitled to debate a falrly debatable claim whether the debate concerns a matter of fact 
or law. McGilvre~ v. Farmers Nrw World hs. Go., 136 Idaho 39, 45, 28 P.3d 380, 386 (2001). 
Defendants argue that the claim was fairly debatable on several grounds. 
Defendants argue that whether the Welnsteins were eligible for partial payments of 
outstanding medical bills on a UM clairn is fairly debatable. They assert that no Idaho case 
squarely states that insurers must pay medical bills before a final settlement In UM cases, and 
therefore the Weinsteins' request for payment was fairly debatable. The Weinsteins argue that 
all bad faith cases should be treated the same, regardless of the type of insurance involved, to 
best meet insureds' expectations regarding how claims will be handled under insurance policies. 
The Weinsteins argue that because bad faith cases exist in Idaho mandating the payment of 
undisputed amounts within a reasonable time, the lssue of whether or not those cases apply in a 
UM case is not falrly debatable. Idaho case law has not distinguished between types of 
insurance when discussing bad faith cases, thus the Court agrees that bad faith case law applies 
to UM coverage the same as it does to other types of coverage. 
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The tort of bad fa~th was first recogntzed in Idaho in Wzite v. Urzigurd M~~tuc i l  Iils. Co., 
1 12 Idaho 93,96,730 P.2d 10 14, 1016 (1986). The court stated 
"The tort of bad fatth breach of Insurance contract, then, has its foundations In the 
common law covenant of good filth and falr dealing and is founded upon the 
unique relationship of the insurer and the insured, the adhesionary nature of the 
Insurance contract including the potential for oveneaching on the part of the 
Insurer, and the unique, 'noncommercial' aspect of the insurance contract. 
ld. at 100. The Idaho Supreme Court indicated that the tort of bad faith was applicable to UM 
cases in Anderson v. Fat-n~c~rs Ins. Co., 130 Idaho 75.5, 947 P.2d 1003 (1997). 
Once a claim has been filed and the company has investigated the claim and determined 
that there is no dispute as to at least part of the claim, the insurer must pay the undisputed 
portion. lrllclnd Group of Conlpaulies v. Providerzcu Wusiz. Ins. Co., 133 Idaho 249, 985 P.2d 674 
(1999) (holding that a bad faith claim may exist even in the absence of a technical breach). In 
Inland an insured filed a bad faith claim against its insured and prevailed. Id. The insured filed 
a claim for losses due to the destruction of its equipment in a fire, and notified the insurer that the 
financial condition of its business was precarious. Id. Although the insurer demanded payment 
of the undisputed amount needed to repair the equipment, the insurer delayed in paying, resulting 
in the collapse of the insured's business. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court held that an insurance 
contract secures "more than the company's bare promise to pay certain claims when forced to do 
so; implicit in the contract and the relationship is the insurer's obligation to play fairly with its 
insured." M. at 680.255. 
An insurer is required to pay undisputed portions of a claim even if the insurer 
legitimately disputes another part of the claim. Chester v. State Fumz Ins. Co., 117 Idaho 538, 
789 P.2d 534 (Ct. App. 1990). In Chester, an insured submitted a claim for the burning of his 
barn. Id. The insurer offered Chester the actual cash value of the barn, which was only $50,000, 
but Chester believed he was entitled to the replacement cost of the barn, which was $95,000. Id. 
The insurance company paid nothing while this issue was being contested. Id. Chester then sued 
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for breach of contract and bad faith. The court held that the insurance company cornmltted bad 
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faith by fallng to pay the $50,000-the minlmum amount it was liable for-even though the 
Issue of valuatton was fairly debatable. Id. 
Defendants' claim that the rnajorlty rule fsom other jurisdictions 1s that pre-payment of 
UMfUIM clalms are not required. Aroizsorz v. State Furttz Ins. Co., CV 99-4074 CAS, 2000 US 
D~s t  LEXIS 6979 (C.D. Gal. 2000); Volurzd v. Furrtzers lns. Co. cf Ariz., 943 P.2d 808 (Anz 
1997); LeFcrvrr v. Westberry, 590 So.2d 154 (Ala. 1991); Ellwein v. Wurlli,rd Accidenf urzd 
Initem. Co., 15 P.3d 640 (Wash. 2001). These cases are all distinguishable from the present case. 
Aronsoiz, is an unreported decision. Further, the insured never asked for payment in 
advance, and the holding was explicitly limited to such circumstances. In Volaad, there was no 
"und~sputed amount" bur rather an unaccepted settlement offer. Additionally, the insured did not 
request payment in advance of the medical bills, as the Weinsteins did in this case. It should be 
noted that Arizona courts do consider the failure to pay undisputed amounts potential bad faith 
acts. See Borlund v. Sqfeco Ins. Go., 709 P.2d 552 (Ariz. App. 1985). 
In LeFevre, the Alabama Supreme Court held that UM claims are "hybrid" claims that 
are part first-party and third-party claims, and therefore no bad faith cause of action exists for 
UM claims until the uninsured motorist's liability is fixed. This is substantially different from 
Idaho law, which recognizes bad faith claims for UM claims as first party claims. Finally, in 
Ellwein, the Washington Supreme Court held that in bad faith cases, insureds must prove bad 
faith as a matter of law, thus allowing trial courts to dispose of bad faith claims on summary 
judgment so long as uny evidence exists to show a reasonable basis for the insurer's  action^.^ 
This is different from Idaho law, which allows the jury to hear conflicting evidence on bad faith 
claims and render the ultimate decision. 
7. It should also be noted that Ellwein was overruled by Snzitfz v. Safeco Ins. Co., 78 P.3d 1274 (Wash. 2003). 
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Many jurisdictions recognize UM bad faith clams as first pasty claims, as does Idaho. 
See Slate Furtn Mrt. Auto Ins. Co. v. Sht-uder, 882 P.2d 813 (Wyo. 1994). Under those 
lu~-~sd~ctlons, UM cla~ms are treated the same as other first party cla~ms. The rat~onale behlnd 
this is that an Insured 1s entltled to expect that the ~nsurer will handle a claim for uninsured 
motonst coverage In the same manner as other coverages: fairly and in good fa~th. ALLAN D. 
WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES: REPRESENTATION OF INSURANCE COMPANlES AND 
1NSUREDS 6-324 FN 6 (2007). In fact, some expests suggest that the ~nsurer's standard of conduct 
should be higher for UM claims, because most states mandate such coverage by statute. ALAN 
WDISS, 11 UNINSUED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE 237 (2000). Junsdictlons do 
specif~cally recogn~zc that the fallure to pay undisputed amounts on UM or UIM cla~ms may 
amount. to bad farth. See Saucier v. Allstute Ins. Co., 742 A.2d 482 (1999); Millers Mut. Ins. 
Ass'n v. House, 675 N.E.2d 1037 (1997). 
In this case, it was undisputed from October 1, 2002 that the uninsured motorist was at 
fault. There was no fairly debatable issue of comparative fault on Mrs. Weinsteln's part. 
Addit~onally there was no pre-existing condition that may have contributed to Sarah's injuries. 
Defendants had a duty to investigate and evaluate the claim in a timely manner. Defendants were 
requlred to pay the existing medical bills, which were undisputed amounts. 
Defendants next argue that causation was fairly debatable because Sarah may have 
aggravated or worsened her condition by returning to play soccer too soon. This argument IS  not 
supported by what actually occurred in the claims adjustment process. Although in June of 
2004, Defendants noted that Sarah may have returned to play soccer too soon, that "debate" was 
never communicated to the Weinsteins or their attorney. The "not fairly debatable" requirement 
does not require plaintiffs to show that the claim was not hypothetically debatable. See 
Robirzsorz, 137 Idaho at 178, 45 P.3d at 834 (holding that the relevant time for determin~ng 
debatabllity is "at the time the claim was under consideration"). Rather, it requires plaintiffs to 
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show that the cla~rn was not uc.tidully debated on a legrtlmate ground, Here, although Defendants 
have alleged causation, this was alleged In hrndslght after suit was filed. Further, because Sarah 
was slmply following the instructions of her medical providers, her actlons were not an 
intervening cause rel~ev~ng the insurance company from Irability. When a tortfeasor 1s liable for 
another person's bodlly injury, he 1s also 11able for any additional bodily harm resulttng from 
normal efforts of rhtrd persons In rendering a ~ d  which the other person's Injury reasonably 
requires, regardless of whether such acts are done tn negl~gent manner. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS Ij 457. Sarah d ~ d  not return to play soccer until her phys~cal therapists advised her to, 
therefore if there was resulting harm, it is attnbutable to the tortfeasor. The evidence at tnal 
~nd~cates Sarah followed the advice of her doctor-recommended physical therap~st. 
Defendants also argue that the cla~m was fairly debatable because there was a quest~on of 
fact as to whether Sarah will require a hip replacement due to the motor vehicle coll~sion, and 
because there was no evidence or demand relating to non-economic damages. Even ~f these 
elements were debatable, the insurer was required to pay the undisputed amount of the 
outstanding medrcal b~lls. 
C. The delay was not the result of an "honest mistake" 
Defendants argue that if there were mistakes, they were made in good faith. The 
Welnstelns have the burden of showing that any delay or denial was not the product of a good 
fatth or honest mistake. Robinsorz, 137 Idaho at 176. Idaho law defines "honest mistake" as "an 
Innocent mlstake which was made despite the presence of procedures to prevent the making of 
such mistake. It is a mistake that occurs despite reasonable care to prevent it. A mistake which 
IS  the result of negligence or inattention or Indifference is not an honest m~stake." Id. The jury 
was glven thls tnstructlon and declded that the delay was not the result of an honest mlstake. 
Suffic~ent ev~dence supports that flndtng. 
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D. Extra-contractual damages 
Next Defendants argue that the Weinsteins faled to carry the burden to show that the 
resulting harm was not fully compensable by contract damages, and that they fatled to do so. 
Defendants c~ t e  numerous rntent~onal ~nfll~tlons of emotlonal distress cases to support thelr 
contention that the Wernsterns faded to carry the burden of proof regarding extra-contractual 
damages. However, the cause of action in this case was bad faith handling of an insurance 
contract, not an emotional distress tort. Because bad faith is a tort, the full range of tort damages 
is available to a plaintiff with a successful claim, including emotional distress. 
A bad faith clarm is a tort claim arising out of a breach of contract, for which an insurer 
can recover damages nomaily recoverable in tort, including emotional distress. Walstoiz v. 
Monumerztal Lzfk lizs. Co, 139 Idaho 21 1, 219, 923 P.2d 456, 465 (1996). In discussing a case 
where only emor~onal dlstress damages remalned outstanding, the court noted "an actlon for 
lntentlonal lnfllct~on of emot~onal distress w~ll  ie only where there 1s extreme and outrageous 
conduct coupled wtth severe emotional distress." Wulston, 129 Idaho at 219, 923 P.2d at 464 
(quotlng Davis v. Guge, 106 Idaho 735, 741, 682 P.2d 1282, 1288 (Ct. App. 1984)). After 
quotlng the standard for lntentlonal lnflrctlon of emotlonal dtstress, the Walston court looked 
only to whether the insurer's conduct was "extreme outrageous conduct" before conclud~ng such 
damages were recoverable. 
The duty of care in  an insured-insurer relationship is much higher than the standard duty 
of care contemplated in general tot-ts for emotional distress. "The court has 'recognized a special 
relationship' between an insured and insurer due to the adhesionary aspects of the insurance 
contract. Id. citing White v. Unigurd Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho at 99, 730 P. at 1019. Insurers are 
a kind of fiduciary for insureds. Wulston used the elements of the tort of emotional distress to 
weigh the evidence to determine if it supported the bad faith claim. This is consistent with how 
other jurisdictions deal with the issue of emotional distress damages. In most jurisdictions that 
000343 
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consider a bad Calth clalm a tort, the full consequentlal damages are allowed, lnclud~ng mental 
distress. ALLAN D. WINDT, INSUKANCF: CLAIMS AND DISPUTES: REPRESENTATLON OF INSURANCE 
C o h l i ~ ~ r n ~ s  AND INSUREDS 3 6:40 (2007). Orlly those states that do not recognize bad falth 
clalrns or recogntze them as contractual clams require the Insured to prove all the elements of 
the tost of lntentlonal infiict~on of emotional dlstress to recover emot~onal distress damages. Id. 
In thls case, the seventy of Defendants misconduct coupled wlth the We~nste~n's 
expectatlun of the contract satisfies the requirements of Wlston.  The Defendants denled the 
Welnstelns' sequests for payment and defended a policy of delaying the settlement of the UM 
clalm, w~th knowledge that the Weinstelns were recelvlng phone calls from bill collectors and 
bang threatened by medical providers. The Weinsteins entered into the contract expect~ng that 
the Defendants would protect them in thelr tlme of need. The Weinsteins presented evldence 
that they suffered from embarrassment, harassment by bill collectors, from internal famlly strife, 
and overall misfortune and distress in their life as a result of the Defendants failing to meet their 
contractual obligations. Mrs. Weinstein experienced depression and crying. The jury was 
instructed on thls element, and found that the emot~onal dlstress was severe. The Welnstelns met 
thelr burden to prove thelr harm was not fully cornpensable by contract damages. 
THE PAYMENT IN ADVANCE AGREEMENT 
Defendants argue that the Payment in Advance Agreement ("PIA Agreement7') was not, 
as a matter of law, improper, and therefore they are entitled to JNOV. Regardless of whether the 
PIA Agreement was proper or not, the We~nsteins' counsel made his closing argument based on 
the evidence in the record and the jury was Instructed that the closing argument was not in itself 
evidence. Since the Defendants have not explained why, even if the PIA agreement was proper 
as a matter of law, this would entitle them to a JNOV, the court reserves d~scusslon of th~s  ~ssue 
for the motlon for a new tnal. 
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THE DUTY TO MITIGATE 
Dekndants argue that the Weinste~ns' bad Edith damages must be offset in whole because 
the Welnstelns Failed to mltigate by uslng their lnherltance to pay overdue rned~cal btlls. "The 
duty to mltigate . . provldes that a plaint~tf who 1s lttjured by actionable conduct ot a defendant 
is osdlnanly denled recovery for ctamages whlch could have been avoided by reasonable acts, 
~ncludlng reasonable expend~tures, after actionable conduct has taken place." Margaret N. 
Ctrityrze Trust I>. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253, 261, 846 P.2d 904, 912 (1993). The issue of whether or 
not pla~ntiffs acted reasonably 1s one for the tner of fact. Id. 
The We~nsteins dld not receive any ~nhentance until one year after the accident. Thts 
was after Defendants refused to investigate or pay medical bills, and after Mrs. Welnsteln had 
begun to recelve threatening phone calls from medical providers and collection agencies. The 
jury could reasonable belleve that prlor to the Inheritance, the Weinste~ns could not mltlgate their 
Injuries, and that the bad Path had already been committed. Also there was no evldence 
presented to show that the inheritance eased their financial obligations. Flnally, the jury was 
provided with a jury instruction on mitigation and could have found that the Weinstelns' cholce 
to not use the lnhentance money to pay the overdue bills was reasonable under the 
circumstances. 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND CORPORATE RATIFICATION 
Defendants argue that the We~nsteins faded to show corporate ratificat~on of any actlons 
support~ng a clalm for punltive damages. In Idaho, the plalntlff must show that the d~rectors or 
managlng officers of a corporation partlclpated i n ,  author~zed, or ratified the alleged bad acts of 
the agent In order to recover punitive damages from that corporation. Manning v. Twin Fulls 
Clinic & Hosp., 122 Idaho 47, 53, 830 P.2d 1185, 1191 (1992). GrifjS Inc. v. Curry Bean Co., 
138 Idaho 315, 321 (2003). Further, in order to ratify the malicious act of a lower-level 
employee, the officer or director must "at the time of such ratification [have] knowledge 
"6b345 
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The Court DENIES Defendants' motion for JNOV. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 23"' day of January, 2008. 
Darla Williamson, 
District Court Judge 
I, J. Davld Navano, the itnderslgned authority, do hereby certlfy that I have ma~led, by 
Unlted States Mall, one copy of the Dec~slon and Order on Defendants' Motlon for Judgment 
Notwlthstand~ng the Verdict to each of the attorneys of record in this cause in envelopes 
addressed as follows: 
James E. Risch Robert A. Anderson 
R. John Insinger Phillip J. Collaer 
Jason Risch C.W. Moore Plaza 
407 West Jefferson Street 250 S. 5th Street, Suite 700 
Boise, ID 83702-6049 P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
Dated this@day of January 2008 
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I"hllllp J .  C'oll~ier-, 1SB it3347 
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;"", ANI)k;KSON, JII1,IAN CI; Hlilsl, 1 I IJ 
- (' W. MC)C)IL" P I ~ L ~ I  
a 250 South F~fth Street, Su~te '700 
- Post Offlce Box 7426 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
r"5 Tclephnnc: (208) 344-5800 
Facslmlle: (208) 344-55 10 
Xttul-nei \ 1 0 1  Defendants 
IN THE DISl'RICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
Plain tiffs/Respondents, 
LESLIE WEINSTEIN. and LINDA 
WEINS'TELN. J-Ii~shanci and Wife, ~ n c l ~ l  lcltlally 
and ,I\ Ciua~il~~ins ad l~tem lo]- SARAH K .  
Wt,IhS I L:lh. .~nd SARAH R WkINSrI'l=IN 
I ndl L ldual l y 
VS.  
Case No CV PI 0300280D 
DEFEIVDANTS' NO'I'ICE OF 
APPEAL 
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND 
CASLIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY and 
PKllUENTIXL GENERAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY and LIBERTY MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY and LM 
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE, 
1 -1HE ABOVE IiNl'lTLED PLAIN'TIFFS, LESLIE WEINSrI'EIN, LINDA 
WE1NSrTElN, AND SARAH WEINSTEIN, AND T m I R  ATTORNEY, JAMES 
RISCH, AND THE CLERK OF TEE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT 
NOTlCE IS &REBY GIVEN THAT: 
DEFENDANTS' NOTICE: OF APPEAL - 1 
I The above named appellants, PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND CASUAEl'Y 
INSliRANCE COMPANY and PRIIDENTIAI. GENERAL, INSURANCE C'C)MPANL' a11d 
1-IBL;IC I Y ML' 1 l A 1 -  l?tSlIR,'\hC't, C'Ohl13,4h?i c t ~ ~ d  l h l  PKOPEII 1'Y ANl) (. "\SC'=II. 1 L 
INSC'RANCE, appe;"I agalnst the above runled lespondentx to the ld~tho Supreme ('OLII-t 11ori1 the 
./rrc/grrlc/ri entered tn the abo~c-entttled proceeiilng o n  October 1, 2007: ;mtl the I Z I I I P I I L I C ~  
.ltlc/yrrzc~ttt rrl I - L ~ I  or  of Strrilll IVc~ll~,\rcirr, I>c~c*r\loil clttcl Onlev 0 1 1  i2rtonzev I.'i~c.\ mil Co\t.$ C'lc~rtric~~l 
'[A t o  LS~~t-t/ii  W C > I I ~  \tc tz, :itid I>c< I ~[oiz  C ~ I Z L I  O F L ~ O F  0 1 1  I ~ ~ ~ f ~ ~ t t c i c ~ ~ t t ~ t  [SIC] 1V10?1011 for Ncjw ~ ' F I L I ~  rcJ. 
.Irrr-or Ml.rcorldrrct entered In the aboie entltled proceed~ng on the December 27, 2007, Dai-la 
Wllllalnson presiding, Appellants reserve the right to appeal the Dlstrrct Court's declslons 
I egal ding other outstanding motions for new trlal andlor judgment notwl~hstandrng the verd~ct i t  
and when such decisions should be entered by the Dlstrlct Court and served on Appellants 
7 r - 
- lhat the parties hate a 11ghr to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
ludgments or orders described In paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pulauant LO 
Rules 1 I(;"), I.A.R. 
3 The primary Issue:, on appe. ‘1 1 are. 
(a)  Did the D~xts~ct Court err In holding that there Mas no misconduct on the 
part of juror Mark Barbo sufficient to warrant the grant of a new trial'! 
(b) Dld the Dlstr~ct Court e1-r In award~ng attorney'b fees to 
Pla~ntlff/Respondent Sarah Wernste~n pursuant to Idaho Code 4 4 1 - 1839'! 
(c) Dld the Dlstrict Court err In awardlng costs as a matter of rlght to 
Pla~nt~fSIRespondent Sarah We~nstern? 
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(d) Dld the D~str-lct Court err in grantlng the Arrzrrtdi~el fudgnlc~~zr z l  k i vor  of 
Sc~rirlt Ml(~rrlali~rl1 pnor to rullng on Defendants'lAppellants' outstanding 
motloris lor new trial andlor judgment notwithstanding the \ierdict'! 
i e )  Uld the District C'iturt e n  In falling to use the prc>pcr set-oil\ In 
detern.lining the arnoun t of thc judgment? 
4. A repol-ter's transcrtpt 1s requested In its entirety for the hearings conducted on 
Ntt~cmbei 7 and 19.2007, and December 13, 2007 and Trlal transcript. 
5 
-1 hc i2ppcllcrrit\ lcqi~cst t I i , i ~  [ I I C  1c)llon rr~g ciocumcnls bc ~nclird~cl rn the clci I < ' \  
I-ecord in tlddltlon to those autornatlcally lncluded under Kiile 28. 1 A.K.: 
(a) All bnefs, affldavlts or other documents flled or lodged by the partles t t ~  
the D~strlct Court pertalnlng to the Dcyi2rld~rzt~ ' Motion for NC'LI: Tr1u1 rc2: 
.Iirror MI.K ortclucr; 
(h) All bl-lefs, tlffldavits 01- othel- doculnents flied or lodged by the pal-tles 01- 
the Dlstrrct Court perta~ntng to the Plaintiffs' motlons for costs and fees; 
(c) All brlefs, afflda~lts or other documents filed or lodged by the pal-tles or 
the D~sti-lct Court pel-tuning to the ilrtzetttlecl Jitckgr?z~~zt ill F~n~ot. 0 ) SC~IYIII 
l.t;.lil \ r t ~ l / r .  .~nd. 
(d) All exhlblts offered 01. admltted at the hear~ngs conducted on Noveinbt.1- 7 
and 19,3007, and December 13,2007. 
( e )  All Exhlblts admltted at the tl-ial. 
0 I eel-t~tj th,tr 
(a) The clerk oi the Dlhtr~c~ Coui-t will be pald the estllnated fee 101- 
preparation of the reporter's transcript and clerk's record; 
I)EFENI),ANri'S' NOTICE OF APPEAI, - 3 
(17) 'l'he Ltl~pell;iii: I~lirlg 1cc i n  the ~tnctutii 1 1  $100.00 has becn paid; and. 
( c )  lTt-rat se~-\~lce has been made upon the trall court Repol-ter and all pastres 
reyurred to be served pursuant to Rule 20. 
DATED this ay of January, 2008 
'4 LIAN BL HULL I.I.~) 
w t  A. Anderson, Of the  FII-m 
Aitolneys 101- Defendants 
DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thlsgTday of January, 2008, 1 served a true and correct 
cctpy of thc fc,regolng DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF APPEAL by deliverrng the same to each 
of the follow~ng attorneys of record, by the method tndicated below, addressed as follows: 
407 W. Jcl'fermn Street 
Botse, ID 83702 
DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5 
Rohci-t A Atiderson, ISB #3 1 33 
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P o ~ t  Offlce Box 7326 
Bo~se, Idaho 83707-7426 
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I;ac\lmllc: (208) 333-55 10 
E-M,ril. iiindcl ~on@!:a~hlaw.conl 
*.*A &>;*;$& 
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NO. 
Ai~ol-neys t)r- Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PKI~DL,N'I'IAL_ PKOPkRTY AND 
C'IISI~AL~IY INSURANCE COMPANY and 
PRULItN I'IXL GENERAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY and LIBERTY MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY and LM 
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE, 
LESLIE WEINSTEIN, and LINDA 
WEINS'I'EIN, Husband and W~fe ,  ~ndiv~d~lal ly 
x n ~ l  a \  C;uar-dlans ad 11tem for SARAH R 
W1:INSrl't.,1N. aiid SARAH R WEINSTEI3 
~nd~\idually 
TO: TIiE ABOVE ENTITLED PLAINTIFFS, LESLIE WEINSTEIN, LINDA 
WEINSTEIN, AND SARAN WEINSTEIN, AND THEIR ATTORNEY, JAMES 
RISCH, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT 
Case No. CV PI 040028013) 
DEFENDANrI'S' FIRS?' AME:Nl)E:l) 
NO'TICE OF APPEAL 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
DEE'ENDANrI'S' FIRST AMENDED NOTlCE OF APPEAL - 1 
1 .  'The abokc named appellants, PR'CJDENTJAL PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 
INSL'KAKC'E COMPANY and PRIIDENTIAL GENERAL, INSURPlNGE COMPANY and 
LIBEK'I'Y MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and LM PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 
INSURANCE, appeal against the above named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Coui-t fi-om the 
Jrrllg~tlrrtt  cntel-cd In the above-ent~tled proceeding on October 1 .  2007; and the A I I I ( - ' I ~ ~ ~ c L ~  
.Irr t lqi trc~lrr  111 I-lr\'or of .V~lr-ci lr  1 2 / ; j i r t \ r c ~ t r r ,  I I c J ~  1 \ t r j 1 1  t i l l ~ i  01 c l r - ' ~  o i l  : \ r f o r - ~ t ~ ~  \J 'OO\  t l r l r l  C ' i ) \ f \  C ' l t l i ~ ~ t ( l ( l  
c r  l o  S t i r  r l l t  C Z / l ~ t 1 1  i t c j i ~ l .  and 1,lc.c i \tot1 [r l t t i  01 dot- ort I ) c ~ / i ~ ~ l ~ l c i ~ r ~  t I \ I C ]  ,Motloll for IVOII I'n~rl I-(. 
Jut-or Mr.\cotiduct entered In the above ent~tled proceeding on the December 27, 2007, Darla 
W~ll~amson presldlng. Appellants reserve the right to appeal the Distrlct Court's dcc~sions 
i-egtlrd~ng othel- outstanding ~no t~ons  for tiew trlal andor judgnlent notwlthstandlng the verd~ct ~f 
and when such decls~oris hould be entesed by the District Court and served on Appellants. 
2. That the partles have a r~ght to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgments or orders described In paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to 
Rules 1 I(a), I.A.R. 
3 The primary issues on appeal are. 
(a) Did the D~rtl-~ct COLII-L err in holcl~ng that there mias no ni~scoiiduct 011 the 
part of juror Mark Barbo sufficient to warrant the grant of a new tl-lal'? 
(b) Did the Dlstnct Court err In award~ng attorney's fees to 
Plaintlff/Respondent Sarah Welnstein pursuant to Idaho Code 4 41 - 1839'? 
(c )  D I ~  the D~st r~ct  Court en. In awardlng costs as a matter of r~ght to 
Plaint~ff/Respondent Sarah Welnstein? 
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(dl Did thc Di\k~ rut C'OLII t C I I  I II  g ~ ; t ~ i t ~ i ~ s  the A/rli.iltli)d .lutlq~r~c~/tr rri F l i t  or- r~l  
Sl i r~r l r  CZ'ol~istoirl p110i 1 ~ )  ru1111g on Dcfe~idants'/Appellati~~' outstdndrii~ 
motlons for new trral andlor judgrrtent notw~thstanding the verd~ct? 
(e) Drd the Dlstrrct Court err In falling to use the proper set-utfs In 
determ~nlng the amount of the judginent'? 
3 A I-eporter's transcrrpt 1s rcquesled In rts entlrety for the hcar-~ngs conducted o n  
No~ember 7 and 19, 2007, and December 13, 2007 and 'Prial transcript. 
5.  The Appellants request that the follow~ng documents be Included In the clerk's 
I-ecord In add~t~on to those ai~toniat~cally ~ncluded under Rule 38, I.A.R.: 
(a)  All hrlels. at t~d, i \~ts  01 othe~ docurnents tried or lodged b j  the p,lrtics or- 
the D ~ s t ~ - ~ c t  Court pci-talnlng to rhe Llc.fe/z~lulzt.~ ' Morrorl )or. Nelt 1-t-ILL/ 1-6. 
Juror Mi.) cot duct; 
(b) All briefs, aff~davlts 01- other documents filed or lodged by the part~es or 
the D~st r~ct  Court pel-ta~n~ng to the Plalnt~ffs' motlons for costs and Sees: 
( c )  All bl-lets, attidav~ts or other documents filed 01- lodged by the pal-tles or 
the Distnct Court pertalnlng to the Amerxled Judgitzerzr irz Favor 01 SarciI1 
Winstc.in; and, 
(d) All exh~bits offered or adm~tted at the heal-~ngs conducted on Novelnber 7 
and 19, 2007. .lnd Deccmber 13, 2007. 
(el All Exh~brts adln~tted at the t1-1~t1. 
6. 1 cert~fy that: 
(a) The clerk of the Distr~ct Court will be pard the estimated See tor- 
prepal-atlon ot the repol.te~-'s transcl-lpt and clerk's record; 
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(b) The appellate t illng Ice m the amount rf $100.00 has been p a ~ d ;  and, 
(c)  That sesvlce has been nude upon the tsatl court Reporter and all parties 
reyu~sed to be served pursuant to Rule 20. 
DATED this I* day of February, 1008. 
Robert A,, Anderson, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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sc I HEREBY CERTIFY that on t h ~ s  ( day of February. 2008,I served a true and correct 
copy of the forcgo~ng DEFENDANTS' FIRST AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL by 
del~verlng the same to each of the follow~ng attorneys of record, by the method indicated below, 
acldrcssed as follows: 
( 1 Overntght Marl 
[ j F;icsrmlle 
Penny Tardiff, Reporter [ ] U.S. Ma1 I, postage prepald 
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE [ 4 Hand-Dell vered 
200 W. Front Strect 
t3or~c. 1ii;~lio 83703 
I ] Overn~ght Mall 
[ j Facstm~lc 
Robert A. Anderson 
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JAMES E. RISCH (ISB ff1224) 
R. JOEIN INSINGER (ISB #1678) 
JASON S. MSCH (ISB #6655) 
RTSCEl GOSS INSINGER GUSTAVEL 
Attorneys at Law 
407 West Jefferson Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 345-9974 
Facsimile: (208) 345-9982 
Attorneys for PlaintiffsICross-Appellants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
LESLIE WEINSTEIN and LINDA 
WEINSTEIN, Husband and Wife, 1 Case No. CV PI 0400280D 
individually and as Guardian Ad Litem ) 
for SARAH R. WEINSTEIN, and Sarah ) NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL 
R. Weinstein, individually, 1 
PlaintiffsICross-Appellants, ) 
VS. ) 
1 
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND ) 
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY ) 
and PRUDENTIAL, GENERAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY and 
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE 1 
COMPANY and LM PROPERTY AND ) 
CASUALTY INSURANCE, 1 
1 
DefendantsICross-Respondents. ) 
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TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED CROSS-ESPONDENTS, PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY 
AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, PRUDENTIAL GENERAL 
NSUKANCE COMPANY, LIBERTY MUTUAL I N S U M C E  COMPANY, AND 
LM PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE, AND SAID PARTIES' 
ATTOWEYS, ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL, AND THE CLERK OF THE 
ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. LESLIE WElNSTEIN and LINDA WEINSTEIN, as Cross-Appellants, do cross- 
appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court against the above-named Cross-Respondents from the January 
23,2008 Decision and Order on Defendants ' Motionfor Remittifur, or, in the Alternative, New Trial 
entered by the Honorable Darla S. Williamson (this Cross-Appeal is only as to the Court's remittitur 
of the jury's $6 million punitive damage award to $1.89 million; Cross-Appellants do not appeal 
any aspects of this Court's January 23, 2008 Decision and Order other than Section C.3. and all 
remittitur issues, and do not appeal any other judgment or order entered in this action). Although 
Cross-Respondents have not yet amended their January 29,2008 Notice of Appeal to specifically 
include issues subject of the Court's January 23,2008 Decision and Order, their Notice of Appeal 
specifically reserved (in paragraph 1) the right to appeal the District Court's decisions and orders 
regarding their motions for new trial and/or judgment notwithstanding the verdict when entered. 
Based on that reservation and the fact that those reserved issues were decided in the January 23,2008 
Decision and Order, Cross-Appellants expect that Cross-Respondents will amend their Notice of 
Appeal to include that Decision and Order (presumably excluding an appeal of the Court's decisions 
on remittitur and Section C.3.). Because it is not expected that Cross-Respondents will appeal the 
remittitur aspects or rulings of the January 23, 2008 Decision and Order and because Cross- 
Appellants only appeal from the remittitur decisions in this action, this may not be a pure 
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'%ross-appeal'3n a technical sense, but to any extent this Cross-Appeal might otherwise be construed 
or characterized as a direct appeal of those remittitu: issues rather than a cross-appeal, it should be 
deemed as such as to Section C.3. (and any other remi~itur affected sections) of the January 23,2008 
Decision and Order. 
2. Cross-Appellants, LESLIE WEINSTEIN and LINDA WEINSTEIN, have a right to 
appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the above-referenced January 23,2008 Decision and Order 
described in paragraph 1 above, is an appealable order under and pursuant to Rules 1 1, 1 1.1 and 
1 1.1(5), I.A.R. 
3. The primary issues on this Cross-Appeal by LESLIE WEINSTEIN and LINDA 
WEINSTEIN are: 
a. Did the District Court err in reducing the jury's $6 million punitive damage 
award to $1.89 million? 
b. Did the District Court e n  in ordering a rernittitur reducing the punitive 
damage award from $6 million to $1.89 million as a condition of denying the 
Defendants'/Cross-Respondents' Motion for New Trial? 
c. Did the District Court e n  in granting the DefendantsY/Cross-Respondents' 
Motion for New Trial as to punitive damages should PlaintiffsICross- 
Appellants rehse to accept the remittitur of the punitive damages award from 
$6 million to $1.89 million as a condition of denying the Motion for New 
Trial? 
4. No additional reporter's transcript is requested by the Cross-Appellants, because an 
adequate transcript has already been requested by the Cross-Respondents in their January 29,2008 
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Notice of Appeal; Cross-Appellants acknowledge that the extent of the reporter's transcript 
requested by Cross-Respondents in their January 29, 2008 Notice of Appeal is appropriate and 
complete as to all issues and that no additional transcript is needed. 
5 .  Cross-Appellants concur that the docments listed in Cross-RespondentsYanuary 
29,2008 Notice of Appeal should be included in the clerk's record in addition to those automatically 
included under Rule 28, I.A.R.; no others are needed or requested by Cross-Appellants. 
6. Icertify: 
a. Because of the requests for the transcript and the record specified in Cross- 
Respondents' January 29, 2008 Notice of Appeal, no additional reporter's 
transcript or clerk's record will be required as a part of this Cross-Appeal, 
and thus no additional fees are required. 
b. Service of this Notice of Cross-Appeal (including the statement herein that 
no additional transcript will be required or requested beyond that specified in 
the Cross-Respondents' January 29,2008 Notice of Appeal) has been made 
upon the reporter. 
c. Service of this Notice of Cross-Appeal (including the statement herein that 
no additional transcript will be required or requested beyond that specified in 
the Cross-Respondents' January 29,2008 Notice of Appeal) has been made 
upon the clerk. 
d. The Cross-Appeal filing fee in the amount of $101 .OO has been paid. 
e. Service of this Notice of Cross-Appeal has been made upon the trial court 
reporter and all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20, I.A.R. 
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - Page 4 
000361 
DATED This 7" day of February, 2008. 
IZISCH GOSS INSINGER GUSTAVEL 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Cross-Appellants 
BY 
R. JOHN INSINGER, of the firm 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 7'h day of February, 2008, I caused to be served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL as follows: 
Robert A. Anderson [(/I U. S . mail (postage prepaid) 
Phillip J. Collaer [(/I Facsimile (344-55 10) 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL, LLP [ ] Hand Delivery 
Attorneys at Law [ 1 Federal Express 
C. W. Moore Plaza 
250 S. Sth Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
Penny Tardiff, Court Reporter 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Jean Hirrner, Court Reporter 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
[ I  U.S. mail (postage prepaid) 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Federal Express 
[/I U. S. mail (postage prepaid) 
[ 1 Facsimile 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ 1 Federal Express 
R. John Insinger 
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I t4iillil>J C'oIl,tc.i.ISB#34-17 
M,uI\L) Sel~a\ticii~,1SB#0013 
z ANLIEKSON, JULIAN X HULL 1.1.1' 
- C .  W. Moore Plaza 
FEB 2 i 20bd 
250 South Fifth Street, Sulte 700 
- Post Office Box 7426 
Boise, Itllrho 81707-7426 
Tclephonc: (208) 344-5800 
I;ac\imlle' (318) 343-55 10 
E-hl,ii l randel son C@ajhla~v.con~ 
Attoi-neys l'or Defendants 
I N  THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
Plainti ffslRespondents, 
l,kSL,If: WI,INSI'EIN, .tnd LINDrZ 
\iV121YSI klh tl~~sh,incl ,~nd W ~ t c .  indi~id~ially 
.u1d .is ( ; L I ~ ~ I ~ I ~ I I I I  ;id litem ioi SARAH R. 
WklNSTEIN, and SARAH R. WEINSTEIN 
indlviduall y 
VS.  
Ca\c N o .  ('V PI 0400280l> 
DEFENDANTS' SECOND 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
PKCIDET\;7L'IAL PROPERTY AND 
CASIJALTY INSURANCE COMPANY and 
PRUDENTIAL GENERAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY and LIBERTY MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY and LM 
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE, 
TO: THE ABOVE ENTITLED PLAINTFFS, LESLIE WEINSTEIN, LINDA 
WEINSTEIN, AND SARAH WEINSTEIN, AND T m I R  ATTORNEY, JAMES 
RISCI-I, AND TKE CLERK OF TKE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
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I Thc above named appellants, PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 
I N S I f K , 4 N f ' t  COMPANY and PKCJDEN'I'IAL GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY and 
LIUkRrlY MI'TUAL INSL'RANCE COMPANY ,~nd LM 13ROPERTY AND C"4SCiAL'I'Y 
INSURANCE, appeal agalnst the above named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from ( I )  
the .fil~lq?)lcv~lf enlered In the abote-entrtled proceed~ng on October 1,  2007; ihe ( 1 1 )  Ai~~orr~lcd 
.f~ttl:,~~rt~trr 1 1 1  I-rit~or of SLITLIJI U'i~zrt.\f~112 entered In the tthove ent~tled pi-oceed~ng on December 27, 
2007, ( 1 1 1  ) thc 1jc.c r rroti m i l  0r~lc.r ori Attorrirv Frri tatd Co,rr.r Clnznzed ~ 1 . 3  to Suruh Wo~~i.srer~i 
entered In the above ent~tled proceedlng on December 27, 3007; (IV) the De~.i.siorz und Or-dcur 012 
Dt~f<~lirlu~zr.\ [slc] Motiolz fijr New Ti-iul re: Juror Miscorzdz~ct entered In the above ent~tled 
proceeding on December 27, 2007; (v) the Deci~iotz ulzd Order on Defi,nd~l~zt.s' JVlorio~z for 
J L I L ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ J I I ~  N O ~ V I I I ~ S ~ L ~ I ~ ~ L ~ ~ ~  ~ I Z P  V(~il~11ct entered In the above entltled proceedlng on January 21, 
2008; ( V I )  the L)ecl.\zolz cud OF-drr on Dejelzllcilzts' il/lotiolz for Kcmztrztur or, itz the Alter-~rutrl~j, 
iVr\t+ Trrtil entered In the above ent~tled proceed~ng on January 23, 2008; (vll) the L ) O L I ) I ~ I I  CUZL/  
Orrlc~r 011 fist\ Clnirned (is to Leslie ci~td LincJu Weilzstc~ilz entered in the above entitled 
ploccedlng o n  Junutil-y 23, 2008; and ( ~ I I I )  all court orders and l-ul~ngs leading up to those 
judgment\, the Eionorahle Darla Wllllamson presldlng. 
3 
. That the partres have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgments or orders descr~bed in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to 
Rules I I(a), I.A.R. 
3 The prlinary lssues on appeal are: 
(a) Dtd the Dlstr~ct Court err in holding that there was no mlsconciuct on the 
part of juror Mark Barbo sufflc~ent o warrant the grant of a new tnal'! 
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(b) Uld the Dtstrrct Coui-t crr In awarding attorney's Sees to 
Pla~nt~i'i'ltiespctndent Sarah Wetnsteln pursuant to Idaho Code 4 4 1- 1839? 
((3) Dtcl the D~stnct C ~ ~ i r t  err In a~vardrng costs as a mattes ol- rrght to 
Platntiff/Respondent Sarah Welnste~n? 
(cl) Did the Dlstrrct Court err In granting the Antended Judgnletlt irz Fullc/r of 
Suruft Wein.rteirz prror to rul~ng on Defendants'/Appellants' outstanding 
motloni lor new tt-lill L i ~ ~ d / ~ ~ -  juclgmcnt notwlthstand~ng the ~ e r d ~ c t ' ?  
(c )  Did the D~strlct Court cir In I'a~llng to use the proper set-otls In 
determlnlng the amount of the judgment? 
(1') Should the punltlvc damage award (as reduced by the court's remtttttur 
ru 11 ng) he  reversed bccause: 
0 )  the court erred In fa111ng to apply Idaho's statutory pun~ttvc 
damages cap, wh~ch took effect July 1, 2003; 
(11) the court erred In allowtng Plaintiffs' counsel to invite puntshment 
of' the entll-e Insurance ~ndustry, takrng Into account harm to others bestdes 
Plalnr~ffs, and In ratlonallztng that those comments were tmpl~cltly llmtted 
to Idaho; 
(111) the court erred In refus~ng to instruct the jury or set aslde the 
verdlct w~th  respect to the t'allure to prove the elements of corporate 
rat~ttctltlon necessary to obtaln punltlve damages under Idaho law; and, 
O L )  the court erred in not reduc~ng the award to a constltutlonally 
acceptable amount relat~ve to the amount of compensatory damages 
awarded by the jury; 
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(v )  the c o u ~ ~  ctred In lnstructlng the jury that ~t could conslder the 
Dctcnclants' ~ i c ~ ~ l t h  '111d ~ I I ~ ~ I ~ C I L ~ I  L ' O I I ~ I ( I ~ I ~ "  
) UIJ the court ~~~~rcc tns t lue  as 3 mattel ol law the duties of an Insurance 
company w ~ t h  respect to an un~nsured motorrst clalm by: 
( I )  holdtng that under Idaho law an Insurance company's duty to an 
~ns~i red  to pay benef~ts on an uninsured motonst c l a ~ m  1s the same aa the 
duty to an ~nbured w ~ t h  a f~rst-party c lam;  and, 
(11) find~ng that Defendants engaged In bad fa~th  breach of contract by 
not ~mmed~ately paylng un~nsured motorlst benef~ ts w~ th each med~cal b~ l l  
I-ecel bed'? 
( h )  D I ~  the COLII-t ell .t\ .I m~lttel- ol lau In l a ~ l ~ n g  to glanl a judgment 
nolw~rhstand~ng the L erdlct. 
( I )  based on the evldence that Pla~nt~ffs '  counsel prevented 
Defendants from maklng tlmely payments by fallrng to prov~de proper 
releases and/or t~niely del~verlng med~cal records; and/or that ~t was a 
good ta~th  mlstahe for Defendants to rely on the representations on 
Pla~nt~ffs '  counsel that he would del~ver said records; 
(11) based on the evidence that the Insurance pollcy d ~ d  not reyulre that 
Defendants ~mmeci~ately pay un~nsured motorlst benefits w t h  each 
111ed1cztl b~l l  rece~veci, and/or that such obl~gat~on was "lit~rly debatable" 
due to the lack of pnor Idaho precedents recognlLlng such ,I duty, 
(111) based on a lack of ev~dence supporting an ~ntent~onal and 
unreasonable den~al or delay In paylng benefits; 
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( I \ )  based on cvidcncc that ihc extent of Dclendant's obl~gatlon to 
make u n ~ ~ ~ s u r e d  motorist payments for Platntiff Sarah We~nstein's rnjui-tes 
or damages were fairly debatable; 
(v)  based on a lack of ev~dence to establish the Plaintiffs suftercd 
extra-contractual daniages: 
( v ~ )  based on an ~nsultlclency of the evidence shvuing either 
~ntentional delay or that any delay was not the result of a good f a t h  
mistake on the part ol Defendants; 
( \ I ) )  hased on an ~nsuff~clency of the evtdence to support the awards for 
cornpenhatory damages; and, 
( ~ 1 1 )  based on evidence showing that Plaintiffs failed to mittgate their 
damages'? 
( I  C)ld the court er-r in giving, over Defendants' objections, a jury instruction 
thai prcbents the text of the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act'? 
(1) Did the court err rn failing to grant a new tnal as to the claims of breach of 
contract and bad faith as to the un~nsured motorist provisions of the 
policy: 
( I )  based on the Improper d~str~bution to the jury of Plaintitts' 
annotated exhibi t I~st; 
(11) based on an award of excessive damages both for compensatory 
damages and punlt~ve damages; 
(111) based on a failure to instruct the jury as to the defense of adv~ce of
counsel; 
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( I \ )  thi~cd 011 thc c o i ~ i t  i~rovid~rig a j~11.y I I I \ ~ I . L I C I ~ O ~  on bad la1111 
rnct)ll?ol .t1111g .I ~icglrge~ici: \rdnddl d ,  
( v )  b a ~ e d  on the court permitting the testimony of Pla~nt~ftb' witncss, 
Norma Nlelson: 
( V I )  bascd o n  et.rdence t h ~ ~ r  the jury verd~ct was the I-esult oi passlon 
dnd 1"-qudlce, 
( V I I )  based on the court's comments before the jury disparag~ng, 01. 
seemlng to d~sparage, Defendants' counsel; 
( ~ 1 1 1 )  based on ~ncorrectly Instructing the jury as to when payment was 
due; 
(1x1 bascd on inzoi-~cctly ~ns~rucrlng the jury as t o  \+hat c o n ~ r ~ t ~ i ~ c d  
actionable delay; and, 
(x )  based on ~nconectly Instructing the jury as to proper standard (rol- 
bad t 'uth'! 
( k )  D I ~  the court en- In holding that Pla~nt~ffs had made a sufflclent proof of 
loss as to all claims? 
( I )  Did the court err by falling to give an instruction that whei-e a claim 1s 
i'a~rly debatable there can be no bad faith? 
(m? Did the court e n  by falling to glve an instruction that where there exists a 
matter of flrsr Irnpresslon these can be no bad falth? 
(n) Did the court err by falling to glve a jury ~nstrucrion on the requ~l-ed 
severity for emotional distress damages? 
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(o) Did the court e1-r ~n c(3ntrnulng the summary judgment hearing In  order Lo 
EI ve Pialnt~ t t s an opporlunl ty  to amend the~r  Second Amended Complall~t 
b 
to avoid a poss~ ble adverse summary judgmet~t ruilng? 
(p) D I ~  the court err in not grantlng Defendants' mottons in li~ni~ze? 
(4) Did the court err In not granting Defendants' motlon for drr.ected verdict? 
( I )  DICI [tic court (11-1 In riot ~nstruct~ng the J ~ I - y  that Sarah We~rtite~ri'\ 
Jdmdgeb 101. futulc ~neJ~c,ti ~" t rc  were to bc d~varded on LI p~e\)enl cLt\li 
value bas1 s? 
(s) Dtd the court err In fa~ilng to grant Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment? 
( I )  D I ~  the court err i n  grant1 ng Pl~~i~ztiff :~ ' Motiorz to A I ~ c ~ I ~ L I  PIC~LLCI~I I~  5 to 
Irz~.lttde a Prayer fitr KeEiejSeekitzg Punitive Dunzuges? 
4. A reporter's transcript is requested in its entirety for (i) the September 2007 trial 
of th~s  matter: and fcrr the hearings conducted on (11) December 7, 2006; (111) January 3, 2007; 
( I L )  April 25,  2007; ( v )  May 2. 2007, ( 1 1 )  Scplernher 1 1 ,  2007: ( L I I )  No~ernber 7, 2007: ( ~ 1 1 1 )  
N o ~ c ~ n b c ~  1 I. 3007, ( ~ x )  November 19, 3007. , ~ n d  ( x )  December 13, 2007 
5.  The Appellants request that the following documents be included In the c i e rk '~  
I-ecord In addltlon to those automatically illciuded under Rule 28, 1.PI.R.: 
(a) Ail bnefs, aff~dav~ts or other documents filed or lodged by the parties or 
the DIS~I -~c t  Court pel-talnlng to the Dc.felldurzt.c1 Motiorz fi)r Necv 7r-z~ll re: 
Juror Miscolzd~ict; 
(b) All br~efs, affidav~ts or other documents filed or lodged by the parties or 
the Dlstrict C ~ U I - t  pertalnlng to the Plaintiffs' motions for costs and fees; 
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All briels, ttt fldavtts or other dclcurncnts t lied or lodged by the partlcs or 
the D~strlct Court pertalnlng to the A I I ~ C ' I ~ ~ O C ~  f lgl?leiz f  111 Eiivor of Sui-(i11 
\\'(jlll $ t C 1 l ! 1 ,  
All exhlb~ts 01 Je~ecl 01 acltnlt~cd at the heannga conducted on Novcmbcr 7 
and LC), 3007, and December 13,2007; 
All Exh~  b ~ t s  admitted at the trtal; 
All briefs, aff~davlts or other documents f~led  or lodged by the partles or 
the D~st r~ct  Court pertalnlng to Dejendatzts' Motion filr Rertrittiti~r or, iiz 
tile Alterrzutivt., Ncjw Trial; 
All briefs, af'fidav~ts or other documents filed or lodged by the parties or 
the D~strict Court pertalnlng to Defendants' Motion for Ju~I,y~ilelzt 
Kot\t~trll stcr~ltlltz~) tlii) l'c~nllc t :  
All brlels, utf~duv~ts or other documents f~led or lodged by the partles or 
the District Court pertainlng to Defendants' Motion for Su~tlrtlury 
J~ldgnzent filed on or about November 8, 2006. 
All bnefs, affidav~ts or other documents f~led  or lodged by the parties 01- 
the D~stnct Court pertainlng to Plainfig&' Motion to Amerzd  pleading^ to 
Itzclude u Pruyer for Relief Seeking Punitive Daunuges f~led  on or about 
November 15,2006. 
All brlefs, aff~davlts or other documents flied or lodged by the pal-tles or 
the D~st r~ct  Court pertalnlng to Motro~~  to  A~~tcjild Srcofld AIIIC~I~LL~JLI 
Gorrtpl~liltt, ~ncluding, but not llrn~ted to, Defendarzt.5' Ol~jectrort to 
Procedure; 
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( h )  Any and all ot the Dtslnct Court's schedultng or-ders entered In the above 
entitled matter; 
( 1 )  All jury lnstructlons grven, tendered and refused; 
(m) All briefs, afficfavits or other documents jsertainlng to Defendants' motions 
111 !1171111<": 
in) All briefs, affldavlts or other documents filed In support or In  opposition 
to proffel-ed jury instructions; and, 
(01 All brief\, aftidavits or- otl~es do~uments pet-r,iining to Dclcndant\' n~otioii 
tor directed ver-d~ct. 
6. I certrly that: 
(a) The clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee h r  
preparation of the reporter's transcript and clerk's record; 
(b)  The appellate fillng tee in  the amount l f  $100.00 has been pald; and, 
(c) That servlce has been made upon the trral court Reporter and all pai-ties 
requlred to be served pursuant to Rule 20. 
DATED this M 5 a y  of February. 2008. 
A N D V I A N  bi HULL tar.t) 
Robert A. Anderson, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this &%ay of February, 2008,I scrved a true and cori-cct 
copy 01 thc filrego~ng DEF):NDANrTS' SECONI) AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL by 
del~vci-lng the sitme to each of the following attorneys of record, by the method lndlcated below, 
nddi-eased as thllows: 
Jaine\ Kl'rch 14 U.S.Mall,postagepl-epald 
~1s~- GOSS INSINGER CUSTAVEL, / j Hand-Del~vered 
307 W. Jefferson Street [ ] Overnight Mall [ 1 Facs~m~le Bolse, ID 83702 
Penny Tardl f f ,  Reporter [Jf U.S.Mail,postageprepaid 
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE [ ] Hand-Delivered 
200 W. Front Street 
Bor \c, Idaho 83702 
/ j Overn~ght Mall 
[ 1 Facsimile 
------i 
'. , 
Robert A. Anderson 
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JAMES E. IUSCH (ISB #I2241 
R. JOHN INSINGER (ISB # 1678) 
2 JASON S. RISCH (ISB #6655) 4 RISCH GOSS INSINGER GUSTAVEL 
Attorneys at Law Z 407 West Jefirson Street 
Cf"J Boise, Idaho 83702 
- Telephone: (208) 345-9974 
Facsimile: (208) 345-9982 
t DAVID MAVARRa, GI@& 
By A. GARDEN 
DEPUTY 
. , 
a 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Cross-Appellants 
IN THE DISTIUCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
LESLIE WEINSTEIN and LINDA ) 
WEINSTEIN, Husband and Wife, ) Case No. CV PI 0400280D 
individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for ) 
SARAH R. WEINSTEIN, and Sarah R. ) FIRST AMENDED NOTICE OF 
Weinstein, individually, 1 CROSS-APPEAL 
Plaintiffs/Cross-Appellants, 
VS. 
) 
1 
) 
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND 
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY ) 
and PRUDENTIAL GENERAL 1 
INSURANCE COMPANY and LIBERTY ) 
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and ) 
LM PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 
INSURANCE, ) 
) 
Defendants/Cross-Respondents. ) 
) 
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TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED CROSS-RESPONDENTS, PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY 
AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, PRUDENTIAL GENERAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY, LIBERTY MUTUAL INSUUNCE COMPANY, 
AND LM PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSUMNCE, AND SAID 
PARTIES' ATTORNEYS, ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL, AND THE CLERK 
OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. LESLIE WEINSTEIN and LINDA mPNSTEEN, as Cross-Appellants, do cross- 
appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court against the above-nanled Cross-Respondents, from the 
January 23, 2008 Decision and Order on Defendants' Motion for Remitfitur, or, in the 
Alternative, New Trial entered by the Honorable Darla S. Williamson. This Cross-Appeal is 
only as to the Court's remittitur of the jury's $6 million punitive damage award to $1.89 million, 
and related new trial and remittitur issues, and is not an appeal of any other judgment or order 
entered in this action. Notwithstanding the inclusion of Sarah Weinstein as a party in the 
original Notice of Cross-Appeal and in the heading of this First Amended Notice, Sarah 
Weinstein is not a party to this Cross-Appeal because it only pertains to the claims of Leslie 
Weinstein and Linda Weinstein. 
The order and issues appealed from in this First Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal are 
essentially the same as those addressed and cross-appealed from in the plaintiffs' original 
February 7,2008 Notice of Cross-Appeal; this First Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal is filed so 
that if for any reason the February 7, 2008 Notice of Cross-Appeal was insufficient or deficient 
in including these issues on appeal, they are hereby preserved and presented for appeal by this 
First Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal. 
This First Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal is to amend, supplement, correct, clarify, 
present and preserve the appeal of all remittitur issues and the Court's reduction of punitive 
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damages and conditional denial of a new trial. LEf LIE WEINSTEIN and LINDA WEINSTEIN 
thus give this notice of their cross-appeal of those issues set forth in the Court's January 23,2008 
Decision and Order. 
2, Cross-Appellants LESLIE WEINSTEIN and LINDA WEINSTEIN have a right to 
appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the above-referenced January 23, 2008 Decision and 
Order described in paragraph 1 above, is an appealable order under and pursuant to Rules 11, 
1 1.1 and 1 1.1(5), I.A.R. 
3. The primary issues on Cross-Appeal by LESLIE WEINSTEIN and LINDA 
WEINSTEIN are: 
a. Did the District Court err in reducing the jury's $6 million punitive 
damage award to $1.89 million? 
b. Did the District Court e n  in ordering a remittitur reducing the punitive 
damage award from $6 million to $1.89 million as a condition of denying 
the DefendantsVCross-Respondents' Motion for New Trial? 
c. Did the District Court e n  in granting the Defendants'/Cross-Respondents' 
Motion for New Trial as to punitive damages should LESLIE 
WEINSTEIN and LINDA WEINSTEIN refuse to accept the remittitur of 
the punitive damages award fiom $6 million to $1.89 million as a 
condition of denying the Motion for New Trial? 
d. Did the District Court err in granting the Defendants'/Cross Respondents' 
Motion for New Trial on the issue of punitive damages only, thereby 
precluding a new trial of the Weinsteins' other damages? 
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4. No additional reporter's transcript is requested by the Cross-Appllants LESLIE 
WEINSTEIN and LINDA WEINSTEIN, because an adequate transcript has already been 
requested by the BefendmtslCross-Respondents in their January 29, 2008 Notice of Appeal; 
PlaintiffslCross-Appellants acknowledge that the extent of the reporter's transcript requested by 
DefendantslCross-Respondents in their original and their First and Second Amended Notices of 
Appeal is appropriate and complete as to all issues appealed by all parties, and that no additional 
transcript is needed. 
5 .  Cross-Appellants LESLIE WINSTEIN and LINDA WEINSTEIN concur that 
the documents listed in Defendants'lCross-Respondents' original and their First and Second 
Amended Notices of Appeal should be included in the clerk's record in addition to those 
automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.; no others are needed or requested. 
6. I certify: 
a. Because of the requests for the transcript and the record specified in 
Defendants'lCross-Respondents' Notices, no additional reporter's 
transcript or clerk's record will be required as a part of this Cross-Appeal, 
and thus no additional fees are required. 
b. Service of this First Amended Notice of Crass-Appeal (including the 
statement herein that no additional transcript will be required or requested 
beyond that requested by the DefendantslCross-Respondents) has been 
made upon the reporter. 
c. Service of this First Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal (including the 
statement herein that no additional transcript will be required or requested 
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beyond that requested by the Defendants/Cross-Respondents) has been 
made upon the clerk. 
d. The Gross-Appeal filing fee in the amount of $10 1 .OO has been paid. 
e. Service of this First Amended NQtice of0oss-Appeal has been made upon 
the trial court reporter and all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20, I.A.R. 
L;t;lf DATED This f day of March, 2008. 
RISCH GOSS INSINGER GUSTAVEL 
Attorneys for PlaintiffslCross-Appellants 
ER, of the firm 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 5 % a y  of March, 2008, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing FIRST AMENDED NOTICE OF CROSSAPPEAL as follows: 
Robert A. Anderson [ J ]  U.S. mail (postage prepaid) 
Phillip J. Collaer [ J ]  Facsimile (344-5 5 10) 
ANDERSON, WLIAN & HULL, LLP [ ] Hand Delivery 
Attorneys at Law [ ] Federal Express 
C. W. Moore Plaza 
250 S, 5th Street, Suite 700 
Y .O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
Penny Tardiff, Court Reporter 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Jean Hirmer, Court Reporter 
Accurate Court Reporting 
P.O. Box 140218 
Boise, ID 837 14-02 18 
[ ]  U.S. mail (postage prepaid) 
[ 1 Facsimile 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Federal Express 
[dl U.S. mail (postage prepaid) 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ] Wand Delivery 
[ ] Federal Express 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH m I C I A L  DISTRZCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, EN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
husband and wife, mdi\ridually and as guasdjans ad litem 
for SARAH R. WEENSTEIN, and SARAH R. 
WEINSTEIN individually, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross Appellants, 
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 
INSURANCE COMPANY and PRUDENTIAL 
GENERAL INSUMNCE COMPANY and LIBERTY 
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and LM 
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE, 
Supreme Court Case No. 34970 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHBITS 
I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
That the attached list of exhibits is a true and accurate copy of the exhibits being 
forwarded to the Supreme Court on Appeal. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as EXHIBITS to 
the Record: 
1. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment - Fees and 
Interest, filed February 24, 2005. 
2. Affidavit of Linda Weinstein in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment - Fees, filed February 24,2005. 
3. Affidavit of Bruce S. Bistline in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment - Fees, filed February 24,2005. 
4. Defendant's Memorandum Opposing Partial S m a r y  Judgment, filed March 18,2005. 
5. Second Affidavit of Linda Weinstein in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment - Fees and Interest, filed April 7,2005. 
6. Second Affidavit of Bruce S. Bistline in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment - Fees and Interest, filed April 7,2005. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHLBITS 
7. Defendam Prudential Property's Memormdum In Support Of Motion For Sununary 
Judment, filed November 8,2006. 
8. Affidavit Of Vicki Kempczenski In Support Of Defendants' Motion For Summary 
Judment, filed November 8,2006. 
9. Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion To Amend Pleadings To Include A Prayer 
For Relief Seeking Punitive Damages, filed November 15,2006. 
10. Affidavit Of Wayne L. Soward Re: Plaintiffs' Motion To Claim Punitive Damages, filed 
November 1 5,2006. 
1 1. Affidavit Of R. John Insinger In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion To Amend Pleadings To 
Include A Prayer For Relief Seeking Punitive Damages, filed November 15,2006. 
12. Defendants' Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Continue Hearing On Plaintiffs 
Motion To Amend Pleadings Re: Claim For Punitive Damages, filed Novernber 27,2006. 
13. Defendants' Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs' Motion To Amend Pleadings To 
Include A Prayer For Relief Seeking Punitive Damages, filed November 30,2006. 
14. Memorandum In Support Of Defendants' Motion To Strike The Affidavit Of Wayne L. 
Soward, filed December 1,2006. 
15. Reply Brief Re: Defendants' Motion To Continue Hearing On Plaintiffs Motion To 
b e n d  Pleadings For Punitive Damages, filed December 5,2006. 
16. Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Opposition To Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, 
filed December 19,2006. 
17. Affidavit Of Wayne L. Soward In Opposition To Defendants' Motion For Summary 
Judgment, filed December 19,2006. 
18. Affidavit Of R. John Insinger In Opposition To Defendants' Motion For Summary 
Judgment, filed December 19,2006. 
19. Affidavit Of James L. Wadhams In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion To Amend For Punitive 
Damages, And In Opposition To Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, filed 
December 22,2006. 
20. Supplemental Affidavit Of Robert A. Anderson In Support Of Defendants' Motion To 
Continue Trial, filed December 29,2006. 
21. Affidavit Of Phillip J. Collaer, filed December 29,2006. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
22. Supplen~ental Affidavit Of Wayne L. Soward In Support Of Plaintiffs' Notion To Amend 
And In Opposition To Defendants7 Motion For Summaw Judgment, filed 
February 2 1,2007. 
23. Plaintiffs' Closing Brief In Opposition To Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, 
filed April 1 1,2007. 
24. Plaintiffs' Closing Brief In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion To Amend Pleadings To 
Include A Prayer For Relief Seeking Punitive Damages, filed April 1 1,2007. 
25. Affidavit Of Irving "Buddy" Paul In Opposition To Claims Of Bad Faith And Punitive 
Damages, filed April 1 1,2007. 
26. Defendants' Reply Brief Re: Motion For S m a r y  Judgment, filed April 1 1,2007. 
27. Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs' Motion To Amend 
For Punitive Damages, filed April 1 1,2007. 
28. Second Affidavit Of Phillip J. Collaer, filed April 11,2007. 
29. Affidavit Of S. David Childers In Support Of Defendants' Motion For Summary 
Judgment And In Opposition To Plaintiffs Motion To Amend To Claim Punitive 
Damages, filed April 12,2007. 
30. Defendants' Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs' Motion To Amend Second 
Amended Complaint, filed May 1,2007. 
* 3 1. Memorandum In Support Of Defendants' Motion In Limine No. 1, filed August 3 1,2007. 
32. Affidavit Of Counsel In Support Of Defendants' Motion In Limine No. 1, filed 
August 3 1,2007. 
33. Defendants' Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Directed Verdict, filed 
September 21,2007. 
34. Defendants' Requested Jury Instructions Nos. 1-36, filed September 26,2007. 
35. Plaintiffs' Jury Instructions, filed September 26,2007. 
36. Defendants' Requested Third Supplemental Jury Instructions And Amended Jury 
Instructions, filed September 26,2007. 
37. Original Jury Instructions, filed October 1,2007. 
38. Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for New Trial Re: Juror Misconduct, 
filed October 15,2007. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
39. Affidavit of Phillip J. Collaer in Support of Defendants' Motion for New Trial Re: Juror 
Misconduct, filed October 15,2007. 
40. Memorandum in Support of DefendantsWotion for Remiaitur or, in the Alternative, 
New Trial, filed October 15,2007. 
41. Affidavit of Robert A. Anderson in Support of Defendants' Motion for Remittitur or, in 
the Alternative, New Trial, filed October 15,2007. 
42. Memorandum In Support Of Defendants' Motion For Judgment Notwithstanding The 
Verdict, filed October 15,2007. 
43. Affidavit Of Janet Nolan, filed October 15,2007 
44. Memorandum of Costs (Rule 54, I.R.C.P,) as to Leslie and Linda Weinstein, filed 
October 15,2007. 
45. Affidavit of Amounts Due to Plaintiff Sarah Weinstein in Support of Judgment in Favor 
of Plaintiff Sarah Weinstein, filed October 15,2007. 
46. Affidavit of Attorneys fees Claimed as Costs as to Sarah Weinstein, filed 
October 15,2007. 
47. Memorandum Of Costs And Attorney Fees (Rule 54, I.R.C.P.) As To Sarah Weinstein, 
filed October 15,2007. 
48. Plaintiffs' Response Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Remittitur or 
New Trial, filed October 26,2007. 
49. Affidavit of James E. Risch in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for a New Trial Re: 
Juror Misconduct, filed October 26,2007. 
50. Affidavit of Mark Barbo, filed October 26,2007 
5 1. Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for New Trial Re: Juror Misconduct, filed 
October 26,2007. 
52. Brief In Opposition To Defendants' Motion For Judgment Notwithstanding The Verdict, 
filed October 26,2007. 
53. Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants7 Motion for New Trial Re: Juror 
Misconduct, filed November 6,2007. 
54. Affidavit of Kenneth Bensinger in Support of Defendants' Motion for New Trial Re: 
Juror Misconduct, filed November 6,2007. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
55. Defendants' Reply Brief Re: Motion for Remittitur or, in the Alternative, New Trial, filed 
November 6,2007. 
56. Defendants' Reply Brief Re: Motion For Judgment Notwithstanding The Verdict, filed 
November 6,2007. 
57. Amended Reply Memorandm in Support of Defendants' Motion for New Trial Re: Juror 
Misconduct, filed November 7,2007. 
58. Affidavit Of Kelly Saar, filed December 12,2007. 
59. Affidavit Of Mark Northcutt, filed December 12,2007. 
60. Supplemental Affidavit of Amounts Due to Plaintiff Sarah Weinstein in Support of 
Judgment in Favor of Plaintiff Sarah Weinstein, filed December 13,2007. 
TN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 7th day of July, 2008. 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
EmIBIT LIST 
Darla Willimson 
Judge 
Date September 14,2007 
Janine Korsen 
Clerk 
Disposition Jury Trial 
Case No. CVPI0400280D 
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Linda & Sarah Weinstein 
vs.  
Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance 
Jim Risch 
Risch Goss & Insinger 
Rob Anderson 
Anderson Julian & Hull 
BY No. Description Status 
CHRONOLOGY AND EXRIBIT LIST 
Weinstein v. Prudential 
Ada County Case No. CV PI 04002801) 
/ Exhibit / Date &L fld/nw Event 
1 No. 1 
EX 1-37 1 p s u r a n c e  Poiicy I 
- + - - 4 I I Ex 38-44 ' 09130102 1 Accident - Police Report 
I PRU393-399 1 I 1 
I I Adjuster's Log - Greg Sanders - See no liability on the part of the insured 
I Adj. Log - Sanders - It appears that the sole cause is Brittany Hardan the UM - Good , 
chance there is no insurance - "Appears UM caused this multi-car accident, closed i 
I liab SFX and opened UM SFX." 
t- -- -- - - - 1 I 1010 1102 1 Adj. Log - Vicki Kempczenski - Case transferred from Sanders to Kempczenski - I 1 She also concludes UM caused accident. 
1 E x  47-48 ' 1010 1/02 1 Letter - Patricia Doyle to Parent of Sarah Weinstein- I am handling claim -you have , 
PRU644-647 
1 W2016-2017 L- - I $5k med pay coverage - - - - -  1 p- - - 1 
! Ex 4p I 10101102 1 Letter - Doyle to Parent of Sarah Weinstein - Your auto policy carried COB - "This PRU648-650 I 
I requires our policyholder to pursue reimbursement for medical bills through the 
appropriate health carrier." I I 
- - -I_i_---  - -I 
1 PRUXOI-802 Letter - Doyle to McMillan Med. Center Dr. Little - Payment Denial. "Sarah 1 
~202.5-2026 Weinstein carries COB coverage on their auto policy with Prudential. This is excess 1 
over any coverage" under primary med. plan. I 
1 10102102 Kempczenski - Explained Coll, Ded, Med Pay, UM to Linda; Subro letter 
PRUO 16-0 18 
W2019 I 
-- -- - -- - -- ---- 1 
CHRONOLOGY AND EXHIBIT LIST (Weinstein v. Prudential) - Page 1 
Ex 51 
PR1J404 10108102 ' Prud. requests search of all prior claims made by Sarah. 
- -- 
W2020 I - -- -- -- - - -  1 
E X  52-53 I 10/14/02 g - Dorothy Quim - Received Police Report - Describes details of accident I PRU02 1-024 
~2022-2021 I 1 after witness interviews and police report - Concludes UM caused accident; "1 00% 1 
- 
/ ... on Hardan." 
-- 
I i 
Ex 54 I 
P R U O ~  I - 1011 a; i d j .  Log - Quinn - Called insured and lcfi msg that after investigation it appears only 
~ 2 0 2 4 ~ - 2 0 2 4 ~  1 fault is with Hardan - Advised her to tell her atty to send out a letter of representation 
-- 
I j since this appears to be a UMBI claim. I 
I 2
Exhibit 
No. 
Date Event 
I 
Letter - Doyle to Ada Co. Emerg. Serv. -Payment Denial. "Sarah Weinstein carries I 
COB coverage on their auto policy with Pmdential. This is excess over any 
coverage" under primary med. plan. 
---+ 
Adj. Log - Kempczenski - No rep letter rec'd to date. Will await atty rep letter to j 
find out about treatment - Index forms in, shows a MVA for Linda on 05/21/02 - 1 
send inquiry forms to Farmers. 
Adj. Log - Kernpczenski -Mrs. Ins called . . . (ends with) "I'm going to increase UM 1 
reserves to $5500 each with ongoing TX." I 
1 111 1/02 Letter - Kempczenski to Linda Weinstein - need info - copies of med. exp./reports 
and sign and return med. auth. - Linda handwritten note indicates mailed back on 
1 215. 
Letter - Doyle to St. Al's - Payment Denial. "Sarah Weinstein carries COB coverage 
on their auto policy with Prudential. This is excess over any coverage" under primary 
- ----- 
/ med. plan. +- 
Linda mailed back signed Medical Authorization Form to Kempczenski 
(Kem~czenski never used it) 
- - - - -- - -- - - - - - - - 
A ~ ~ . - L o ~  1 Doyle called Linda - Starting to get threatening phone calls for bills not 
being paid. COB on all bills, including Sarah. Bills must go to HCP first; Linda 
"didn't agree with it" 
Letter - Doyle to McMillan Med. Center Dr. Turner - denial - "The patient carries a 
Coordination of Benefits policy with Prudential which provides that all medical bills 
must first be submitted to patient's health care provider." 1 
Ex 66 1 0 111 6/03 1 Adj. Log - Doyle - Tells McMillan bills must first be submitted to HCP. 1 PRU 117 i I I 
- 
to Linda -Linda upset, says PN is denying claim. Doyle tells her / 
to HCP. 
-- 
I i 
Letter - Doyle to McMillan Med. Center Dr. Turner - Payment Denial. "Sarah 
Weinstein carries COB coverage on their auto policy with Prudential. This is excess Cp-- I I over any coverage" under primary med. plan. t-7 -- - 
02/12/03 
- --- 
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Adj. Log - Doyle untes "advised that we need denial for HCP claim." Sending 30 
day letter - if no bills received will close. 
-- 
I 
1 
Ex 70 
PRU809 1 02/12/03 
~ 2 0 3 8  I 
Ex 71 
PRU132 1 I 02/24/03 
---- -- -- 
Letter - Doyle to Parents of Sarah - I am handing the medical claim. I've noticed we 
have not received any med. bills "in quite some time" -will close in 30 days. 
Adj. Log - Since no response to 30 day letter, no bills, no OOPS, deactivating file. 
-I 
- -  
Event - 1 Exhibit / Date 
I Med Pay Log -First med bill payment ($52.22 to Sarah Weinstein for prescription 1 
' UM Adj. Log - First entw since 1111 1/02, except one irrelevant subro entry I -- ---- -I 
Adj. Log - Ken Bensinger - "Mrs. Ins called - daughter had one MRI showing labial I 
tear in hip and may need arth. surgery. . . is having another MRI this week. . . I raised 1 
the reserve to $25k. Ken" 
- -1 
1 LeMer - Prud - Allowed med bill, but not paid I 
Adj. Log - Kempczenski - Called Mrs. Ins, she said that the MRI on her daughter 
showed a tear of the cartilige in her hip. She is scheduled for surgery 5/19/03-under 
anesthia they will stretch out the socket, then go in arthoscopicaly to repair it. The dr. 
said it would be 6 to 9 months of recovery and therapy main therapy will be a 
stationary bike, she will be on crutches for at least a month . . . . she has been unable 
to play soccer since MVA, has missed a lot of school due to pain, the bills are running 
up, she will get the info together and in to me, she said her neck still hurts, but she has 
been concentrating on her daughter and will deal with herself when her daughter 
is OK. Will discuss reserve increase when info rec'd. 
Letter - Delphina Steward to Id. Sports Medicine - denial - "Because the patient's 
health care carrier was elected as the primary payer of medical bills, the patient must 
submit their bills to the health care carrier first and provide us with an EOB when it 
is made available to them. 
Adj. Log - Steward - TC Linda. Insd very concerned re: outstanding meds for Sarah. 
Steward tells Linda COB & applies to Linda, not Sarah (Prudential) will not 
process meds under Med Pay coverage. 
Ex 77 
PRU 144 
1 EX 72 1 07/31/03 1 Med Pay Log -Payments on 9 bills, some dating back to 9/30/02 date of the accident. I 
UM Adj. Log - First entn since 05/12/03 
Adj. Log - Kempczenski - Linda called - Said that med pay was not paying for 
daughter's bills. Health ins was not paying also . . . went through mult med pay reps 
. . . recently Del Stewart got the case and paid some of the old bills, a lot of bills are 
outstanding, collection agency after ins, health ins won't pay . . . Del Stewart told 
insured that med pay cov on daughter now exhausted and UM will pay the bills . . . 
insured called, credit ruined, Pru took all this time to decide to pay med pay, she 
demands that UM now step in and pay, since we won't make the at fault party pay . 
. . told her UM coverage: we gather all info and settle to include all when ready to 
settle. She refuses to wait, collection agencies after them, credit ruined . . . health 
won't pay, said auto is primary. . . faxed her new HIPPA med auth . . . she will fax 
back so I can get med pay file and order info from Dr's etc. - Dr. said the inj is very 
unusual, don't know what recovery etc. will be, have her in PT now . . . she has 
developed bursitis in the area, don't know how long that will go on . . . need ongoing 
- 
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Exhibit I Date 1 
j No. I i Event 
I include a list of the current medical providers, called, left message asking she fax that 
I 
I 
I I 
, Faxed rned auth to rned pay rep asking for a copy of the rned pay file on Sarah ASAP. 1 
I Ex 1 09/02/03 FAX Letter- Kempczenski to Steward -Hi Del, As I'm sure Mrs. Weinstein told you, 1 PRU283 
/ med pay file to me ASAP. Med. auth. is enclosed. 
I 1 they have collection agencies after them for Sarah's bills. Please get me a copy of her 1 
I 
\ 
Ex83 09102103 1 Letter - Steward - Payment Denial to St. Luke's. "benefits exhausted" I 
W205I 1 1 
I 
Ex 84 09/02/03 1 Letter - Steward - Payment Denial to Dr. Lach. "benefits exhausted" W2052 
/ p:;s$60 1 09/25/03 1 FAX - Linda to Kempczenski - Full list of medical providers 
Ex 72 
PRU158-160 
~ 2 0 9 3 - 2 0 9 5  
Ex 90 1 W2064 1 10110103 Letter - Bistline to Stice (Prop. C1. Adj.) - I represent Weinsteins -No insurance on 1 vehicle that caused accident. I 
09/03/03 
EX 89 
EX 91 10110103 / E-mail - Carol Stice (Prud.) to Bistline - Weller is handling PD - "Vicki I W2066 1 Kempczenski is handling the injury portion" - can be reached at 480 etc. - I handle 1 
subro. 
Med Pay Log - St. Luke's paid $920.21 from rned pay - that payment takes rned pay 
to $5,000 but does not pay St. Luke's in full - (next payment on St. Luke's bill was 
more than 1 year later, 09/29/2004) 
10/10/03 Letter - Bistline to Doyle (PI C1. Adj.) - I represent Weinsteins - Weinsteins 1 understand you have paid out full rned pay benefits of 5k - Responsible driver 
/ uninsured - Please confirm that - Who at Prudential will process UM claim? 
E ~ 9 2  1 1011 0103 / E-mail - Bistline to Stice - Appreciate input - File very confusing - "I have five 1 W2065 1 1 separate Prudential claims numbers" - Understand tortfeasor is uninsured - Is this 
I I / your understanding? 
/ 1 10/10/03 Adj. Log - Kempczenski - Apparently ins hire atty that got Carol S. name who reps 
I ~ 2 0 6 7  1 1 the Weinstein's called atty, left mess. sending ack. Letter 1 I 
I I 
Ex 94 10/1 3/03 1 Letter - Kempczenski to Bistline - We have been notified of your rep. - need med. PRU8l4 1 
~ 2 0 6 8  1 I and wage loss documentation. I 
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I E?:it Event I 
I--+-- -- --- - - I 
Adj. Log (SUPERVISOR '"TARGET REVIEW") - Martha McLaughlin - Our invest 
indicates UM clmt is prox cause-insd contends clmt Kaya contributed to loss. Insds 
are now atty rep for the inj IVP Sarah. Sarah sustained a hip injury with resulting 
surgery and a recovery time of 9months. Med pay limit exhausted. We do not have 
the hi1 amt of bills or any med reports. Recent lor ltr - ack with req to supply records, 
Due to the seriousness of injury to 16yr old Sarah and our position that the UM is 
responsible, recommend increasing the reserve on Sarah's "AJ" to $SOk. Linda is fine 
at the $5k. File is properly directed. Martha (McLaughlin) 
I Evaluation/Authority Request (title of doc i 
I 
Letter - Bistline to Kempczenski - Last time Weinstein spoke to Prudential she was 1 
advised no basis to proceed against Kaya - I concur - Does Prudential intend to claim I 
E-Iardan's conduct is not sole cause (and 4 related questions) -Tendering 6 rned bills 
for $1,898.52 - I realize rned benefits exhausted but submit under UM coverage. 
Ans f/ 2, 
W200 1 
- -- - 
Ex 106 
PRU048-050 
W208 I-2081A 
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. purchased Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co. (Answer 
filed in this lawsuit in 2004 says Liberty Mutual "is the entity responsible for handling 
all matters involved in this Complaint") 
Adj. Log -Kempczenski - Atty Bistline called, MP on child used, ongoing meds with 
no other cov. Wants me to short cut and get the med pay file and pay the outstanding 
bills under UM. Told him that is not our practice. He said he will send a letter saying 
ifwe don't dispute liab, and we don't dispute the bills, we have to. Told him fine, I'll 
review that with my bosses when I get it, told him there is no short cut to the rned pay 
file, I'll need a current rned auth. Will send it to him, went over MP payment with 
him, appear bills paid by them are older bills, they may not have the current bills, said 
he will gather everything also and return to me with the med auth. I'll order the rned 
pay file and when I get it in share it with him. Told him I don't know what is wrong 
with the child, he said the hip was damaged, at first they thought it was bruised, then 
they did surgery and that has not worked and now they are talking about a possible 
total hip replacement, said he only got on this recently, does not have a lot of info, he 
knows they have $250,000 UM cov, so he wants the bills paid . . . sending him the 
rned auth. 
Ex 108 
PRUOS f 
W2083 
recent telephone conversation, we 
discussed that we will need the following additional information to resolve this claim: 
auth. for Prud. Med Pay Unit to 
Log - Kempczenski - Talked to (supervisor) Ken (Bensinger) and (Unit 
Manager) Julie (Kippenhan) about Bistline wanting meds paid under UM, contact 
counsel for opinion. 
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/ Exhibit Event 
I No. C- -- - . - -- A 
Ex 110 
PRU053 1 1/06/03 Adj. Log - Kempczenski -Liberty Mutual in-house attorney (Ken) Day; Idaho is his 
~ 2 0 8 4  state, "he is unaware of anything in Idaho that requires payment of bills prior to 
seEIement," suggests asking atty Gordon for authority and he will be happy to look 
at it when I get it. 
I----- -- 
1 1/06/03 Adj. Log - Kempczenski - Atty Gordon said he would send me a letter, I'll wait for 
letter to see if he has any authority on this. 
-- - 
1 E x l l l  1 PRU812 Letter - Steward to Intnntn. Orthopedic - Payment Denial. "Please be advised that 
1 ~ 2 0 8 5  the maximum policy limits of $1,000.00 for med. expenses related to this accident 
! 1 have been paid and no further payments can be made." - Contact patient or health I 
I I i carrier. 
I E x 1 1 2  
I PRU054 1111 8/03 1 ~ 2 0 8 6  
I I 
11/19/03 1 Letter - Bistline to Kempczenski - We will get med. records from treating doctors 
PRU239-24 1 
~ 2 0 8 8 - 2 0 9 0  I and send to you - enclosed is a release to allow you to secure copies of med pay dept. 
Adj. Log - Martha McLaughlin - SUPERVISOR Mandatory QR - Idaho UM case. 
File is properly directed with on going invest into atty allegations to pay meds prior 
to UM settlement. Case is properly reserved . . Martha (McLaughlin) 
l a  
PRU796 
I 
I I / of your company. I 
4 
11/18/03 / Letter - Steward to Foothills Physical Therapy and Linda - "Please be advised that 
the maximum policy Limits of $5,000 for medical expenses related to this accident 
have been paid and no further payments can be made. You may wish to contact this 1 patient on the appropriate health insurance carrier for payment of future bills." 1 
Ex 1 1 1120/03 Adj. Log - Kempczenski - Red Med Auth yesterday will send to get Med Pay file. 1 PRU054 I I 
I 
Letter - Kempczenski to Steward - "As part of our investigation of this claim, we 1 
request that you forward a complete copy of your med pay file for Sarah Weinstein. 1 
We have enclosed a signed authorization for this request." I 
Letter - Prudential to Foothills Phys. Therap. - Payment Denial. "Policy Benefits 
have been exhausted." 
Ex 1 2 0  1 12/03/03 Adj. Log - Kempcreniki - Statement to ird party: "Harden at fault and Harden is a i 
UM." I 
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121 1 W2096 1 
- - - - - 
02/09/04 1 Letter - Prudential to losephR. Gobel, M.D. - Payment Denial. "Policy Benefits 1 have been exhausted." 
r- -- - 
-- - 
1- 1 Exhibit / Date Event 1 
1 No. 1 1 1 
I I 
Ex It2 1 03109104 Adj. Log - Kempczenski - Rec'd mess. from Kathy with atty office wanting a copy 
of the med pay log called her back, left mess, with med pay office info, asked she call 
me with ur~date. 
I 
Letter (FAX) 3 pages - Steward to Cathy at Bistline Law Office - "As requested, I 
attached is med pay log for Sarah" 2 attachments show 05/28/03 $1 88 - 06/03/03 $25 1 
- 0711 8/03 $142 - 07/31/03 10 pmts. total $3,323.57 - 09/03/03 $950.21 plus i 
notation med pay benefits exhausted. Total paid is $4,628.78. (List is inaccurate-one I 
page is missing) 
-- 
--I 
Adj. Log - Kempczenski - Wave not rec'd the med pay file I requested in November 
and the request I faxed in Sept. of last year, copied Nov. request again and will fax it 1 
to med pay rep. 
--- - 1 
Ex "7 1 04120104 FAX Letter - Kempczenski to Steward (Liberty) - 3rd request for med pay file (first 1 I I PRU237 1 ~ 2 1 0 1  1 1 was 09/02/03; second was 11120103). I 
/ Ex 130-2S4 1 04120/04 1 Anachments to Bistline letter of 04120/04 
PRU653-777 
-- 
EX 128-129 I 04120104 
PRU651-652 
Letter - Pierce to Kempczenski - We are still working on updating records and bills 
since 1 1120103 and to provide info we have rec'd since Bistline letter of 4/20 - also 
encloses Dr. Shea's chart record of 12/9/03 -"Suggests that she is developing some 
mild but early degenerative arthritis in her hip." 
Adj. Log - Kempczenski -Letter from atty office rec'd May 24, they are still working 
on getting the updated records/bills. File to Ken for trans 
Letter - Bistline to Kempczenski (Prud.) -Enclosed rned bills and records - Consider I 
this Proof of Loss for med exp -Prudential has paid $6,759 so owes $16,669 - Will 
work over next few weeks to get prognosis (totals are incorrect). I i 
Ex 260 06/07/04 / Adj. Log - Bensinger - (SUPERVISOR) *OK to inc the reserve to $75,000 on one PRU057 1 
Wil09 1 1 clmt with injury to hip to 16 yr old . . Ken (Bensinger) 
Ex I 06/07/04 1 ;;; 1 
i 
I 1 
Adj. Log - (NEW ADJUSTER DOROTHY OUrNN - file review) Rev'd UM 
transfer-I assisted 01 0 Kempczenski in investigation-this is ID loss-we have 2501500 
UM limits-facts indicate that UM driver pulled out of d/way--crossed road & was to 
pull out into median but when she got to median-clmt saw OV conway in the median- 
thought she would hit it headon-so she continued into WB lanes and hit OVD Kaya 
as he was braking and caused Kaya to lose control and go into EB lane where Kaya 
hit IV on left front-then OV Kaya spun and hit the OV conway-there is 
- 
- 
Adj . Log - Kempczenski - Discussed Sara's claim with Ken (supervisor Bensinger), 
with the hip surgery to repair the tear and ongoing complaints with long 
walkinglrunning, increasing reserve to $75,000. I 
Ex261 1 06108104 
PRU058 , 
w2!10 1 
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I Adj. Log - Transfer to 04008 (Quinn) from 04010 (Kempczenski) by 04079 / 
(Bensinger) I 
1 Exhibit 
1 No. 
Event 
spd on OV Kaya despite insd's allegation-we have assessed liab on UM Hardan-she 
is teenager wlo insur and suspended license-insd has atty representing NPIdaughter 
who has had hip injury & surgery? The injury appears unusual and she does play 
soccer per file notes to will have to review the medical infomation-insd atty has 
asked us to pay the medical expenses prior to settlement of UM and ID defense 
counsel had advised that we have no legal obligation to do so-5k h4P is exhausted 
perhaps the insd has health insur covering the bills now-reserve is set at 75k-need to 
find out if any residuals-will send atty a letter that I have assumed handling and to 
advise me on current medical status-will review the meds now. 
Adj. Log - Quinn - Mrs insd had neck inj but appears to have not tx'd-minimal amt 1 
paid under medpay-she adv 01 0 (Kempczenski) that she was dealing with daughter 
first-will check IS0 for other claims. I 
Adj. Log - Quinn - It doesnt appear we recd the MP file which was requested in Nov- 
will send note to Chris Rose and see if she can get file if it is closed. 
- -- 
Adj. Log - Quinn - Revd the ER notes-IVP was taken post MVA to St A1 and she 
had right sided neck pain and left pelvic discomfort-she didnt have any discomfort 
with hip movement-she was restrained-3 point restraint-she had a small abraison in 
the left superior iliac crest and there was tenderness along the ridge but none in the 
abdominal region-was dx'd with a muscular neck strain and a left hip and pelvic 
contusion-associated with seatbelt buckle-she then sought tx with McMillan Urgent 
Care-seen 1018 and notes indicate left sided pain-stabbing pain for 4-5 days in flank 
area-in flu on 11/29 she had left sided pain-he rc'd meds and PT-on 119103-she 
reports lsided hop and left rib pain-unable to tolerate activity-she went to St A1 for 
rehab 12112102-mentions IV hit curb after impact-she adv her neck inj resolved-she 
had pin in left rib cage-and left hip-notes indicate she tx'd thru 2/20 and resumed 
soccer w/o problems but has residual rib pain and hip pain-given a home exercise 
program-is it possible that she resumed the soccer too soon and caused add1 
problems?? the ortho records begin 3121103-states she resumed playing soccer and 
noted she had signif pain while running and kicking ball-and she had a clicking 
sensation in hip presetn for past 2-3 wks-and she has incr pain with activity-exam 
found palpable popping or clicking in the left hip-some tenderness and dr rx'd MRI 
and set up PT again-the left hip MRI showed a suspicious tear at the anterosuperior 
labrum also a cyst that accompanies a tear. 
Ex 266 
PRU235 06/09/04 
W 2 l l 8  
I 
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- -- 
Internal Memo - Quinn to Rose -"Can you check on the whereabouts of the med pay I 
file? If it is in storage - can you obtain it for me?" Handwritten notes: "Outstanding 
(bills), recognize out of pocket expenses and willing to offer advance." 
0611 0104 Adj. Log - Quinn - Disc case with Julie (Unit Manager Julie Kippenhan) and Ken 
(Supervisor Ken Bensingerkwill send ltr outlining our liab position that the UM 
driver appears 100% liab for the loss-not clmt Kaya-will also advise that defense 
counsel states we are not obligated to pay bills as incurred but offer to do a PL4 of 1 
0k for the OOP expenses-since he claims there are a financial hardshipwill 1 
- 8 
if he files suit against OVD Kaya to send me copy of suit-adv Julie of delay on 
payment by medpay-mistake on WC primary issue-didnt apply to ivpass just ni-also 
advised that I want to have records review of the medical file ESP since her physical 
activities might have aggrevated the injury-we disc reserve and I suggested 150k-she 
adv me it will be referral since we have reserve for IVD open also-will do referral and 
Date 
- ----- 
eserve at 150k. 
Event 
Letter - Quinn to Bistline - I have assumed handling UIM claim - Review of file 
indicates Hardan solely responsible and not insured so 2501500 UIM will be 
"afforded." 
In response to your request that we pay Ms. Weinstein's medical expenses, we have 1 
been advised by our Idaho defense counsel that there is no legal obligation to do so. I If you have any case law that differs with his opinion, then please provide it for our i 
review and consideration. I i 
We do recognize that there may be some out of pocket expenses and will offer a 1 
$10,000 payment in advance on Ms. Weinstein's Euture settlement. Must sign form. / 
I 
We will evaluate Ms. Weinstein's damages when her medical treatment is completed 
or when you submit a settlement demand with all the medical documentation and 
L I / proofs. I I 4 
1 Ex 1 0611 1104 1 Document enclosed with Letter - "In consideration of our payment . . . ." I PRU232 1 
1 ,";:,'Q8 0612 1104 Adj. Log - Quinn - Waiting for atty response to PIA - FRI July 1 I 
Letter - Bistline to Quinn - I have your letter of June 1 1,2004, and I have reviewed 
it with my clients. While the Weinsteins are more than happy to have payments made 
for which they were contracted, my clients feel that they have no duty to agree to 
anything before receiving payment for the medical bills which have been incurred, I 
and presented in a proper proof of loss. Nor can they, in view of the pendency of the 1 
statute of limitations, wait any longer in expecting whatever company it is that is now 1 
responsible to honor the contractual obligations for which Prudential Property and 
Casualty Insurance Company accepted premiums. I 
1 
Hence they have instructed me to file the complaint . . . . Initially, we need to 
determine if any of the "defenses" which "Liberty Mutual" seeks to reserve in the 
"advance" agreement, which you tendered, include an assertion that the conduct of 
some person who will soon be protected by the statute of limitations is a partial cause 
of the damages sustained by Sarah Weinstein. I note that your letter gives at least the 
appearance of a concession that this is properly a UIM claim, but I cannot reconcile 
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- T liiC -- Exhibit Event I 1 NO. I 
this appearance with the reservation language in the "advance" agreement. In any 
event, the complaint has been filed today . . . . 
When the Weinsteins purchased their policy, they trusted that policy would pay on I 
their behalf under the circumstances such as these. As far as 1 can tell, there is 1 
nothing in the policy that affords the insurance company the oppomi ty  to defer 
making payments once it has received proof of loss; rather the statute seems clear that 
payment is due within 30 days of proof of loss. As a practical matter, I can see no 
reason why your company should be allowed to enhance its cash flow situation by 
shifting the burden of amounts on which it is obligated to pay, to the insured, the 
health insurer or the physician. However, given the advise you claim to have received 
from Idaho counsel, 1 suppose we will sort this all out as we go along. 
If your company wishes to tender the sum to the Weinsteins to allow them to pay the 
accruing medical bills, you should feel free to send that payment to this office. . . . 
Of course any payments you make will go toward reducing the total UIM coverage 
due under the policy. My clients would be happy to sign a receipt acknowledging the 
payment as a credit against the policy limits. However, they are under no obligation 
to agree that your company has reserved any defenses or that the payment is not an 
admission of liability under the policy. 
Complaint filed (this lawsuit initiated) 
Adj. Log - Quinn - Referral for reserve incr not completed yet due to rep being out 
1 Odays and today recd a ltr from insd atty-he has filed complaint-his position is that 
we should pay the bills-the suit includes a dec action re payment of the bill and breach 
of contract and he notes he sent 2 proof of loss 10/03 and 4/04 for unpaid med and we 
refused to pay-atty also sent interro & production requests----advised Julie (Unit 
Manager Julie Kippenhan) that atty has suit ready to be filed & served on Idaho insur 
dept-she adv me to fax to Mary Rowe=get her approval on legal counsel and then do 
SIC and referral-the atty mentions the SOL in his letter-could he be planning to sue 
the other driver Kaya? 
Computer entry on Suffix J 
- Payment of $298.19 to Bomeville Collection 
Letter - Quinn to Bistline - Enclosed is check for YMCA membership for Sarah 
($264.57) and check. I 
000390 
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I 
- Reason - 010 (Kempczenski) - Bad Faith 
Letter - Cantrill to Bistline - Enclosed is a copy of computer pmt to the collection 
firm fiom Prudential. Note: Computer printout says reason 01 0 - Bad Faith 
Letter - Pierce to Cantrill - Understand your client has an interest in paying the 
balance of med bills. Here they are. Lists bills with collection agencies. 
4 
I 
- 
Ex 277 
W2144-2145 08/25/04 
Ex 278-279 O9/lOiO4 
W2148-2149 / 
J 
' Exhibit 1 Date I I No, , 
Event 
1 09/29/04 1 Letter - Gantrill to Bistline - requesting additiomj rned expenses as outlined in your 911 0104 letter. 
Weinsteins evaluates Sarah's injuries to be worth $60,000 in addition to what has 
Mid-West Health Insurance Policy 
/ UM & UIM Motorist Claims and the Process of Good Faith Claims Handlers 
/ Pages PRU002-PRU407 OF DEFENDANTS CLAIMS HANDLING DOCUMENTS 1 
/ Pages PRU408-PRU865 OF DEFENDANTS CLAIMS HANDLING DOCUMENTS I 
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PRU 001 371 - 
PRU 598-600 
I 1 an uninsured motorist appears t o  have caused this I 1 1  I 
10008 
PRU 015 
responsible party 
10/01102 - Log notes showing transfer of file from 
Greg Sanders to  Vicki Kempczenski and her notes that 
10009 
PRU 608 
PRU 799 
10014 
PRU 408 
multi-car accident 
10/01 102 - Jacket for Medical Payments unit file 
1001 0 
PRU 118 
1001 1 
PRU I2O 
1001 2 
PRU 797-798 
1001 3 
10015 
PRU 01 6-01 8 
10101 I 0 2  - Pat Doyle log note (MP) re: new Med Pay 
claim 
10101 I 0 2  - Pat Doyle log note (MP) re: Idaho being a 
Healthleare Primary state 
10101102 - Letter from Pat Doyle (MP) t o  parents of 
Sarah Weinstein re: Medical payments coverage 
10101 I 0 2  - Letter from Pat Doyle (MP) t o  parents of  
Sarah Weinstein re: coordination of benefits 1 1 I 
10/02/02 - Casualty transfer sheets assigning the 
UMIUIM file t o  Vicki Kempczenski 
10/02/02 - Vicki Kempczenski log notes re: discussion 
about accident wi th  Linda Weinstein. Ms. 
I I Kempczenski explains the various coverages available ( I 1 I I / under the policy in this conversation. \1/ 
Mrs. Weinstein. Mrs. Weinstein mentions that she has 
PRU 401 1 witness Ernest Jabs. 1 
10022 1011 5102 - Dorothy Quinn's log note re: discussions 
PRU 026 wfadjusters from other carriers for drivers involved in 
10023 
PRU 390 
10025 
PRU 400 
accident. 
10115102 - Dorothy Quinn's log note re: conversation 
PRU 027 - 02* 
10024 
10026 
PRU 029 - 030 
wi th Geico representative. 
1011 5/02 - Letter from Allied Insurance t o  Linda 
requested a recorded statement from Mrs. Weinstein, 
her husband referred them t o  attorney Phillip Gordon. 
Weinstein seeking recorded statement. 
10/15102 - Dorothy Quinn sends police report to  
Geico representative Scott Roberts 
10116102 - Dorothy Quinn log re: her discussions wi th  
other adjusters who informed her that when they 
I 
insurance carriers and that there did not appear t o  be 
any fault on the driver of the vehicle which struck the 
10027 
PRU 03' - 32 
Weinstein station wagon. Ms. Quinn advised Mrs. 
Weinstein t o  call if there was anything else she 
wanted Prudential to  do and that her attorney should 
1011 6/02 - Dorothy Quinn log re: her message t o  the 
Weinsteins outlining her contacts with the other 
I send a letter of representation as this appeared to  be I I 1 1  
10028 
an UM BI claim. 
10115102 - McMillan Medical Center sends medical 
PRUo01345 
10029 
Defendants' Exhibit List - 2 
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PRU 001389- 
001 390 
10030 
PRU 629 - 630 
bill to Scottsdale claim office. 
10121 102 - Scottsdale claim office receives St. Al's 
billing for services provided t o  Sarah on 9130102. 
10121 I02 - Med Pay unit receives McMillan Medical 
Center billing for 1018102 office visit by Sarah. 
I 
PRU 121 Sarah from ~ c ~ i l l a h  ~ e d i c a l  Center, Ada County 
Emergency Service for the ambulance. Indicates she 
was sent a letter indicating this is a health care 
I I counsel received to  date. Will await attorney I 1 1  I 
1 0035 
PRU 033 
portion of the policy. 
1 1/05/02 - Vicki Kempczenski log note in which she 
reviews entries by Dorothy Quinn and notes that there 
is no letter of representation from the Weinsteins' 
I PRU 631 - 633 1 services on 9 /30 /02  for Sarah. Medical records I 1 1 1  
10036 
representation letter to  find out about treatment. 
1 1/07/02 - Med Pay unit receives St. Al's billing for 
10038 
PRU 815 
10037 
PRU OJ5 - 037 
- 
10039 
PRU 391 
supporting billing are attached, 
1 1 / I  1 /02 - Vicki Kempczenski log note re: 
conversation wlMrs. Weinstein. Mrs. Weinstein was 
stating that she felt Ransom Kaya was at fault 
because he did not have his seatbelt on. Mrs. 
Weinstein said that Sarah was still treating and Vicki 
indicated she would send them a medical authorization 
PRU 122 L 
Insurance setting forth argument that Ransom Kaya 
was traveling too fast for the conditions and failed t o  
1 111 1 I 0 2  - Letter from Vicki Kempczenski t o  the 
parents of Sarah Weinstein requesting medical 
expenseslreports and enclosing a Medical 
Authorization form. 
11/11 I 0 2  - Fax cover sheet from Linda Weinstein t o  
Vicki Kempezenski. (Police report follows in file) 
11/15/02 - Letter from Vicki Kempczenski to  Allied 
maintain control over the vehicle he was driving. 
11/15/02 - Pat Doyle (MP) log note acknowledging 
I 
receipt of St. Al's bill for ~ a r a h  for date of service of 
9/30/02. Because this bill had not been sent t o  the 1 1 1 1  
health carrier first, Mr. Doyle would send a letter t o  
the hospital requesting that to  occur. 
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-* 
10042 
PRU 634 - 636 
10043 
PRU 386 
10044 
W2033, PRU 265 
10045 
PRU 1340, 1338, 
1339 
10046 
PRU 625-626 
10047 
PRU 123-125 
10048 
PRU 126 
10049 
PRU W2035 - 2036 
10050 
PRU 127 
1005 1 
PRU 1336, 1337, 
1342, 1343 
denying [Ransom Kaya] that he was liable for the 
Medical Center billing for 1 I 129102 date of service for 
Sarah Weinstein. 
1211 8/02 - Med Pay office receives McMillan Medical 
Center billina for 1 1 129102 date of service for Sarah. 
01/02/03 - Pat Doyle (MP) log note re: telephone call 
to  Mrs. Weinstein, who advised that she was getting 
threatening phone calls from the ambulance company, 
as well as a phone call from hospital, re: bills not being 
paid. Advised Mrs. Weinstein that letters had been 
sent to  both the ambulance company and the hospital 
indicating that the bills had to be submitted t o  the 
health carrier first, then t o  the Med Pay office if any 
balance was owed. Ms. Doyle advised Mrs. Weinstein 
that i f  any EOBs were contained in  the letter she had 
just received from the health carrier, she could fax 
those to Ms. Doyle for payment. She also advised 
that even i f  there was no payment by the health 
carrier due t o  a deductible, the bills would be taken 
care of under the Med Pay provision of the policy. I 
01 103103 - Pat Doyle (MP) indicates that she received 
the McMillan Medical Center billing for Sarah for 
service on 1 1/29/02. Because no health care EOB 
was attached, she was sending a letter t o  McMillan. 
01/4/03 - Pat Doyle to  McMillan Medical Center re: 
how to  file a claim wi th the health carrier and then 
submit the EOB to  Prudential. 
0111 6/03 - Pat Doyle (MP) log note re: voicemail from 
Star at McMillan Medical Center. She returns the call 
and explains t o  Star how to  submit bills first t o  the 
health insurance company and then any outstanding 
balances t o  Prudential. 
01 121 103 - McMillan Medical Center sends billing for 
1/9/03 date of service for Sarah Weinstein t o  
Scottsdale claims office. 
Defendants' Exhibit List - 4 
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carrier being primary. Ms. Doyle explains that she will 
contact the health carrier if Mrs. Weinstein provides 
her with a name. Also advises Mrs. Weinstein that if 
she was getting any threatening letters t o  let Ms. 
Doyle know and she would address them for her. 
Explained again the process of sending EOBs t o  
attached so sending letter t o  provider. 
10055 01/29/03 - Letter from Pat Doyle (MP) t o  McMillan re: 
I PRU 808 / need t o  send bill to  health carrier first then EOB t o  1 I I I 
10056 
PRU I 3 l  
1 PRU 809 / Sarah Weinstein re: the lack of any  recent medical bills 1 1 1  1 
Prudential. 
0211 2/03 - Pat Doyle (MP) log note re: no bills or 
health care EOBs received. Called Mrs. Weinstein t o  
inquire where the bills/health care EOBs are. Advised 
that Prudential needed a denial from the health carrier 
and it would then review the bills after the EOB was 
10057 
received. No EOBs received as of this date. 
0211 2103 - Letter from Pat Doyle (MP) t o  parents of 
10058 
PRU 132 
10059 
PRU 134 
being presented. 
02/24/03 - Pat Doyle (MP) log note indicating that no 
new medical bills had been received as of that date. 
0311 2 103 - Jennifer Phillips (MP) log note indicating 
the medical payments unit had received a bill from 
McMillan Medical Center for Sarah for an office visit of 
10060 
PRU 136 - ' 38 
12/3/02. No outstanding balance. 
0311 7 /03  - Jennifer Phillips receives call from Mrs. 
Weinstein who sets out various balances after 
payments by  Mid West. Mrs. Weinstein will be faxing 
10061 
/ PRU 139140 1 indicating she received fax from ~ i n d a a n d  escribes I 1 1  1 
several doctor bills t o  Jennifer Phillips. 
0311 7/03 - Fax cover sheet from Linda Weinstein to  
5018 
10062 
her actions to  pay outstanding balances. Refers t o  the 
billing from St. Al's Ambulatory Rehab Services for 
Jennifer Phillips of the Med Pay unit. 
03/25/03 - Log note by Jennifer Phillips (MP) 
Defendants' Exhibit List - 5 
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oncerns she had with the ldaho Emergency 
hysicians and PT services biils and EOBs noted in her 
I25103 log note. Mrs. Weinstein agreed t o  call St. 
Al's ambulatory rehab services and get a ledger o f  
payments that  were her responsibility and forward it 
tearing in the  hip and that  another MRI is planned. 
PRU 038 Weinstein indicating that  he daughter had an MRI 
showing a labial tear in the hip and may need 
arthroscopic surgery. She's having another MRl this 
week. Reserve raised t o  $25,000. 
10068 0511 2 /03  - Vicki Kempczenski log note documenting 
PRU 039 - 040 her call t o  Mrs. Weinstein and learning that  the second 
MRI showed a tear of the cartledge in  Sarah's hip. 
She is scheduled for surgery 5/19/03. Mrs. Weinstein 
indicated Sarah had been unable t o  play soccer since 
the accident, had missed school, the bills were running 
up and that  she would get the information together 
and provide it t o  Ms. Kempczenski. Ms. Kempczenski 
noted that  she would discuss a reserve increase when 
the information f rom Mrs. Weinstein was received. 
10069 05 /21  103 - Statement f rom Del Stewart to  Weinsteins 
W5025 
10070  
W2046 
indicating full payment of $219  bill f rom ldaho 
Emergency Physicians. 
05123103 - Statement f rom Del Stewart t o  the 
Weinsteins indicating that  Prudential was paying t he  
allowed amount o f  Dr. Shea's billings for the off ice 
visits by Sarah Weinstein on  4 /4 /03  and 411 5/03.  
Defendants' Exhibit List - 6 
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Phoenix office. 
Medicine had been received in the amount o f  $538. 
No amount paid by the health carrier and a letter 
outstanding medical bills on her daughter. Ms. 
Stewart explained that the health care primary portion 
of the policy is only for named insureds and not for her 
10076  
PRU 160,159,158 
10077  
W20u 
10078 
W2052 
10079 
PRU O4' - 043 
Defendants' 
daughter. Will n o w  process meds under Med Pay 
coverage. 
07 /31  103 - Med Pay payment log shows 1 0  payments 
on 07 /31  I 0 3  for a total of $3,323.57. 
09 /02 /03  - Statement f rom Del Stewart t o  the 
Weinsteins showing payment of $950.21 for the 
hospital bill for service on 511 9/03.  Statement 
indicates that medical payments coverage benefits 
have been exhausted. 
09 /02 /03  - Statement from Del Stewart t o  the 
Weinsteins indicating that  the diagnostic radiology bill 
for Imaging Center Radiologists was not allowed 
because medical payments coverage benefits had been 
exhausted. 
09 /02 /03  - Vicki Kempczenski log note re: call f rom 
Mrs. Weinstein and her concerns about lack o f  medical 
payments coverage. Mrs. Weinstein asked t o  pay bills 
as they were incurred. Mrs. Weinstein indicated that  
collection agencies were after them and that  their 
credit was ruined. Kempczenski indicated she would 
fax a new  HlPPA med authorization form t o  Mrs. 
Weinstein so she could get the Med Pay file and order 
information f rom doctors. Mrs. Weinstein indicated 
that  she did not  know what  the recovery would be 
regarding Sarah's injuries. Mrs. Weinstein said she 
would fax the  medical authorization back t o  Vicki 
Exhibit List - 7 
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10080  
PRU 286, 285 
1 0 0 8  1 
PRU t 369, 256 
10082 
PRU 045 
10083 
PRU 289 
10084  
PRU 044 
10085 
PRU 257, 001 367, 
001 368,001 366 
10086  
PRU 254 
10087 
PRU 045 
10088 
PRU 252 - 253 
10089 
PRU 814 
10090  
PRU 249 
Authorization for Release of Medical Records. 
received the medical authorization back f rom Mrs. 
Weinstein but  it did not  include a list of current 1 
medical providers. She called and left a message 
asking that  Mrs. Weinstein fax this t o  her. Also notes 
that Ms. Kempczenski faxed the medical authorization I I \ /  
form t o  the medpay representative asking for a copy 
of  the m e d ~ a v  file asaxl. 
0 9  02 /03  - Fax f rom Vicki Kempczenski t o  Del 
- - ! 
Stewart requesting Med Pay file. 
09 /02 /03  - Vici Kempczenski log note re: her review 
of  the facts of the accident in light of Mrs. Weinstein 
saying that  Prudential decided not  t o  go after the party 
that  hit them and that  such party had insurance. 
09/25/03 - Mrs. Weinstein faxes t o  Vicki 
Kempczenski a l ist of medical providers for Sarah 
Weinstein. 
1011 0103 - Letter f rom Bruce Bistline t o  Ms. Carol 
Stice in the Phoenix, AZ office of Prudential. Letter of 
introduction. 
1011 0103 - Vicki Kempczenski log note 
acknowledging that  the Weinsteins had hired an 
attorney. She called the attorney, left  message, and 
indicated she would be sending an acknowledgment 
letter. 
1011 0103 - Bruce Bistline email t o  Carol Stice 
indicating some confusion regarding the different claim 
numbers and asks for some clarification. He also 
mentions that he understands the tortfeasor and the  
car owner are not  insured and wonders i f  that  was 
consistent w i th  her understanding, 
1011 3 /03  - Letter f rom Vicki Kempczenski t o  Bruce 
Bistline acknowledging his representation and 
requesting complete medical and wage loss 
documentation. 
1011 5 /03  - Email f rom Vicki Kempczenski t o  Mr.  
Bistline indicating she is the main adjuster on the case 
1 and that  Mrs. Weinstein had indicated the vehicle 
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I I or any medical reports. A recent letter of I I !  I 
representation had been received and that it had been 
1 I that he does not represent Linda Weinstein, only her I I \  I 
payment of medical bills as presented under the U M  
file. He indicated he would send a letter that includes 
his authority and she said she would review it w i th  her 
bosses when she got it. She reviews the Med Pay 
payments log wi th  him which indicated that Med Pay 
had some of the earlier bills, but, not the later ones. 
He indicated he would gather the medical bills and 
records for her review and she sent him a medical 
10095 
P R U  1360 - 1J65 
10096 
PRU 04* - 050 
I / authorization form so that she could access the I 1 1  1 
10/28/03 - Letter from Bruce Bistline t o  Vicki 
Kempczenski wi th  her handwritten notes. 
1 111 3/03 - Vicki Kempczenski log notes re: 
conversation w/Bruce Bistline in which he requests 
I 816 1 Bistline confirming that he will provide copies of all I / I  / 
10097 
medical expenseslreports, that he would have his 
client sign the enclosed Medical Authorization form for 
the Med Pay file and provide a list of all treating 
medical payments file. 
1 1/03/03 - Letter from Vicki Kempczenski t o  Mr. 
Kippenham about Mr.  Bistline wanting of the medical 
bills paid as they get them under the U M  coverage. 
She will call for a legal opinion. 
Defendants' Exhibit List - 9 
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10098 
PRU 05' 
physicians. 
1 1/05/03 - Vicki Kempczenski log note documenting 
her discussion wi th  Ken Bensinger and Julie 
PRU 052 
10100 
PRU 053 
10101 
PRU 812 
,,,,, PRU 054 
with attorney Lundeen regarding the issue raised by 
wi th  attorney Kent Day indicating that he was 
unaware of anything in Idaho that required payment of  
- 
bills prior to  settlement. Also stated he would be 
happy t o  look at any authority provided by the 
Orthopedic indicating that they had received the bill in  
the amount of $5000 and that the maximum policy 
limits for medical expenses was $1000, which had 
been exhausted. 
1 1 /I 8/03 - Martha McLaughlin log note re: mandatory 
Mandatory QR Review. She notes that the file was 
properly directed with an ongoing investigation into 
attorney allegations to  pay meds prior to  U M  
101 03 
PRU 147 
I 
. . / that he would secure a copy of the medical records I 1 1  1 
101 04 
PRU 796 
101 05 
pRU 239 - 241 
settlement. Case is properly reserved. 
1 1 11 8/03 - Del Stewart log note. Received call f rom 
Foothills PT, explained t o  same benefits were 
exhausted and that a letter would be forthcoming. 
1 1 1 1  8/03 - Letter from Del Stewart to  Linda 
Weinstein with a cc t o  Foothills PT indicating the bill 
of  $71 5 for services provided between 9/2/03 and 
1011 /03 cannot be paid because the $5000 limit for 
medical expenses are exhausted. 
1 1 1 1  9/03 - Letter from Bruce Bistline to Vicki 
Kempczenski returning the medical authorization form 
for the Prudential medical payment unit and indicating 
I 
101 06 
PRU 054 
and provide them t o  Ms. Kempczenski. 
1 1 /20/03 - Vicki Kempczenski log note indicating she 
received Mr. Bistline's fax wlmedical authorization t o  
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i 101 07 
PRU 
101 08 
101 09 
PRU 055 
get the Med Pay file. 
1 1/20/03 - Letter from Vicki Kem~czenski to Del 
Stewart requesting Med Pay file. 
1 1/24/03 - Statement from Del Stewart to  the 
Weinsteins indicating that the $71 5 from Foothills PT 
could not be paid. 
12/03/03 - Vicki Kempczenski log note detailing her 
conversation wi th  Nationwide adjuster. 
- \J 
1 
the medpay log. She called "Kathy" back and left a 
message with the Med Pay office information and 
including update by Dr. Shea from a 12/09/03 office 
101 19 06/07/04 - Vicki Zempczenski log note indicating she 
PRU 057 received a letter from attorney's office on 05/24/04 
and that they are still working on getting the updated 
records/bills. Sent file to Ken Bensinger for transition. 
101 20 06/07/04 - Vicki Kempczenski log note indicating she 
PRU 058 discussed Sarah Weinstein's claim with Ken and due 
to her hip surgery and ongoing complaints with long 
I ( walking/running, they were increasing the reserve to 1 
$7 5,000. 
101 21 Ken Bensinger's log note approves the increase to the 
PRU 057 reserve to $75,000. 
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PRU - 067 case w i th  Julie Kippenhan and Ken Bensinger. During / that discussion, they agreed that she would send a I 1 1 1  
letter t o  Mr .  Bistline outlining the company's position 
that the UM driver appeared to  1 0 0 %  liable for the  I 1 1  
loss and wil l  advise that defense counsel had stated 
they were not obligated t o  pay bills that  were incurred. 
Will also state that  offering a payment in advance in 
the amount of $10,000 for out-of-pocket expenses, 1 1 1 1  
I I because Mr. Bistline was claiming there was a 1 / / I  
financial hardship. Also discussed having records 
reviewed in the medical file especially since Sarah's 
I ( physical activities might have aggravated the injury. I 
They also discussed the reserve and Dorothy 
suggested increasing it t o  $150,000. She was 
101  28 
PRU 818, 819, 232 
advised it would require referral t o  the home office. 
0611 1 104 - Letter f rom Dorothy Quinn t o  Bruce 
Bistline attaching a Payment in Advance of Future 
Injury Settlement document setting for th an offer t o  
101 2 9  
PRU 068 
/ had received a letter from the Weinsteins' attorney 1 1 1  I 
advance $1  0,000. 
06 /21  I 0 4  - Dorothy Quinn log note re: awaiting 
resoonse from attornev to  PIA. 
101  3 0  
PRU 1891 l g O  
1 0  1 3 1 
PRU 069 - 070 
07 /07 /04  - Letter f rom Bruce Bistline t o  Dorothy 
Quinn indicating his clients rejected the $1 0,000 
payment in  advance and had filed suit. (Copy o f  
complaint and initial discovery requests omitted.) 
0711 2 /04  - Dorothy Quinn log note indicating the 
referral for reserve increase had not yet been 
completed due to  being out of the office and that  she 
pRu 071 - 072 1 Weinstein reserves were at $75,000. i-k 
101 3 2  
Defendants' Exhibit List - 1 2  
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indicating he had filed suit. 
0711 3 / 0 4  - Dorothy Quinn entry indicating Sarah 
101 33 
PRU 583, 594 
08124104 - Prudential check loss form showing I 
of 2 bills in  collection and a diary date o f  
Cantrill forwarding 2 pages of medical records f rom 
Dr. Shears examination on 611 5104 and the YMCA 
0911 0104 - Bruce Bistline's office t o  Tony Cantrill Re 
West 
Ada County Paramedics 
t 
ldaho Emergency Physicians 
Gem State Radiology 
St. Als RMC 
Fred Meyer Pharmacy I I l l  
McMillan Medical Center 
St. Als RMC Rehabilitation (STAARS) I I l l  I I I 
lntermountain Medical lmaging I I 
lntermountain Orthopaedics (Dr. Shea) 
lmaging Center Radiologist 
MRI Center o f  ldaho 
ldaho Sports Medicine 
Defendants' Exhibit List - 1 3  
Weinstein v. Prudential, et  al. 
I 
St. Luke's Elks Rehabilitation PT 
Foothills PT 
Anesthesia Associates 
I I 
I I 101 53 St. Luke's RMC 
1 3 1 54 Withdrawn (IDX Pathology) 
101 55 Dr. Bates 
156 04/20/04 - 0611 5/04 - 09/10/04 Bruce Bistline 
spreadsheets 
1 b157 Spreadsheet with addition errors 
101 58 Bruce Bistline check t o  Mid West 
101 59 Billed payments and outstanding balances as of 
0611 1 /04 &, 1 ' 
101 60 Weinstein Treatment and Claim History 
1 0 1 6 1 Withdrawn 
I I I I 1-1 
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I 
162 
1 d l  63 
101 
101 
101 
Withdrawn 
Billed Payments and outstanding Balances at 09/30/03 
Weinstein Lien by Intermountain Orthopaedics and 
payment receipt 
1 
10 
1 
- 
- 1 
C1164 
1 65 
67 
68 
69 
166 
Mid West File 
Med Pay File 
Time Line and payment history of Prudential, 
Weinsteins, and Mid West 
Dr. Shea's chart note of 06/25/07 
Bill from lntermountain Orthopaedics (Dr. Shea) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTOF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
LESLIE WEINSTEIN, and LINDA WEINSTEIN, 
husband and wife, individually and as guardians ad litem 
for SARAH R. WEINSTEIN, and SARAH R. 
WEINSTEIN individually, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross Appellants, 
VS. 
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 
INSURANCE COMPANY and PRUDENTIAL 
GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY and LIBERTY 
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and LM 
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE, 
Defendants-Appellants-Cross Respondents. 
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